Two reports on the indispensible Abdul Raziq

U.S. Lt. Col. William Clark, second from left, talks with Gen. Abdul Razik, the border police commander for southern Afghanistan, during a joint patrol along the border with Pakistan, on the outskirts of Spin Boldak, Afghanistan, Friday, Aug. 7, 2009. (AP Photo/Emilio Morenatti)

I'll start with the December 27, 2010 Canadian Press/AP report because it's a good introduction to Raziq (also spelled Razziq and Razik) and because it contains this declaration:

"What is little understood about the Afghan war is that the Taliban are largely supported by the powerful Noorzai tribe ..."

Darn tootin it's little understood. But golly gee isn't it nice someone got around to letting us know? After all these years?

Sigh.

NATO bullish, Canadians wary of Afghan warlord Raziq
by Murray Brewster
Associated Press/The Canadian Press via Nato World News
Monday December 27, 2010 12:22 PM ET

KANDAHAR, Afghanistan — He reportedly makes no apologies for killing his "enemies" on sight and has been instrumental in NATO's attempt this fall to pacify Kandahar one brutal step at a time.

There are those in Afghanistan who have labelled Col. Abdul Raziq a "butcher" in the past, and some have accused him of profiting from the burgeoning illegal drug trade.

Yet others in the provincial government and western armies hail him as a hero who is helping to bring stability to a troubled land, with a series of lightning-style raids deep in Taliban enclaves.

There is no doubt the prominent Achakzai border police commander's influence has been significant in wrestling key pieces of the province away from insurgent influence.

It began with a raid in Mehlajat, on the outskirts of the provincial capital last summer, but Raziq's operations have taken on a life of their own.

He has been all over the war-wasted province this fall to the enthusiastic applause of American commanders who regard him as "tremendously respected among the Afghans" and "a great partner" for NATO.

Knowing his history, Canadian officers are more circumspect.

"He's been extremely effective," Brig.-Gen. Dean Milner, the commander of Canadian troops, said in a recent interview. "I think you always have a few concerns because he's had some challenges in the past."

Over the last five weeks, The Canadian Press has conducted dozens of interviews with Afghan officials, ordinary citizens and military commanders about this shadowy proxy war within the war.

The raids conducted by Raziq and up to 400 hand-picked fighters, alongside U.S. Special Forces soldiers, are playing with ethnic fire, according to some Afghan officials, who -- despite giving the raids their approval -- worry about the potential fallout.

The attacks fuel suspicion and threaten to reignite the hatred that four years ago layered a bloody tribal war on top of an already violent insurgency in western Kandahar.

Since the raid into Mehjalat in late August, Raziq's militia has acted as a roving disruption force for NATO, striking at hardened Taliban redoubts such as Zangabad, Bandi Taimoor in far-flung Maiwand district and pockets of Arghandab district.

There is little warning, even for allies.

Canadian ground commanders in Panjwaii had no idea he was coming into their sector in October until his convoy of heavily armed fighters "tripped one of the spike belts" along a newly constructed east-west road in the district, according to a senior military source.

Raziq's mission was to hunt down and kill senior Taliban commanders as well as known bomb-making cells. He went in ahead of American and later Canadian troops in the Horn of Panjwaii.

A farm owner in Zangabad, Haji Noor Muhammad, said the militia force gunned down an insurgent who wasn't from the area.

"He was an Afghan from another province," Muhammad said in an interview, with the help of an interpreter. "As long as he doesn't kill anybody from Zangabad there is no problem."

Fear that Raziq's operations could rekindle a tribal war between Raziq's Achakzai militia and the Noorzai, the dominant tribe in southern Afghanistan, are never far from the surface.

"It depends on the activities (of) Mr. Raziq," said Haji Agha Lalai, who ran a re-integration for Taliban fighters in Kandahar city.

"If he acts positively then the war will not start between (tribes). If he uses harsh words and shows that he's targetting (Noorzai) instead of anti-government forces, then it will start again."

Canadians have watched the developments with an uneasy eye.

Many of them remember all too well the late summer of 2006, when frustrated provincial council members gave Raziq the green light to lead his Achakzai militia into Panjwaii to counter a growing buildup of Taliban fighters. That was before Operation Medusa routed up to 1,000 insurgent fighters.

What is little understood about the Afghan war is that the Taliban are largely supported by the powerful Noorzai tribe, rivals to the Achakzai.

The hatred runs deep because, during the reign of the Taliban, the Achakzai were slaughtered and many fled to Pakistan until the U.S. ousted the hard-line Islamist movement in 2001.

Raziq's father was killed, while his uncle was hanged from the barrel of a Taliban tank, according to a Kandahar provincial councillor.

As he led his militia into Panjwaii in 2006, the then 28-year-old was believed to have a score to settle and word spread among the rival tribesmen that Raziq was out for Noorzai blood. His raid turned in to a fiasco, with dozens killed, when the force was ambushed at the district centre outside of Bazaar-e-Panjwaii.

"This was a bad idea to bring in Abdul Raziq," Haji Qassum, a provincial council member, told the Globe and Mail in 2006. "One village had 10 or 20 fighters against the government, and the next day maybe 200."

Today, district officials like Panjwaii governor Haji Baran sing a different tune.

"Raziq is my brother," said Baran, an elder of Noorzai blood. "Concern about him is only what we see in the media."

After the 2006 gunfight in Bazaar-e-Panjwaii, the Canadians were happy to see Raziq retreat to the border region, where he was given the title of border police commander and largely left alone to grow wealthy, thanks to his control of the porous Spin Boldak crossing.

His rehabilitation as a military commander began in 2009 when the U.S. 5th Stryker Brigade took over the Canadian forward operating base in the district. American Lt.-Col. William Clark, commander of the brigade's 8th Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment, cultivated a friendship with Raziq.

But it wasn't until the murder of a police chief in Daman district last summer that Razik was fully unleashed on the Taliban.

The New York Times reported that a furious Ahmed Wali Karzai complained to his brother, Afghan president Hamid Karzai, who in turned invested provincial governor Tooryalai Wesa with the powers of a commander-in-chief.

They turned to Raziq to lead a 1,700-man force in Mehlajat.

Milner said it's understood by everyone that the militia leader is a polarizing figure among Kandaharis.

"He understands, he can only do so much, but the bottom line is the people are very supportive of his actions," said Milner.

Milner said people have to be careful about how much they make use of Raziq. "I think Gov. Wesa understands that. You can lean on him only so much."

That may be an understatement.

When asked what sort of rules of engagement apply to Raziq, NATO officials responded that he fights the Afghan way. Even a generous interpretation of that means there are few restrictions on what he and his men can shoot at.

There is also a political embarrassment in the making.

Training competent Afghan security forces is supposed to be the alliance's primary goal, yet the provincial administration is compelled to turn to a militia leader to carry out its counter-terrorism operations.

Now on to The Washington Post; the following photo and maps are taken from their report. These quotes from the report reached out and grabbed me:

To reduce opportunities for graft, the U.S. and Canadian governments are spending $20 million to build a new customs facility that is separate from the border police station. They eventually hope to have truckers pay duties electronically, a tall order in a nation where inspections still are conducted by jabbing a wooden stick into the cargo compartment.

"How are you?" [Razziq] said to every shopkeeper as he reached over to hug them. "Do you need any help?"


Washington Post, October 4, 2010

Afghan colonel vital to U.S. despite graft allegations
By Rajiv Chandrasekaran
Washington Post Staff Writer

IN SPIN BOLDAK, AFGHANISTAN When Abdul Razziq, a colonel in the Afghan Border Police, walks through the chockablock bazaar in this sand-swept trading hub on the frontier with Pakistan, he is mobbed by a crowd that deferentially addresses him as General Razziq. Young boys want his photograph. Gray-bearded men offer him tea. Merchants refuse to sell him anything - if he wants a bottle of cologne, he gets it for free.

U.S. officials say Razziq, who is illiterate and just 32, presides over a vast corruption network that skims customs duties, facilitates drug trafficking and smuggles other contraband. But, he also has managed to achieve a degree of security here that has eluded U.S. troops elsewhere in the country: His force of 3,000 uniformed policemen and several thousand militiamen pursue the Taliban so relentlessly that Spin Boldak has become the safest and most prosperous district in southern Afghanistan.

Despite the allegations of graft, which he denies, Razziq represents the Obama administration's best hope for maintaining stability in this important part of Afghanistan. Keeping Spin Boldak quiet, which allows more U.S. and Afghan forces to be employed elsewhere, is critical to fulfilling the president's pledge to begin withdrawing U.S. troops next summer.

"Is it a long-term solution? That's for others to decide," said the top NATO commander in the south, British Maj. Gen. Nick Carter. "But it is a pragmatic solution. . .He's Afghan good-enough."

Meanwhile, U.S. and NATO officials have begun an ambitious plan to reform Razziq, hoping they can turn him into a more savory strongman. They are attempting to chaperone him, to offer incentives aimed at improving his behavior, and to set down new rules to compel him to put less money in his own pocket and more in the national treasury.

"We're trying to promote integrity by watching his operations a whole lot more closely, but we don't want him to stop doing all of the good things that he's doing," said U.S. Army Special Forces Col. Robert Waltemeyer, who runs a border coordination center here with representatives of the Afghan and Pakistan security forces. "We want to capitalize on his leadership."

The question of what to do about Razziq has vexed U.S. and NATO officials. Some have advocated for his ouster to demonstrate a hard line against graft, while others have argued that he be left alone because his force, which is more than five times the size of the U.S. military presence here, provides vital security for NATO supply convoys heading into Kandahar.

"If we didn't have him, we'd be screwed," a U.S. Army officer said during a visit here in August. "It wouldn't be this quiet."

Razziq, a lanky man with a close-cropped beard, is the chief of the Achakzais, one of the two principal tribes in this part of southern Afghanistan. His position as local strongman could have sparked the kind of conflict over power and resources that has driven people in other places to ally themselves with the Taliban. But thus far, Razziq has managed to spread the spoils deftly to avoid an open rebellion by the rival Noorzai tribe.

"He's like this Robin Hood figure who appears from nowhere, takes money and uses it to meet [the people's] needs," said Lt. Col. Andrew Green, the commander of a U.S. Army infantry battalion in Spin Boldak. "He picks favorites, for sure, but he's smart enough not to make too many enemies, which isn't something you can say about every power broker in Afghanistan."

Razziq has begun to extend his influence west toward Kandahar, the country's second-largest city and the site of major U.S. military operations against the Taliban. Dozens of his men have participated in Afghan-led operations in recent weeks to flush the insurgents out of sanctuaries to the north and south of the city. One Afghan official said that Razziq's force is prized by the government because its well-paid members fight more ably than most Afghan soldiers.

Razziq and his men also are valued because he is fiercely loyal to President Hamid Karzai and his half-brother, Ahmed Wali Karzai, the chairman of the Kandahar province council. Razziq owes his job and control over the border crossing to the president, and several U.S. officials said he repays that debt by funneling proceeds from corrupt activities to people linked to the Karzai brothers.

The officials also said they have credible reports that Razziq countenanced widespread fraud in support of the Karzais in last year's presidential election and last month's parliamentary election. Several boxes stuffed with identically marked ballots for President Karzai were stored in his house overnight for what he deemed "safekeeping."

"Razziq is the poster child for all that is wrong with Afghanistan's government," said a civilian adviser working for the U.S. government in Afghanistan who opposes working with him. "He's a militia leader who denies people the right to vote. What sort of message are we sending by keeping him in power?"

Stabilizing force

That concern prompted senior officials at the NATO military headquarters in Kabul to call for Razziq's removal late last year as the first step in the overall campaign to improve the quality of government in Kandahar and surrounding areas.

The commanders in Kandahar pushed back, citing Razziq's cooperation with international forces and his willingness to conduct independent operations against the Taliban, which few Afghan units are able or willing to do. "If we pulled him out of there, our control of the border would have collapsed," said a senior U.S. official who advocated for Razziq.

Ultimately, it was the need to ensure that trucks bearing military equipment could travel to Kandahar unimpeded that led then-Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the former top U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan, to decide that Razziq could stay. The general traveled to Spin Boldak twice to meet with the self-proclaimed general and deliver a mixed message: You need to help us, and you need to reform.

U.S. officials then told Razziq not to interfere in the customs process. Duties and other fees would have to be collected by authorized personnel, not his men. He also was warned to keep his force operating within the border police's mandate, which allows independent operations along the frontier but not into other parts of the country.

To reduce opportunities for graft, the U.S. and Canadian governments are spending $20 million to build a new customs facility that is separate from the border police station. They eventually hope to have truckers pay duties electronically, a tall order in a nation where inspections still are conducted by jabbing a wooden stick into the cargo compartment.

In an interview at the main U.S. base here, Razziq insisted he is not corrupt and denounced allegations of malfeasance as "just rumors."

"I don't need money," he said. "I have everything I need. Everyone likes me and respects me."

Confronting 'enigma'

The centerpiece of the new American approach has been an attempt to watch over him by assigning him a mentor. After concluding that the previous U.S. battalion commander in Spin Boldak had grown too close to Razziq, senior American officials sent in Waltemeyer. His goal, which he spelled out in a memo to his superiors, was to "redirect [Razziq's] energies from day-to-day influence at the. . .border crossing point" to more traditional law-enforcement activities.

As Razziq walked through the main market in Spin Boldak on a recent morning, there was little indication that his sway has been attenuated. A throng of well-wishers and supplicants gathered around him as he walked from stall to stall.

"How are you?" he said to every shopkeeper as he reached over to hug them. "Do you need any help?"

One man complained about the erratic supply of electricity. Another asked about the construction of a new school. Several merchants thrust business cards in his hand, imploring him to find jobs for their relatives.

"He is responsible for everything good here," said Mohammed Qasim, a television vendor.

As the merchants spilled out of their shops to greet Razziq, one asked another to keep watch on his wares. "Don't worry,'' Razziq said. "The thieves do not dare steal in front of me."

An aide followed behind with a phone glued to his ear. He said Razziq has seven mobile phones, one of which is a dedicated line for top officials from Kabul and Kandahar.

"You can see the enigma he presents," Waltemeyer said.

Razziq scoffed at U.S. attempts to confine him to security patrolling along the border. "My duties are universal," he said.

Some U.S. officials said Razziq has been emboldened by a lack of coordination among international troops. U.S. Special Operations Forces have encouraged him to conduct the very sorts of combat missions that other officers have told him to avoid, the officials said. "Our messages to him are not consistent," the U.S. Army officer here said.

Because Razziq's speed-dial includes everyone from Karzai to senior U.S. officers, he has not been timid about trying to change the terms of his relationship with his foreign partners. After repeated requests to work with someone other than Waltemeyer - Razziq wanted a "partner" with more forces at his disposal, not a "mentor" - commanders in southern Afghanistan recently assigned the task to a U.S. Army colonel who has more soldiers. But that colonel also has less time to watch over him than his previous minder.

With security a non-issue in Spin Boldak, U.S. and NATO officers seem willing to forgo some of the supervision they once envisioned. "As long as we don't catch him moving trucks full of opium through the desert, we'll let him slide," the Army officer said. "If his men are shaking people down on the highway, well, that's just the way it's done here. It's no different from toll booths on the highways back home."

Afghanistan's rivers, their regional strategic importance

Published on the Afghanistan Embassy's website

Afghanistan’s Rivers


Surface water is a key resource for a country with an agriculture-based economy. Afghanistan has four major river systems with substantial hydroelectric and irrigation potential.

The legendary Amu Darya (2400 km; "darya" means "river" in Dari), known as the Oxus in ancient times, runs through the northern plains. It is a navigable river, with tributaries originating in the Pamir Knot glaciers. It once fed the Aral Sea, but now often runs dry in its lower reaches due to excessive irrigation under Soviet administration .

The Kabul River (700 km), a major tributary of the Indus River, traverses the capital and crosses the eastern border into Pakistan. A water treaty assuring Pakistan a share of the Kabul's volume is currently being drafted, prior to the construction of a dam on Afghanistan's side of the border.

The capital's 2.3 million inhabitants depend on Kabul River for water. It ran dry during the recent five-year drought. Thanks to strong rains, it returned in 2003, heralding cleaner water and more electricity for an ever-growing population.

The Helmand River (1,150 km), fed by streams from the Hindu Kush, flows south and southeast into Iran. It drains 160,000 square km, and is used extensively for agriculture. Iran and Afghanistan are presently reviewing a water-sharing treaty, as the river is much needed for irrigation by both countries.

Finally, in northwest Afghanistan, the Hari Rud (1,130 km; "rud" means "river" in Farsi) irrigates the fertile Herat Valley, historically renowned for dense cultivation.

Drought has been frequent in Central and South Asia, so demand for water is high. Afghanistan shares its river systems with neighbouring, lower riparian countries Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Pakistan and Iran. Thus, irrigation and hydroelectric projects inside Afghanistan may affect the flow of water to those countries. Water sharing treaties, such as those being negotiated with Iran and Pakistan, aim to ensure a fair distribution of this precious resource to the region.

Four options

August 1, 2010, Guardian:

Afghanistan: which way now?
As the British and US governments ponder their next move, the Observer's foreign affairs editor Peter Beaumont examines the four most likely scenarios

Peter Beaumont
The Observer

Basra Option
During the latter period of the British occupation of the Iraqi city of Basra, two questions emerged: whether the high profile of British troops actually provided a target and made the violence worse? And whether the escalating conflict in that area was a direct result of primarily military efforts to bring security to it?

Soldiers in Afghanistan have raised these questions too. They have noted that, the more they go out on operations, the more they are hit; and how, with each escalation on the side of the US and ISAF, far from dampening the conflict, it has been exacerbated.

So will a reduction, perhaps to the point of withdrawal, lead to less violence? Of all the ideas bubbling around potential alternative strategies for Afghanistan, this is the most radical – the antithesis of the present counter-insurgency strategy, designed by the new US commanding officer General David Petraeus with his predecessor, Stanley McChrystal. The latter strategy, criticised by some both inside and outside the military, has been based on increasing the number of soldiers on the ground in the short term to improve security in the hope that political benefits will follow.

What would it look like?

A reverse of the surge ordered by Barack Obama, it would see troops increasingly concentrated in large civilian centres and bases, a policy tried by the British, leading to a gradual withdrawal.


How would it work?

Its proponents, few as there are, have suggested that by putting the Afghan government and forces on the spot, it might create the opportunity for an Afghan solution to an Afghan problem, avoiding all the collateral political issues created by foreign forces supporting Hamid Karzai's government.

It argues, too, that it is the presence of foreign forces that is the catalyst both for a conflict that has succeeded in presenting itself, like the war against the Soviets, as an anti-occupation struggle, as well as standing in the way of inter-ethnic reconciliation.


What are the objections?

As a military strategy, it is based on something of a paradox. Conventional thinking focuses on the control of operational space. By withdrawing, it would potentially hand that space to the Taliban. Then there is the al-Qaida question. Conventional wisdom has it that such a strategy would allow al-Qaida to return and establish new bases, although some have argued that the Taliban of 2010 is not the Taliban of the late 90s and might not be inclined to replicate a relationship that led to its first downfall.

Equally problematic is precisely what Afghanistan's neighbours – Pakistan among them – might do, confronted with such a potential vacuum.

The covert war option
Several variations of this option have popped up in the past few weeks, chief among their proponents Jack Devine, former CIA deputy director of operations, who was also head of the covert Afghan Task Force during the Soviet occupation. Another supporter is David Rieff, an international affairs analyst, writer and member of the Council on Foreign Relations.

Devine, pictured, agrees with some of the thinking behind the Basra option: that the "large and visible occupying army" in Afghanistan is the wrong force in the wrong place. "Our presence in Afghanistan," he argued recently, "is better left unseen. Most Afghans, even those willing to deal with us, would rather we get our military out of their country. A covert action program would address this concern. It would also cost less than a military effort in treasure and lives, and allow the US to continue to protect its interests and the interests of the Afghans."

Rieff echoes some of Devine's concerns, arguing – in an article for the New Republic – that he would rather see much less fighting in Afghanistan and more drone strikes in Pakistan, and intelligence missions on home soil against potential terrorist threats.


What would it look like?

In some respects, it would look like other theatres of what used to be known as the "war on terror", where drone and missile strikes have been used to target wanted suspects. Devine's model is the CIA's covert actions of the 80s and 2001, when its officials rebuilt their networks among tribal leaders to help topple the Taliban.


What are the objections?

Well, the CIA's covert interventions in the 80s hardly left a stable Afghanistan. And a strategy that concentrates on cross-border drone raids is deeply problematic, both because of the unpopularity of the attacks in Pakistan and because the intelligence has not prevented large numbers of civilian casualties.


The save the north option

Unlike the Basra option, this strategy has more visible support, most recently from Robert Blackwill, a former deputy national security adviser to George Bush and former US ambassador to India. Blackwill is among the growing group challenging the present counter-insurgency strategy which, he said in a comment piece for the FT earlier this month, is "likely to fail".

A policy that could also be called "give the Taliban the south", it is pessimistic, arguing that on the ever-shortening political timeline for finding a successful outcome in Afghanistan, it will be impossible to sufficiently weaken the Taliban to get them to the negotiating table.

Another prominent champion of a similar-looking plan is the Pakistani author and journalist Ahmed Rashid, who has suggested reconfiguring the mission in Afghanistan to easier objectives: providing security for large numbers of Afghans in the province around Kabul, where the Taliban is weak and support for the government is strong.

How would it work?

This strategy would see coalition forces abandon the south to the Taliban to prevent the west and north of the country falling to them, too. It would require a long-term military commitment of perhaps tens of thousands of troops. Its aim would be to prevent the further spread of the Taliban while concentrating on the twin tasks of strengthening a weak central government and potentially laying down the ground for future negotiations with the Taliban which – as Rashid argues – would have the south as a future bargaining chip in any political settlement.


What are the objections?

It risks opening up not only the issue of partition but the even more dangerous question of whether there should be a Pashtun homeland – Pashtunistan. When it is discussed, the issue of the Pashtuns living on the other side of the border in Pakistan is invoked.


The steady as she goes option
Given the inherent problems in the other strategies, you might think this was the least problematic. The recent revelations from the WikiLeaks document dump of the faltering progress of the war confirm the futility of just soldiering on.

The counter-insurgency strategy has become increasingly unpopular with soldiers on the ground and its lack of quick successes have led to criticism. Most problematic is that it now has a use-by date, when troops will begin, at least partially, to withdraw.

The relative failure of operations linked to the surge to improve security for more than short periods of time, and at high cost, suggests that a strategy that envisages a similar operation for the Taliban heartland of Kandahar may be fraught with difficulties.


What does it look like?

All too familiar, is the answer. Expect more large-scale operations. An increasing emphasis, too, will be put on training the Afghan security forces, in the hope that they'll take over in around four years' time.

What are the objections?

With June the worst month for coalition casualties since 2001, the evidence remains questionable that the Taliban is being substantially weakened or that ISAF operations have succeeded in improving security in the south and east.

The new emphasis on training – as a US report revealed last month – comes after billions of dollars have been spent. Nonetheless, little headway has been made in creating an army and police force capable of taking on the Taliban.

Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan: Background reports

A trio of reports from Asia Times:

Helmand's poppy growth surges

Trail of Afghanistan's drug money exposed

Heroin lab menace grows in Afghanistan

Fairy Tale

What follows is a limited but remarkably frank assessment of the failures of U.S. (and international) aid to Pakistan's school system. The remarks, by a fellow at Heritage Foundation, were part of testimony given to a congressional committee. What is most striking about the remarks is their conclusion: after decades of very clear evidence that the aid approach had not worked the recommendation was for -- more aid.

U.S. Aid to Pakistan: Countering Extremism Through Education ReformPublished on June 8, 2007 by Lisa Curtis Lecture #1029

Delivered May 9, 2007

A strong and effective education system in Pakistan will help to ensure that the country steers toward a path of stability, moderation, and prosperity in the years to come, and should therefore be a top priority for Washington in its relations with Islamabad. Lack of adequate education opportunities in Pakistan has contributed to the development of extremist ideologies that have fueled terrorism and sectarian tensions as well as stifled economic growth. Fostering development and reform of the public education system will not only contribute to Pakistani economic prosperity and social tolerance, it will help improve the image of the United States by demonstrating American interest in the human development of average Pakistani citizens.

Today I will focus my remarks on the strengths and weaknesses of current U.S. assistance programs to Pakistan's education sector, as well as the role of the madrassa (Islamic religious school) in contributing to militancy in Pakistan over the last decade.

Pakistan's Failing Education Sector

Pakistan's public education system has suffered from neglect and politicization over the last 30 years. The overall adult literacy rate for the population above the age of 15 is about 43.5 percent, while the rates for Sri Lanka and India are 92 percent and 61 percent, respectively. Female literacy rates in Pakistan are abysmal, standing at about 32 percent. Barely 10 percent of children complete 12 years of schooling. With a population growth rate well over 2 percent, Pakistan is set to add another 100 million people to its current population of 160 million over the next 25 years. About half of this population will be under the age of 18. These demographic trends demand that Pakistan implement significant reforms to its education system and raise literacy rates and skill levels so that these young people can play a productive role in the future economy.

The World Bank and a number of donor agencies spent billions of dollars on a "Social Action Program" for Pakistan during the late 1980s through the 1990s. After a decade, the program failed to achieve basic objectives such as increasing school enrollment rates at the primary level and bringing education to remote parts of the country. The program failed because it did not address problems such as corruption and inefficiency within the Pakistani education bureaucracy. The World Bank's experience should serve as a cautionary tale to the U.S. and other international donors by demonstrating that merely throwing resources at the education sector is unlikely to bring positive results, and that convincing the Pakistani government to reform its own institutions is a necessary part of the process.

U.S. Education Assistance to Pakistan: Targeting Critical Areas

U.S. assistance to primary education and literacy in Pakistan has more than doubled--from $28 million in fiscal year 2004 to $66 million in fiscal year 2005. The impact of the findings of the 9/11 Commission report issued in July 2004 on the importance of educational opportunity in the Middle East and South Asia to uprooting terrorist ideology, and increased congressional oversight of U.S. aid programs to Pakistan contributed to the increase in education spending. The Fiscal Year 2008 State Department Congressional Budget Request includes $52 million for general education programs and an additional $50 million for earthquake reconstruction of schools and health facilities. The 2007 Emergency Supplemental Budget Request calls for another $110 million to develop Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), including the education sector. Through a program started in 2003, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) already is constructing and furnishing 65 primary, middle, and high schools in five agencies of the FATA. The Japanese government is partnering with the U.S. government on this project and constructing an additional 65 schools in the Tribal Areas.

USAID's education program in Pakistan provides training, technical assistance, and infrastructure for government officials, citizens, and the private sector to deliver high-quality education throughout the country. The program is currently focusing on selected impoverished districts in the Sindh and Baluchistan provinces in addition to the FATA. The Basic Education Program benefits over 367,000 Pakistani children and USAID has so far trained over 16,000 Pakistani teachers and administrators. USAID also provides funding for needs-based scholarships for higher education and grants for Fulbright scholarships for post-graduate degrees in the U.S.

USAID education programs also focus on empowering the local community by fostering partnerships between parents and teachers that improve accountability for the children's education. I had the opportunity to visit a USAID-funded girls' school on the outskirts of Islamabad in late 2005. Through a grant of only $1,500, USAID inspired the people of this community to establish a Parent-Teacher Association and to build a library for the school that serves over 500 students.

While this kind of outreach at the grassroots level is necessary, Washington also needs to encourage the Pakistani government to follow through on its own reforms. The government of President Pervez Musharraf launched its Education Sector Reforms (ESR) in January 2002, but has been unwilling to commit substantial resources to reforming the education sector. For example, the government has yet to follow through on its commitment to raise the education budget to 4 percent of GDP in line with United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization recommendations.

One of the major problems with Pakistan's public education sector has been the endemic corruption within the system, which has led to the phenomenon of "ghost schools," i.e. teachers not showing up to teach classes but only to collect their paychecks. The U.S. can help by supporting teacher training programs and encouraging greater accountability through community involvement, but the Pakistani government will have to do its part to limit corruption and inefficiency within the system.

Role of the Madrassa in Islamic Militancy in Pakistan

The role of the madrassa in Pakistan and its contribution to Islamic militancy has been the subject of intense debate in U.S. academic and policy circles. Observers have been unable to agree on the actual numbers of madrassas and madrassa students in Pakistan, and some studies reveal that the international media has exaggerated these figures during the last few years. A World Bank study from 2005, for example, says Pakistani madrassas account for less than 1 percent of total academic enrollment in the country. In April 2002, Dr. Mahmood Ahmed Ghazi, the former Pakistani Minister of Religious Affairs, put the number of madrassas at about 10,000, with 1.7 million students.

While most madrassas in Pakistan are not churning out terrorist foot soldiers, there are a handful of religious seminaries that promote anti-West, pan-Islamic, and violent ideologies. Many of the older madrassas have well-established reputations for producing serious Islamic thinkers, while others provide welfare services to the poor through free religious education, lodging, and food. A madrassa student learns how to read, memorize, and recite the Quran, and those with advanced theological training become Ulema (religious scholars). Each of the different schools of Islamic thought in Pakistan, including the Sunni Deobandis, Barelvis, Ahle-Hadith (Salafi), and Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) as well as the Shiia, runs its own seminaries.

From a counterterrorism perspective, U.S. policymakers should focus their attention on the handful of madrassas in Pakistan that have well-established links to terrorism. These madrassas are likely well known to the Pakistani authorities and increasingly to U.S. intelligence and policy officials, and deserve special focus in our counterterrorism policies. The Darul Uloom Haqqania located near Peshawar in the Northwest Frontier Province, for example, served as training ground for Taliban leaders and a recruiting center for Pakistani militants fighting in Kashmir.

Other madrassas connected to violent militancy are located in the southern port city of Karachi as well as in the province of Punjab and have also contributed to sectarian tensions in the country. The banned Kashmiri militant organization Jaish-e-Muhammad (JEM, or "Army of the Prophet") and Sunni sectarian organization Sepah-e-Sahaba (SSP, or "Army of Companions of the Prophet") are headquartered in southern Punjab. These organizations have close institutional links with the Taliban and have been involved in terrorism against Indian and Western targets, including the murder of Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl in 2002; the hijacking of an Indian Airlines flight that landed in Kandahar, Afghanistan, in December 1999; and the kidnapping and murder of five Western hostages, including American citizen Donald Hutchings, in 1995.

These madrassas and associated militant groups have an interdependent relationship in which the militant groups provide armed backing for the madrassas, and the madrassas in turn provide motivated recruits for the militant organizations. The recently jailed leader of a fertilizer bomb plot in England--British citizen of Pakistani-origin Omar Khyam--was reportedly inspired and trained by Pakistanis involved in militancy in Kashmir. In addition, one of the suicide bombers who carried out the July 7, 2005, bombings of the London transport system reportedly spent time at a Pakistani madrassa. Convincing the Pakistan government to completely close down these dangerous militant groups and to sever their links with the madrassas should be the centerpiece of our counterterrorism policies in Pakistan.

Madrassas in Pakistan are financed either by voluntary charity, foreign entities, or governments. The Saudi Arabian organization, Harmain Islamic Foundation, reportedly has provided substantial financial assistance to the Ahle-Hadith madrassas, which have provided fighters to the banned Kashmiri militant group Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LET). The Ahle-Hadith madrassas emphasize the Quran and Hadith (sayings of the Prophet Muhammed) and oppose folk Islam and practices such as celebrating the anniversaries of saints or the distribution of food on religious occasions. The large madrassa complex supporting LET is located in the town of Muridke outside of Lahore and is well known for preaching hard-line views on Islam. Since the Pakistan government officially banned LET in 2002, the group has changed its name to Jamaat-ul-Dawa and played a significant role in assisting victims following the October 8, 2005, South Asia earthquake, demonstrating its ability to operate freely within Pakistani society.

President Musharraf's government has had little success with its attempts to assert greater government authority over the madrassas. In August of 2001, the Musharraf government promulgated the "Pakistan Madrassa Education Board Ordinance 2001" to establish three model madrassa institutions in Karachi, Sukkur, and Islamabad that would include English, math, computer science, economics, political science, law, and Pakistan studies in their curricula. Through the "Voluntary Registration and Regulation Ordinance 2002," the government promised funding to madrassas that formally registered with the government. In a more controversial step, the Pakistani government demanded that madrassas expel all foreign students by December 31, 2005. Islamist groups vehemently resisted the government's efforts, however, and authorities backed down and made public statements indicating that they would not use force or shut down noncompliant madrassas to enforce the directives.

The Minister for Religious Affairs, Ejaz ul-Haq, son of the late former President Zia ul-Haq, is responsible for implementing madrassa reform. It was Zia ul-Haq's Islamization policies in the 1980s that resulted in an expansion of the madrassa network to support the Afghanistan jihad against the Soviets and that incorporated militant interpretations of Islam into the public school curriculum. Minister Ejaz ul-Haq has so far been reluctant to confront the prominent religious parties that have ties to foreign-funded madrassas and are resisting government reform.

Recommendations for U.S. Policy

The U.S. should begin to program more funds for specific education and development projects rather than continue to provide the bulk of our economic assistance in the form of a direct cash transfer to the Pakistani government. Since 2004, the U.S. has provided $200 million annually to Pakistan in the form of direct budgetary support. We have established a consulting mechanism with the Pakistan government to try to ensure a portion of this money is spent on the health and education sectors. However, we cannot fully ensure that this U.S. taxpayer money is contributing to economic and human development in Pakistan. The U.S. also reaps very little public diplomacy benefits with the broader Pakistani population from this large amount of aid, which most Pakistanis view as mainly benefiting the Musharraf regime. Congress should require that at least two-thirds of our total economic support fund assistance be in the form of USAID project assistance related to education, health, and economic and democratic development.

While continuing to help train teachers and increase the quality of education in Pakistani schools, Washington also will need to encourage Islamabad to implement systemic reform of public education in order to make a significant impact on education outcomes, such as increased literacy and enrollment rates and decreased dropout rates. U.S. policymakers and aid officials need to take to heart the results of the failed World Bank efforts from the 1980s through the 1990s to avoid repeating similar mistakes. Pushing for systemic reform may require the U.S. to increasingly use benchmarks with the Pakistani government in order to encourage greater efficiency and transparency within the education bureaucracy.

Washington will need to encourage Pakistan to crack down on those madrassas that continue to promote extremist violence and sectarian policies that lead to terrorism and the destabilization of Pakistani society. The Pakistani authorities should clean house in any madrassas found to have links to international terrorist incidents and make clear that those individuals who provide protection or safe haven to al-Qaeda and like-minded terrorist groups will be held to account. The Pakistan government's refusal to detain or punish key terrorist leaders because of their links to the Kashmir militancy signals a degree of tolerance of terrorist activity and provides a permissible environment for groups that collaborate with al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups. The Pakistan authorities likely know which madrassas are supplying militants for terrorist training. We should use skillful diplomacy to persuade the Pakistani government to reform or close down these schools.

The U.S. should refrain from getting involved in Pakistan's broader madrassa reform efforts and accept that many of the traditional madrassas serve a useful purpose in educating Islamic intellectuals and providing shelter and food for impoverished youth. While a few Pakistani madrassas represent an international terrorist threat and deserve American scrutiny and condemnation, most madrassas should be left alone.

To conclude, U.S. efforts to encourage education reform and development in Pakistan should be consistent, sustained, and multi-pronged. Ensuring transparency and efficiency in the education bureaucracy is equally important to encouraging local community involvement and accountability in the day-to-day functioning of individual schools, especially in poor, rural areas. The development of a strong and effective education system in Pakistan is central to promoting moderation, tolerance, and economic development. Convincing the Pakistani government to take firm action against the handful of madrassas supporting violent extremism also is necessary, not only for the future stability of Pakistan, but also to prevent future international terrorism.

Lisa A. Curtis is Senior Research Fellow for South Asia in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation. These remarks were delivered in testimony before the U.S. House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs.

Uh Huh.

And just how does the USA, or the United Nations for that matter, plan closely monitor money that once given to Pakistan's government becomes its sovereign property? Never mind; it's a useless question.

April 21; Dawn:

Pakistan govt will be in charge of relief funds, says US
WASHINGTON: The United States has said the government of Pakistan will be in charge of more than $150 million it is donating for flood victims but Washington will closely monitor the process to prevent misappropriation.

“Who’s in charge of the relief effort? It is the government of Pakistan. We are working closely with the national disaster authority in Pakistan. We are following Pakistan’s lead,” State Department spokesman P. J. Crowley told a briefing in Washington.

The US, he said, was trying not only to meet the immediate needs of the Pakistani people, but also their long-term needs.

And in this effort, “we will be guided by how – what Pakistan feels is its most significant needs. So who is ultimately responsible? It’s the government of Pakistan to support and respond to the needs of its people. We are here to help Pakistan do that”.

When urged to send a clear message to the Pakistanis that the funds meant for the flood victims would not be misused, Mr Crowley said: “We will not tolerate corruption. The assistance that we are providing is for the people of Pakistan. We want to see this assistance get directly to the people of Pakistan.”

He said the US was working directly with Pakistani officials who were involved in relief operations after the 2005 earthquake and referred to a recent statement by a USAID official who praised those Pakistanis as honest and trustworthy.

“That helps us with the kind of cooperation and seamless support that we’re looking for. In terms of assistance,” Mr Crowley said.

“In terms of assistance, there are all kinds of assistance. Some of it is direct support through our military stocks directly to the Pakistani people. In some cases, it’s through non-governmental organisations,” he added.

Pakistan floods: "I have never seen a government less bothered."

August 22, 2010:

Floods Force Thousands From Homes in Pakistan

By CARLOTTA GALL
The New York Times

SUKKUR, Pakistan — Floodwaters continued to surge Sunday into areas of southern Pakistan, forcing thousands more people to abandon their homes in haste and flee to higher ground. Attention has now focused on the province of Sindh as the floods that have torn through the length of the country for three weeks move finally toward the Arabian Sea.

Water reached within half a mile of Shadad Kot, a town of 150,000 people, on Sunday afternoon, and several nearby villages were already cut off when a protective embankment began to give way, Yasin Shar, the district coordination officer of Shadad Kot, said by telephone. Most of the population has been evacuated, and more were still leaving, he said.

“We are trying to save the embankment and keep on repairing wherever it is damaged, but the water is flowing with a lot of pressure,” Mr Shar said. “We hope the embankment won’t break. We are praying.”

Nearly five million people have been displaced from the worst flooding ever recorded in Pakistan. Hundreds of thousands are being housed in orderly tented camps set up in army compounds, schools and other public buildings, but thousands more are living on roadsides and canal embankments, spreading out mats under the trees or making shade over the simple rope beds they brought with them.

The town of Sukkur is overflowing with the influx of displaced people. On the edge of the town, a group of 15 families with scores of children are camped along the Dadu Canal. Their mood is nervous, edgy, and they race in a horde after any vehicle that slows down in the hopes it bears food or assistance. One woman showed her fractured arm, the result of a tussle for food.

“People are looting, people run after trucks snatching things,” said Shad Mohammad, 28, a shopkeeper and father of five, who came here after his town of Ghospur was flooded 15 days ago. “People come, sometimes the government comes, or charities with food. Sometimes you get something, sometimes not.”

The children are often hungry and crying, he said. “We don’t know what will happen to us, we have lost everything. We have nothing here, just the clothes we are wearing,” he said.

He and others spoke of their anxiety that because Sindh is so low-lying, it would take months for the waters to subside, and for them to return home. And they know they will return to nothing. The water was up to their necks so their mud-brick houses will have collapsed, and their animals drowned, they said. Surviving would be difficult without assistance, and few expressed confidence they would receive much.

The older people were more resigned. “We will sit under the sky, and God will provide what he wills,” said Qaim Din, 50, a father of eight, who had to abandon his donkey and a single buffalo to the floods as the family fled the rising waters.

The younger men expressed anger and impatience.

“We are not living here happily,” said another man, also named Qaim Din but not related. A fertilizer dealer, he came here after his village 125 miles away was flooded. “We are angry, and they are treating us like animals,” he said.

“You are talking of anger, we are sometimes thinking of killing this government,” he said. “If you go further along this road, you will see people, you will see their faces, they are hurting.”

“Food is creating a law-and-order situation because there is no proper system to look after these people,” said Jamshaid Khan Dasti, a member of Parliament from a neighboring constituency in Punjab Province. There were already incidents of looting and burglary, and he said he had already requested the government to deploy paramilitary rangers to prevent it deteriorating.

The majority of the displaced were falling outside the humanitarian net, he said. In his district, 800,000 people were displaced, but only 100,000 were being provided for in camps. “The rest are scattered, stuck in different places and they don’t have food or water,” he said. “Their lives are in danger, and their frustration is increasing.”

A former prime minister, Zafarullah Khan Jamali, a member of Parliament whose constituency in neighboring Baluchistan was 90 percent under water, warned that the mood would only worsen.

“These people will be out in the streets, this is what I see,” he said. “I have been through many floods, in ’56, ’73,’76 and 2007, but I have never seen a government less bothered.” He added, “The state is a failure, and the people will come out and naturally nothing can stop the wave of people.”

Asked if he was talking about a revolution, he replied, “Yes. We are heading toward that, very fast.”

Karzai tries to rein in private security firms

Hired guns prove trouble for Karzai
Al Jazeera
08/18/2010
By Evan Hill

Hamid Karzai, the Afghan president, has issued a decree that may put an end to the enormous and lucrative business of providing private security in his war-torn country.

According to Karzai's decree, the government will dissolve all foreign and domestic security companies by December, making jobless the tens of thousands of locals and foreigners employed in the industry.

Many powerful Afghans have a hand in the private security business, and eliminating their income would almost assuredly upset the balance of power throughout the country, not to mention force foreign diplomatic personnel and other aid organisations to quickly find adequate security in a land rife with danger.

But hired guns, both local and foreign, have also proved to be a headache for Karzai, killing and wounding civilians and exercising prince-like control over supply lines, in the process making the Afghan government appear as a sideshow in the provision of development and stability to its own people. [...]

Liberals, don't cut and run

Liberals stand with Afghanistan
Politico
08/18/2010
By Joshua Gross

For liberals, Afghanistan was always the “good war.” Until, quite suddenly, it wasn’t.

While the Bush administration was bogged down in Iraq, liberals inside and outside of Congress argued that Afghanistan was being underresourced and ignored. Until, quite suddenly, it was a quagmire, the mission unwinnable, the land ungovernable.

A total of 102 Democrats opposed the recent $37 billion supplemental war funding bill, which followed in the wake of 92,000 classified documents released by WikiLeaks. Members of the Congressional Progressive Caucus are growing bolder in their opposition to the war, with Rep. Lynn Woolsey (D-Calif.) writing in The Hill: “This war is not worth the huge investment, in blood and treasure, which the American people have been asked to make for nearly a decade.”

Liberals should re-examine the conventional wisdom on Afghanistan and provide President Barack Obama the support that he needs to finish the job. As our nation approaches the ninth anniversary of America’s longest war, there are several compelling reasons to stand with Afghanistan.

America Has an Ethical Obligation to Afghanistan

America’s relationship with Afghanistan began long before Sept. 11. After the Soviet Union occupied Afghanistan in 1979, the U.S. poured guns and money into the hands of the country’s most dangerous and fanatical leaders. When the U.S. withdrew its support of the mujahedeen, these warlords turned on one another and tore the country apart.

In 2002, President George W. Bush promised Afghans a Marshall Plan, but his administration tried to stabilize Afghanistan on the cheap. When the Taliban were still on the ropes early in the mission, Afghans were provided only $57 per person in foreign assistance, compared with $679 in Bosnia and $206 in Iraq. Even more disastrous, we neglected to provide the requisite number of ground troops, forcing U.S. and NATO commanders to rely on airstrikes; the resulting civilian casualties further distanced the population from the Afghan government.

Afghanistan Is Not Ungovernable

Contrary to popular opinion, Afghanistan is not ungovernable. Afghanistan was relatively peaceful and stable from the late 19th century until the early 1970s. During this time, Afghanistan’s weak central government provided its citizens with a degree of law and order by making deals with local elites. As American planners scale back their ambitions, they are rediscovering this forgotten chapter of Afghan history, which provides a model for decentralized political development.

While Afghanistan has been steadily declining since 2006, the catastrophic decline described by the mainstream media since President Obama’s West Point speech has been somewhat hyperbolic. Every year, the number of Afghans who perceive gains in security, economic opportunity and reconstruction increases slightly, according to polling done by the Asia Foundation. Localized economic development campaigns that have been Afghan led, such as the National Solidarity Program, have been extremely successful.

Liberals Have Long Advocated a Civilian Surge

Since 2001, liberals have decried the heavy military footprint in Afghanistan, arguing that the civilian-military balance must be recalibrated. Since the Obama administration’s strategic review, the U.S. has been slowly reining in the military, while injecting diplomats and aid workers into positions of responsibility.


For the first time, civilians are working alongside military commanders in provincial reconstruction teams, sharing the burden of engaging tribal leaders and bolstering the Afghan government’s ability to provide goods and services to its people. Gen. David Petraeus, who recently took over ISAF command from Gen. Stanley McChrystal, is committed to prioritizing the protection of civilians over hunting down the Taliban.

From Washington, it may look like “too little, too late,” but on the ground in Afghanistan, diplomats and aid workers believe they can turn around a failing intervention. President Obama inherited a neglected war. Now, his administration is beginning to realistically define success and providing long-needed manpower and resources.

Afghanistan Is Bigger Than Karzai

Corruption is endemic in Afghanistan. President Hamid Karzai’s angelic aura wore off long ago. But Afghanistan is home to 26 million people. Only a handful of them have their hands in the public purse (or on the opium stalk). We must not lose sight of the effect that America’s stabilizing influence has on the Afghan people, even if the government’s perfidy is inexcusable. Over time, American diplomatic leverage can push through the reforms necessary to loosen Karzai’s hold over hundreds of local-level government appointments and institute stronger checks and balances in Kabul.

We Are Protecting the Rights of Women

Liberalism, when reduced to its essence, promotes liberty and equality with the goal of expanding opportunities for individuals. Afghan women like Bamiyan Gov. Habiba Sarabi, human rights activist Wazhma Frogh, Parliamentarian Shinkai Karokhail and Mozhdah Jamalzadah, known as “Afghanistan’s Oprah,” are advancing women’s liberty and equality little by little, day by day. This is why negotiating with the Taliban is not a silver bullet and why any political reconciliation must be predicated on respect for the Afghan constitution, which enshrines the rights of women and minorities.

American blood is not being shed in Afghanistan simply to preserve the rights of women, but liberals should not cynically dismiss this noble goal. The image of Afghan girls going to newly built schools should continue to fill Americans with pride; we are making a difference.

Don’t take my word for it. Ask an Afghan yourself. Seek out conversations with Afghan-Americans — whose opinions the mainstream media largely ignore — and ask them what they think about the U.S. presence in Afghanistan. You most likely will get an earful. Of course, many Afghans inside and outside of Afghanistan continue to be demoralized by corruption, civilian casualties and insecurity, as well as Karzai’s fraudulent election and erratic behavior. But most will admit that the continued presence of the U.S. is far better than the alternative.

Advocates for progressive reform across the greater Middle East will closely watch our withdrawal from Afghanistan. Our leaders must resist premature calls for a troop drawdown and ensure that Afghanistan does not backslide into fanaticism and anarchy. We protect the homeland and advance liberal values by honoring our commitment to the Afghan people.

Joshua Gross served as the media relations director of the Embassy of Afghanistan in Washington from 2006 to 2008. He is a recent graduate of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.

Insurgency pussyfoots into east Afghanistan

Foreigners boost insurgency in eastern Afghanistan
By KATHY GANNON (AP) – 13 hours ago

JALALABAD, Afghanistan — As the spotlight of the Afghan war focuses on the south, insurgent activity is increasing in parts of the east, with Arab and other foreign fighters linked to al-Qaida infiltrating across the rugged mountains with the help of Pakistani militants, Afghan and U.S. officials say.

Security in eastern Afghanistan is critical because the region includes the capital, Kabul, which the insurgents have sought to surround and isolate from the rest of the country. The east also borders Pakistan, where al-Qaida's leaders fled after the 2001 U.S.-led invasion drove the Taliban from power.

Gen. Mohammed Zaman Mahmoodzai, head of Afghanistan's border security force, told The Associated Press that infiltration by al-Qaida-linked militants has been increasing in his area since March.

"One out of three are Arabs," he said, coming mostly from Pakistan's Bajaur and Mohmand tribal areas where the Pakistan military is battling Pakistani Taliban insurgents.

The advent of spring makes it easier to move through mountain passes into Afghanistan, though Mahmoodzai believes the influx of Arabs has been greater than can be explained by seasonal trends.

A NATO official said he thought Mahmooodzai's estimate of Arab infiltration was high but acknowledged that activity by foreign fighters was running "a little more than average" in the east. He said most of them were believed to be Pakistanis, Chechens and Tajiks although it was difficult to determine their origins.

He spoke on condition of anonymity because the information is sensitive.

In some cases, militants enter the country through legal crossing points such as Torkham, 35 miles east of Jalalabad. Mahmoodzai said the infiltrators carry fake passports and visas provided by Lashkar-e-Taiba, a Pakistan-based group that India blames for the 2008 attacks in the Indian city of Mumbai that left 166 people dead.

"We know it is Lashkar-e-Taiba because we have sources inside the Afghan Taliban," Mahmoodzai said. "They said the Arabs are coming here through Lashkar-e-Taiba."

Last month, the NATO-led command announced the capture of two Taliban commanders it said were helping Lashkar-e-Taiba (LASH-kar-e-TOY-bah) members slip into Afghanistan. In reporting the second arrest, a NATO statement referred to a "recent influx" of Lashkar-e-Taiba members into the eastern province of Nangarhar.

The mixture of insurgent groups adds to the complexity of the war in the east, often fought in terrain much more rugged and challenging than in the north or south.

In eastern Afghanistan last year, the U.S. Army pulled out of two outposts in the mountains of Nuristan province after insurgents nearly overran the bases in two battles that claimed a total of 17 American lives. Insurgents operating from bases in the eastern part of Nuristan are believed to have killed the 10 members of a medical team, including six Americans, gunned down last week in a northern province.

Longtime smuggling routes through the east link militant sanctuaries in Pakistan with northern provinces such as Kunduz and Baghlan, where insurgent attacks are increasing. Al-Qaida's links to a Taliban faction led by Jalaluddin Haqqani and his son Sirajuddin are believed stronger than with Taliban groups in the south.

The Haqqani group was believed to have played a major role in the Dec. 30 suicide bombing at a CIA base in the eastern province of Khost that killed seven agency employees.

A NATO official said that if al-Qaida is in Afghanistan, it's probably in Kunar, the eastern Afghan province along the Pakistani border where Osama bin Laden maintained bases in the 1990s. The official spoke on condition of anonymity because he was not supposed to release the information to the media.

Gen. Mohammed Afzal, the Afghan army's commander in the east, said the insurgents were focusing their eastern operations in the provinces of Kunar and Nuristan — which also borders Pakistan — and the area south of Jalalabad, the region's main commercial center.

"The enemy changed their tactics this year, and al-Qaida has started to become even stronger this year," he said.

He cited greater use of suicide attacks and roadside bombs — many against NATO supply convoys coming in from Pakistan. Such tactics had not been used as frequently in the mountainous east as in the south.

"The government is there by day, but by night it is the Taliban who are in control," said Malik Naseer, who is running for parliament in next month's election from a district of Nangarhar. "Residents say there are some foreigners among them."

The NATO official said the Taliban were accelerating a campaign of intimidation in Nangarhar, including letters left in front of homes warning residents against dealing with foreigners and government officials or listening to music.

The role of Lashkar-e-Taiba is especially disturbing because of the group's extensive network throughout South Asia and its purported links to Pakistan's spy agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence, or ISI.

The Pakistani agency helped organize Lashkar-e-Taiba, or Army of the Pure, two decades ago to launch attacks in Indian-controlled Kashmir, the disputed mountain region that lies at the heart of the rivalry between the two nuclear-armed nations.

Lashkar-e-Taiba, which the U.S. military refers to as LeT, is believed to have played a role in the Feb. 26, 2010 car bombing and suicide attack on two guesthouses in Kabul frequented by Indians, and in the October 2008 car bombing at the gates of the Indian Embassy that killed more than 60 people.

Pakistan says it broke ties with the group after the Sept. 11, 2001, terror attacks in the United States. Nevertheless, it is widely believed that some factions within Lashkar are still close to the Pakistani military, which has not pursued the organization as vigorously as it has other Islamic militant groups that have staged attacks inside Pakistan.

"I've watched them since 2008 ... move to the West, become more active in other countries and more active throughout the region and more engaged with other terrorist groups," the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Mike Mullen, told Pakistani reporters in Islamabad last month. "So there is an increased level of concern with respect to where LeT is and where it appears to be headed."

Christine Fair, assistant professor at Georgetown University's Center for Peace and Security Studies, says Lashkar-e-Taiba has been attacking coalition soldiers in Afghanistan since 2004. Fair said she has tracked Lashkar-e-Taiba operations in several eastern Afghan provinces, including Kunar, Baghlan, Nangarhar, Logar and Nuristan.

The NATO official speculated that Lashkar-e-Taiba is using Afghanistan to "get up their jihadi street credentials" among the militants' support base.

"The plan was to kill 5,000 people"

By Emily Wax and Rama Lakshmi
Washington Post Foreign Service
Saturday, November 29, 2008; 2:02 PM

MUMBAI, Nov. 29 -- Indian officials said Saturday that they had killed or captured 10 gunmen responsible for the three-day assault on India's financial and cultural capital. Nearly 200 people died in the attacks that began Wednesday.

The violence ended Saturday morning when government security forces, methodically searching the Taj Mahal Palace and Tower Hotel here, killed the last four gunmen. Officials said that around the city, nine gunmen had died and one was captured.

The commandos recovered 22 bodies at the Taj Mahal hotel Saturday. Clean-up operations at the hotel continued through the day.

"Many unexploded hand grenades were lying on the corridors, we want to diffuse them and only then wanted to declare the building safe," said J. K. Dutt, the chief of the National Security Guard, India's specialized commando troops. "We checked the rooms to see if there are any small bombs, near the air conditioners or any other corner."

Authorities said that the death toll had risen to 195 as more bodies were discovered and that 295 people were wounded, in the attacks on two luxury hotels, the Jewish center and several other sites in Mumbai. Among the dead were two Americans from Virginia; the American rabbi who ran the city's Chabad-Lubavitch center and his Israeli wife; and three of their visitors, including an American man, an Israeli woman and a man with U.S. and Israeli citizenship. In all, at least 16 non-Indians have been reported killed.

The government used 350 security forces and 400 police officers to capture or kill the gunmen, officials announced at a news conference Saturday. On the basis of preliminary inquiry, we know that there were a total of 10 terrorists. Nine have been eliminated, one is caught," said Vilasrao Deshmukh, the chief minister of the state of Maharashtra, of which Mumbai is the capital. "They split into teams of two for action, and there were four at the Taj."

The National Security Guards are based in New Delhi and some Indian officials and residents in Mumbai questioned why it took those troops six hours to get to the attacks here.

M. L. Kumawat, special secretary of internal security, said at a press conference in New Delhi that it usually takes time for the commandos to reach the airport with all their equipment and board the plane. Upon landing in Mumbai after a two-hour flight, he said, "it took time to unload things and 45 minutes to reach the place of the incident in South Mumbai from the airport."
He added that the commandos had done a "splendid job."

Pakistani officials, responding to charges by Indian leaders that the attack was carried out by an organization with ties to Pakistan, initially said Friday that a senior intelligence officer would travel to India, in an apparent attempt to ease tensions between the two nuclear-armed states. On Saturday, Pakistan said that official would not go but that it remained committed to fighting extremism. Some news reports and Pakistani officials said another, lower-level intelligence official would be going to India.

Indian officials said they believe that at least some of the gunmen reached Mumbai by sea. After an interrogation of one of the attackers, Indian intelligence officials said they suspected that a Pakistani Islamist group, Lashkar-i-Taiba, was responsible. An Indian intelligence document from 2006 obtained by The Washington Post said members of the group had been trained in maritime assault.

Deshmukh, the chief minister of Maharashtra, denied that there was any final statement to make about the nationality of the slain gunmen. But he said that the government was only certain that the one in their custody had confessed to being from Pakistan. He said Indian officials had no specific intelligence about an impending attack.

"The information that we get is always general, not specific. Mumbai is always on the target, it is a commercial city, it is an international city," he said. "It is a sensitive place, there is no denying that. But this kind of attack, not just on Mumbai but also on the nation, is something we did not anticipate."

"Their plan was to kill 5,000 people, we recovered two big bombs, other than guns," said R. R. Patil, Maharashtra's deputy chief minister. "They were using mobile phones, GPS and satellite phones. We have many clues from these."

In New Delhi, Prime Minister Singh has called a meeting of all political parties on Sunday to discuss a roadmap for tackling terror and evolved a consensus for further political and diplomatic action.

Explosions from fighting at the Taj Mahal hotel could be heard outside the hotel early Saturday morning, and flames and thick, inky-black smoke were seen pouring from the first floor. Following that final operation, the security forces came out of the hotel at midday to a cheering crowd who walked up to shake hands, express gratitude and shout patriotic slogans. Before they climbed the bus, a few turned to look back at the imposing stone building and clicked pictures with their cell phone cameras. Many spectators queued up to get their photographs taken with the troops.

One commando spoke to TV reporters from the window of the bus and said that the slain gunmen were moving between the second and the third floor and had laid explosives near doorways to prevent entry. He also said that two gunmen were inside a room full of explosives when the commandos finally blasted their way in. During the night long operation, eight live grenades were diffused, and the commandos recovered assault rifles, grenades and ammunition. Every crisis has its defining images. In Mumbai, it was the elegant Taj engulfed in flames. "It hurts my heart. It's like India itself is on fire," said Sanjay Jadhu, 43, a firefighter at the landmark hotel who was covered in soot.

Freed hostages said that many of those trapped did not come face to face with the gunmen but hid after hearing explosions and gunfire and receiving text messages and calls from loved ones telling them what was happening.

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See e-Ariana website for reports

TV Host Targets Afghan Women's Shelters
The Wall Street Journal (08/04/2010)

Afghanistan's nation building
The Washington Post, Editorial (08/04/2010)

Dozens of Afghan refugees missing, thousands displaced
IRIN (08/04/2010)

Living with the Taliban on the Afghan frontline
Channel 4, UK (08/04/2010)

Karzai seeks oversight of anti-corruption unit
The Associated Press (08/04/2010)

'Utilising foreign aid a big challenge for Afghan institutions'
Pajhwok (08/04/2010)

Afghan Checkpoints Key in Battle for Kandahar
CBS News (08/04/2010)

Time to Start Demanding Answers From Pakistan
CBS News (08/04/2010)

Petraeus focuses on civilians in Afghan directive
BBC (08/04/2010)

Wars, lies and lyrics
Imperium (08/04/2010)

The New Afghanistan Policy: Murder Inc.
Truthout (08/04/2010)

In Marjah, a cautionary tale
Global Post (08/04/2010)

Divide Afghanistan at your peril
The Financial Times (08/03/2010)

Biden, on the Afghanistan Debate, in His Own Words
The Atlantic (08/03/2010)

Iranian embassy files complaint against Kabuli
Pajhwok (08/03/2010)

Marja Residents Fear Taleban Resurgence
IWPR (08/02/2010)

Neocons are hypocrites on WikiLeaks
The Guardian (08/03/2010)

New Rules Stress GIs' Limits in Afghan Fighting
The New York Times (08/03/2010)

Top Democrats Pressure White House on Afghan War as WikiLeaks Reveals Bloody Realities
Truthout (08/03/2010)

Chasing Business Opportunities
The New York Times (08/03/2010)

WH: Obama Disagrees With Pakistani Leader's Warning That Afghan War Is Lost
FoxNews (08/03/2010)

Pakistan's president says international community is losing the war in Afghanistan
The Associated Press (08/03/2010)

Some media outlets betraying nation: Karzai
Pajhwok (08/03/2010)

Clerics, elders compelled to join Taliban, Senate told
Pajhwok (08/03/2010)

Afghan bank guards beheaded in robbery
Reuters (08/03/2010)

Afghan court hands down breakthrough drugs jail term
Reuters (08/03/2010)

Planned Afghanistan drawdown a sensitive issue
CNN (08/03/2010)

India, Iran inching closer on Afghanistan
Hindustan Times (08/03/2010)

The Great Game: Afghanistan
The Guardian (08/03/2010)

Momentum becomes substitute for logic in Afghan war
The Washington Post (08/03/2010)

Afghanistan's Islamists try to shut down women's shelters in Afghanistan

August 8, 2010

TV Show Host Targets Afghan Women's Shelters
by Maria Al-Habib, The Wall Street Journal

Momina lives in one of Afghanistan's women's shelters, which have come under fire from conservatives such as TV host Nasto Nadiri. (Kate Brooks reporting for The Wall Street Journal)

KABUL — The televised images shown earlier this year on one of Afghanistan's most popular television shows were stark: several women wailed in a bare room while the host implied that international aid workers had forced them into prostitution.

Acting on a tip from viewers, the show, "Sarzamin-E-Man," or "My Homeland," devoted a multipart series to investigating the place, which the host, 27-year-old Nasto Nadiri, said was an unauthorized women's shelter masquerading as an orphanage.

Mr. Nadiri's report didn't say for sure what was going on at the orphanage, or what the women were doing there. But the show has helped to spark a popular backlash against all shelters, including those registered with the government.

Mr. Nadiri, who is running for Parliament in September, says he wants a clampdown on women's shelters in Afghanistan. The TV host wields considerable power in shaping the national debate here, and has been using it to rail against women's rights and foreign aid organizations.

The shelters are "not acceptable for our people, who have fought 30 years to put the word 'Islam' in front of Afghanistan," he says, referring to the country's full name, the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. "We live in an Islamic country. ... But some NGOs come and want to make another way for our country."

The emergence of a free media is one of the few successes in the nine years since the U.S. overthrew Afghanistan's hard-line Taliban regime, which banned television. The Ministry of Culture and Information says there are 26 TV stations based in Kabul and nine more in outlying provinces. Noorin TV, which broadcasts Mr. Nadiri's hourlong show six nights a week, is among the most popular broadcasters here.

But that media freedom has also been used to stir up xenophobic and fundamentalist sentiments that seek to roll back some of the social liberties that more moderate parts of Afghanistan have enjoyed since 2001.

The government closed another station, Emroaz TV, last week, claiming it stoked sectarian tension by accusing Afghan Shiite politicians of working for Iran. But critics say this is a rare exception.

In a sign of the influence of Mr. Nadiri's show, the government expelled two aid groups from Afghanistan earlier this year, after the host broadcast footage purportedly showing them converting Afghans to Christianity, a crime punishable by death under Afghan law.

The two groups, the Norwegian Church Aid and the Church World Service of the U.S., denied allegations of proselytizing and challenged Noorin TV to provide evidence linking them to the videos, which showed Afghans in a dim room praying frantically while others were baptized.

In Afghanistan's deeply conservative society, foreign aid groups are often looked at with suspicion, especially if they champion women's rights. Greater still is the scrutiny on women these shelters serve.

Many women in Afghanistan are thrown into the country's female prisons for broadly interpreted "moral crimes," which can include adultery or running away from one's family to avoid a forced marriage. Some aid workers say Afghanistan's police force often put women in prison when shelters are a more suitable place for them. Women in these shelters often face death threats for disgracing their families' honor by running away.

Momina has lived in shelters since escaping three years ago with three children—a 10-year-old boy and two girls, aged 3 and 6—from a husband she says was violent and heroin-addicted. Living in a cramped room in a registered Kabul shelter with seven other women and their children, Momina, 34, learned to read, write and sew. She earns $10 a month as a seamstress in one of Kabul's bazaars, a meager income in Afghanistan, but manageable within the shelter.

"Now, when I read street signs I feel proud of myself. I feel in charge," says Momina, who like many Afghans has just one name. "I'm trying my best to improve my tailoring and embroidery so when I have to leave the shelter I can find a job."

Mr. Nadiri says he hasn't visited any of the 17 shelters officially registered with the government, which serve 1,430 women. But he says he received hundreds of inquiries from Afghans "suspicious that most of the women are misused sexually" at the shelters. He says he plans to air another multipart series on Afghanistan's shelters.

Aid groups still working in Afghanistan say they fear Mr. Nadiri's focus on women's shelters will sway President Hamid Karzai's government, which is increasingly eager to bolster its Islamic credentials in an effort to blunt the Taliban influence.

"The main problem is the public image from the TV, which makes Afghans think these NGOs are doing un-Islamic things," said Sayed Abdullah Ahmadi, the program director for the Cooperation Center for Afghanistan, which runs two shelters.

A government commission is investigating the shelters, which are often operated by local and foreign nongovernmental organizations, to monitor their quality—and to look into accusations of prostitution and harboring female criminals and drug users.

Mr. Karzai created the commission late last fall, before the TV feature on the shelters aired.

But the head of the commission, Nematullah Shahrani, says Mr. Nadiri's show has made an impact on the investigation. "So many people have complained about the shelters, saying they're brothels and preaching Christianity. This is why the Afghan government decided to open the commission," said Mr. Shahrani, who is also Mr. Karzai's religious-affairs adviser.

The commission's recommendations will be issued "soon," he added. The report will decide which shelters should close and may increase funding to those allowed to stay open, he said.

"Many people in government oppose the shelters," says Shinkai Karokhail, a female lawmaker. The only reason the government is letting them stay open for now, she adds, is the pressure from the international community.

In Afghanistan, why does counterinsurgency work in some places but not others?

The Washington Post
07/26/2010
By Rajiv Chandrasekaran

Need to get the link for this but posting it now because I don't want the report to get lost in my file cabinet.

Much of Pakistan's water shortage their own making

Associated Press via The Washington Post; July 26, 2010

ISLAMABAD -- Besides grappling with insurgents, suicide bombers and deep poverty, Pakistan is facing a severe crisis as a ballooning population and inefficient farming combine to reduce the availability of water.

Up to a third of Pakistan's 175 million people lack safe drinking water and nearly 630 children die each day from diarrhea, according to a study done last year by the U.S.-based Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

Water availability per person in Pakistan has fallen from about 5,000 cubic meters (175,000 cubic feet) in 1947, when the country was founded, to around 1,000 cubic meters (35,000 cubic feet) today.

Most of the drop is the result of a population that has more than quadrupled since independence, but many scientists predict global warming could have a significant impact by shrinking the glaciers that feed Pakistan's rivers.

Experts also point to inefficient irrigation methods in Pakistan as a key factor.

At least 90 percent of Pakistan's water is used for farming, and around 25 percent is wasted by farms that use flood irrigation, according to last year's study.

Allegedly some Taliban now calling themselves emirs; plus, summary of Obama's Af-Pak strategy

Anything AQ collaborator ex-ISI chief Hamid Gul says has to be taken with a grain of salt but for what it's worth:

ANI
07/17/2010

A former director-general of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has said that U.S.President Barack Obama will pull out American troops from Afghanistan for economic reasons rather than for strategic ones because his administration would find the ongoing surge unsustainable.

Speaking in an interview to ANI, Hamid Gul, who was the ISI chief from 1987 to 1989, said: "I think by the end of the year Obama will come up with another policy, and they are going to pull out of Afghanistan because it is not sustainable economically, casualty-wise and Taliban are winning on every front."

Gul further opined that those fighting the presence of foreign troops in Afghanistan, should not be referred to as the Taliban, but as champions of a national resistance.

"They are not Taliban, this is Afghan national resistance, and any case, they have dropped the word Taliban already. They call it the Emirate of Islamic Afghanistan. So, that is what their official name is," he said.

So, when that thing happens, that monumental, historical event takes place, then we will be left with no choice, both India and Pakistan, to remove our friction and all these things," he added.

President Obama's AFPAK strategy was announced in 2009, and the cornerstone of it is adopting a regional approach.

The strategy aims to treat Afghanistan and Pakistan as two countries, but with one challenge in one region.

The strategy focuses more intensively on Pakistan than in the past, and calls for more significant increases in U.S. and international support, both economic and military, linked to performance against terror.

It also intends to pursue intensive regional diplomacy involving all key players in South Asia and engage countries in a new trilateral framework as - at the highest levels of the countries, being Afghanistan, Pakistan and the United States.

Together, this trilateral format hopes to enhance intelligence sharing, military cooperation along the border, and address common issues such as trade, energy and economic development.

From a military aspect, the strategy has approved the sending of an additional 17,000 troops to Afghanistan, besides deploying approximately 4,000 more U.S. troops to help train the Afghan National Security Forces so that they can increasingly take responsibility for the security of the Afghan people themselves, which is Washington's ultimate goal.

Ethnic divide threatens in Afghanistan

Ethnic divide threatens in Afghanistan

Memories of a devastating civil war along ethnic lines have been heightened and fears raised by President Hamid Karzai's bid to reach out to the largely Pashtun Taliban.

By Laura King, Los Angeles Times

July 17, 2010

Reporting from Kabul, Afghanistan — The sunbaked, shell-pocked ruins of west Kabul stand as silent testament to what happened the last time Afghanistan splintered along ethnic lines.

The country's disastrous civil war in the early 1990s — a conflict that killed at least 100,000 people and helped set the stage for the Taliban's rise to power — reduced whole swaths of the capital to rubble, leaving scars on the landscape that reconstruction efforts have yet to erase.

Memories linger too — stirred, these days, by steadily rising ethnic tensions amid President Hamid Karzai's bid to reach out to the Taliban.

Unconvinced of the United States' staying power in Afghanistan, Karzai is seeking a rapprochement with the Taliban movement, with the ultimate goal of drawing it into the political process. But his overtures have raised alarm among those who fear such a result could realign power along ethnic lines.

The Taliban movement is drawn almost solely from Afghanistan's largest ethnic group, the Pashtuns. And leaders of the country's other significant minorities — Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras — are worried they may be left out in the cold as Karzai moves to woo insurgents and consolidate his base of support among fellow Pashtuns.

"I think Karzai feels that his power is not 100% stable anymore, and for that reason, he needs to reach out to the armed opposition," said lawmaker Shukria Barakzai. "That seems to be the motivation."

It is a change in strategy for the Afghan leader who, last summer, sought reelection by trying to forge alliances across the ethnic spectrum. But massive election fraud tainted his victory, and in his weakened state, he has found himself unable to deliver on campaign promises.

Some of those allies are now distancing themselves — or breaking outright with the Afghan leader. This month, the influential Hazara politician Haji Mohammed Mukhaqiq, a onetime backer, delivered a blistering condemnation of Karzai at a rally, calling his presidency illegitimate.

Mukhaqiq's immediate ire was raised by Karzai's inability to push through the confirmation of two Hazara Cabinet nominees. But Hazaras, who were the target of communal massacres during the Taliban's reign, have for months listened with alarm to the president's increasingly conciliatory references to the Taliban as "disaffected brothers."

The Afghan leader has promised to seek talks only with insurgent figures who renounce violence, reject ties to groups such as Al Qaeda and pledge to respect the Afghan Constitution and its enshrinement of principles such as the rights of women.

But Western diplomats question whether those tenets are enforceable in the type of back-channel contacts that have been taking place for at least a year, and it is widely recognized that a Western troop drawdown will probably hinge on movement toward some kind of political settlement with the Taliban.

American influence over Karzai's actions has been weakened by a perception that the U.S.-led military effort is floundering, as exemplified by delays in a much-vaunted effort to reassert government authority in the key southern city of Kandahar, and the abrupt change in command of North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces.

Amid a growing sense of a power structure in flux, ethnic politics have moved to the fore. One pointed recent example was Karzai's ouster of intelligence chief Amrullah Saleh, who was well regarded by the West. Saleh, an ethnic Tajik, had voiced serious qualms about Karzai's courting of the Taliban with measures such as releases of jailed Taliban suspects, a plan that won the endorsement of a peace jirga, or assembly, convened last month.

Those prisoner releases, which have begun, horrified many in Afghanistan's security establishment, who believed that Karzai was granting the insurgents a major concession while getting nothing in return. Moreover, some of those who have walked out the prison gates, or are slated to do so soon, were captured at considerable risk to the lives of Afghan and coalition forces.

Another leading critic of Karzai's reconciliation strategy is Abdullah Abdullah, the former foreign minister who is now the informal leader of the opposition. Abdullah, the second-place vote-getter in August's polling, qualified for a runoff with Karzai, but quit the race in disgust, declaring there was no way the presidential balloting could be conducted fairly.

On Karzai's recent visits to Kandahar, his home province, the president's references to the Taliban had gone well beyond the fraternal, Abdullah said.

"It's not just the language he has used for months about 'disaffected brothers'; now he says, 'Talib-jan,' which is like calling them 'darling,'" said Abdullah, who is half-Pashtun but has a primarily Tajik political identity. "To me, it shows the lack of a sense of direction and vision."

Just as the Karzai-Abdullah election struggle had ethnic overtones, tensions may reemerge with the current campaign for parliamentary elections, which are to be held in September. This month, an oversight body ejected 31 candidates from the races because of ties to armed groups.

Some, like Pashtun lawmaker Daoud Sultanzoy, believe ethnic-based electioneering is a cynical ploy by power brokers eager to exploit divisions to claim a share of patronage spoils for themselves.

"Much of the time, ordinary Afghans from different groups, different tribes, can get along, because there is a sense of commonality in the hardship of their lives," Sultanzoy said. "But there is what I call a 'merchant class' of politicians who want to fan the ethnic fires for their own benefit."

Ethnic rivalries are mirrored too in the ranks of the country's armed forces, which are crucial to Western hopes that Afghanistan can one day assume responsibility for its own security and foreign troops can withdraw.

The Afghan army's officer corps is dominated by Tajiks, who made up the core of the Northern Alliance, the U.S.-allied group that helped bring down the Taliban — and to this day are deeply mistrustful of Pakistan, whose intelligence service helped create and nurture the Taliban movement.

Many see the hand of Pakistan in Karzai's efforts to bring the Taliban to the bargaining table, and believe the Islamabad government is meddling in policy decisions, such as Karzai's removing of Saleh, the intelligence chief, who was a harsh critic of Pakistani ties to insurgent figures.

The wariness is particularly pronounced among non-Pashtuns, who fear that Pakistan will try to broker a peace deal with the Taliban that will guarantee its own continuing influence and counter that of India.

"Mr. Karzai has been unable to reduce Pakistani interference, and now it seems he welcomes it," said lawmaker Fazal Karim Aymaq, a member of the minority Aymaq ethnic group in northern Afghanistan. "So once again we will see Afghanistan used as a pawn."

laura.king@latimes.com

"US military begins to link Afghan Taliban to Pakistani terror groups"

US military begins to link Afghan Taliban to Pakistani terror groups
By Bill Roggio
Long War Journal

July 11, 2010

Within the past several days, the US military has begun to publicly identify the Lashkar-e-Taiba and other foreign fighters based in Pakistan, as well as a Pakistani Taliban group, as constituting direct threats to Coalition and Afghan forces in Afghanistan.

In what may be a dramatic shift, the official press releases from the US-led International Security Assistance Force and other Department of Defense outlets published on US military websites are starting to mention specific links between insurgents in Afghanistan and their sponsors in Pakistan.

The shift began on July 3, when ISAF announced that it had captured a Taliban commander, a Taliban facilitator, and two fighters during a raid in the eastern province of Nangarhar. "The commander is directly linked to the Taliban emir of Khugyani district and assisted with the recent influx of Lashkar-e Taiba (LeT) insurgents into the province," ISAF stated in the press release.

Four days later, ISAF reported the capture of another Taliban commander who is tied to Lashkar-e-Taiba operations in Khugyani district in Nangarhar province. "The commander had direct contact with a Taliban commander detained by the security force July 3," ISAF reported on July 7. "He was also directly linked to the overall Taliban emir of Khugyani District and associated with the recent influx of Lashkar-e Tayyiba operatives into the province," ISAF reported on July 7.

In all, two initial press releases and four related stories from ISAF and the Office of the Secretary of Defense Public Affairs discussed the capture of the two Taliban commanders linked to the Lashkar-e-Taiba.

Prior to these six recent press releases, there have been only three official releases that discussed the Lashkar-e-Taiba, according to the archives of official military press releases stored at the DVIDS website. Two were issued in December 2008 and one in January 2010. All three releases discussed Lashkar-e-Taiba in relation to the threat to India, however, and not Afghanistan.

Just one day after the US military issued its latest press release on the Lashkar-e-Taiba, it issued another unprecedented press release, this time mentioning a Taliban commander in Ghazni province linked to Pakistani, Arab, and Chechen fighters.

"An Afghan-international security force detained two suspected insurgents in Ghazni province this morning while pursuing a Taliban commander who is responsible for smuggling Pakistani, Chechen and Arab fighters and improvised explosive device materials into Shah Joy District from Pakistan," ISAF stated in a press release.

And today, the US military issued another press release linking Taliban fighters to al Qaeda and a Pakistani Taliban leader coddled by the Pakistani government.

"An Afghan and international security force killed several insurgents and detained two suspected insurgents in Ghazni province yesterday while pursuing a Taliban commander in direct contact with Taliban leadership in Pakistan and associated with al Qaeda and Commander Nazir Group," an ISAF press release stated.

Commander Nazir is none other than Mullah Nazir, the leader of the Wazir Taliban in South Waziristan. Nazir is considered a "good Taliban" leader despite his open support for al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban. Nazir's own forces carry out attacks inside Afghanistan. Nazir does not support attacks against the Pakistani state but backs terror groups that do, including the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan. The Pakistani government has cut several peace deals with Nazir in the past.

The US military has never mentioned Mullah Nazir before in any of its press releases on Afghanistan.

In the past, the US military has occasionally mentioned Pakistani links to Taliban fighters in Afghanistan. For instance, in early 2009, there was a big push to directly name top Afghan Taliban leaders based in Pakistan. But up until today, the US military had yet to officially acknowledge the presence of Chechens in Afghanistan in its press releases. There has been only one mention of Chechens in the military's press releases prior to July 10, and that was related to Chechens in Pakistan's tribal areas.

Although the Lashkar-e-Taiba and Chechen fighters have been operating against Coalition and Afghan forces in Afghanistan for years, the US military has been hesitant to directly identify these groups. The Lashkar-e-Taiba, which is supported by Pakistan's military and intelligence services, and Chechen fighters are known to have carried out multiple attacks against Coalition and Afghan forces in northern and eastern Afghanistan for years. In addition, Chechen fighters have been identified in Taliban propaganda videos as carrying out attacks against US combat outposts in Kunar and Nuristan.

While US military and civilian leaders previously have publicly identified Pakistan-based terror groups, such as the Haqqani Network, the Quetta Shura Taliban, and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hizb-i-Islami faction as being direct threats to Afghanistan's security, the recent identification of the Lashkar-e-Taiba and other groups in the official military press releases is significant because it indicates that the military views these groups as a direct threat and has now begun to openly target them.

Sources: [see the site for list of sources and links]