I've omitted several passages from Tony Karon's analysis that includes data/observations that have have been treated more fully in recent news reports and other analyses; e.g., the wide divergence in current views on how well NATO kinetic operations have succeeded against the Afghan Taliban.
Also, as earlier reports I've featured on this blog underscore, there are questions about whether Karzai's recent claim that he's been involved with three-way negotiations with the Taliban is true, yet Karon accepts the claim as factual. But he also brings out some important points about NATO/US led negotiations with the Taliban -- and how many years NATO has been focusing on a negotiated settlement with the Taliban.
All this provides more insight into Hamid Karzai's many outbursts and seemingly irrational actions since the NDS caught the British regime attempting to set up secret military training camps in Afghanistan for 'good' Taliban. Years before the general public in NATO countries learned the truth, Karzai knew that NATO had been trying to restore the Taliban to power in Afghanistan in a desperate attempt to cover up the fact that the real war was always in Pakistan. That this is one of the greatest military scandals in the modern era -- shrug; move along folks, nothing to see here.
Talks with the Taliban Are Inevitable, But Who Will Be at the Table?
by Tony Karon
February 16, 2012
TIME/Global Spin blog
The fact that Afghan President Hamid Karzai has told the Wall Street Journal he’s held three-way negotiations with the U.S. and the Taliban should come as no surprise: the U.S. has said that within two years it will end its already decade-long military entanglement in Afghanistan’s civil war, and the Taliban is anything but defeated. Indeed, militarily, the U.S. has been spinning its wheels in Afghanistan for years, now, it’s a long-established conventional wisdom that Washington’s best hopes for leaving behind even a modicum of stability require a political settlement with the insurgents.
The question being fought out on the ground for the past four years has simply been on what terms a negotiated settlement would be forged, and who would be at the table.
Where once the U.S. had insisted on the Taliban laying down arms and embracing the constitution that brought Karzai to power as preconditions for talking to the insurgents, it has come around to accepting those erstwhile preconditions as the desired outcomes of such talks.
Now, with the diplomatic pace quickened by the U.S. withdrawal deadline, Karzai — who wields limited leverage of his own — is making sure he’s not sidelined by talks between Western powers and the Taliban, which had reportedly begun some time ago at an exploratory level, mediated by Qatar.
The optimistic spin on Karzai’s announcement highlights the fact that the Taliban is is now talking with Karzai, whom it had previously dismissed as a “puppet” of the U.S.
The Taliban, of course, denied talking to Karzai, though they have publicly confirmed their talks with Washington. Even if the Taliban had agreed to include Karzai in talks, though, there remains considerable grounds for skepticism that it would accept the Afghan constitution drawn up under Western tutelage after the U.S. invasion (and therefore the legitimacy of Karzai’s government).
It’s not clear just how committed the Taliban leadership is to these conversations, and there remains considerable opposition within the movement to seeking a political settlement right now — for the simple fact that many in the Taliban believe they’re actually winning the war.
And as is the case of any insurgent army facing a foreign expeditionary force, the Taliban knows time is on its side.
[...]
The U.S. invasion tipped the balance against the Taliban, but it soon bounced back, with support and sanctuary provided by Pakistan, unwilling to reconcile itself to an Indian-allied government taking root on its western flank. The hubris of the Bush Administration sustained an unfortunate illusion that Pakistan shared U.S. objectives in Afghanistan; having abandoned that illusion, the Obama Administration nonetheless faces the challenge of accommodating Pakistan’s interest in negotiating a peace agreement.
Pakistan has far more leverage over the Taliban than any other player, and it has previously made clear — by, for example, arresting Taliban leaders holding talks with Karzai and the U.S. independent of Pakistan’s okay — that it will not allow the negotiation of any agreement to which it is not (at least tacitly) a party.
In the game of musical chairs over the negotiations, Karzai has kept his options open, withdrawing from talks with the Taliban late last year and vowing to negotiate only with Pakistan.
[...]
Meanwhile, spring is just weeks away, and with it another fighting season. That’s a metaphorical table at which Karzai holds no significant cards, while the Taliban believes that as long as it enjoys Pakistan’s patronage, its hand is sufficient to prompt the U.S. to fold first.
Showing posts with label Taliban negotiations. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Taliban negotiations. Show all posts
Thursday, February 16, 2012
"Taliban reject Karzai claim of secret meetings"
Taliban reject Karzai claim of secret meetings
CNN Wire Staff with contributions by CNN's Josh Levs, Nick Paton Walsh and Masoud Popalzai
February 16, 2012
Kabul - The Taliban rejected a claim Thursday by Afghan President Hamid Karzai that it was taking part in secret talks with the Afghan government.
"The Islamic Emirate strongly rejects Karzai's remarks and adds that the Islamic Emirate has never met with the representatives of the powerless Kabul administration, and has made no decision to hold talks with the Karzai government, even in the future," the Taliban said in a statement e-mailed to CNN.
The statement followed a report in the Wall Street Journal in which Karzai said, "There have been contacts between the U.S. government and the Taliban, there have been contacts between the Afghan government and the Taliban, and there have been some contacts that we have made, all of us together."
Karzai's assertion suggested a change in course for peace efforts, because the Taliban has long publicly refused to meet with Karzai's government, and Afghan officials have complained they were largely sidelined in talks taking place between the United States and the Taliban.
"The last cards are with us. So far, it has been a U.S.-Taliban business. We have not been involved in this so I cannot say what was discussed," an Afghan government official told CNN last month.
In the statement Thursday, the Taliban insisted that "the enemy has only got propaganda left to show off its power, which in reality has been given to them by someone else and only for a few more days" -- an apparent reference to Karzai's government being bolstered by the United States.
"The Islamic Emirate believes that even if somebody claiming to be from the address of the Islamic Emirate has met with Karzai administration, that person is a fake and, like many times before, once again the Karzai government has been deceived."
In a statement Tuesday, Taliban spokesman Zabiullah Mujahid called Karzai's government "a puppet and unauthorized," and said "meeting with them will not be beneficial in solving the issue."
"The issue is ... who is powerful and has got the power to make a decision, and who hasn't, and everyone around the world knows that the one who has got the authority in opposition to the Mujahideen (the Taliban) is America," he wrote.
Last June, Karzai said the United States was involved in peace talks with the Taliban, and that representatives of the government and insurgents had been in touch, but that no high-level meetings had taken place.
Karzai arrived Thursday in Pakistan for discussions with President Asif Ali Zardari on improving relations between the two countries and peace efforts in Afghanistan.
CNN Wire Staff with contributions by CNN's Josh Levs, Nick Paton Walsh and Masoud Popalzai
February 16, 2012
Kabul - The Taliban rejected a claim Thursday by Afghan President Hamid Karzai that it was taking part in secret talks with the Afghan government.
"The Islamic Emirate strongly rejects Karzai's remarks and adds that the Islamic Emirate has never met with the representatives of the powerless Kabul administration, and has made no decision to hold talks with the Karzai government, even in the future," the Taliban said in a statement e-mailed to CNN.
The statement followed a report in the Wall Street Journal in which Karzai said, "There have been contacts between the U.S. government and the Taliban, there have been contacts between the Afghan government and the Taliban, and there have been some contacts that we have made, all of us together."
Karzai's assertion suggested a change in course for peace efforts, because the Taliban has long publicly refused to meet with Karzai's government, and Afghan officials have complained they were largely sidelined in talks taking place between the United States and the Taliban.
"The last cards are with us. So far, it has been a U.S.-Taliban business. We have not been involved in this so I cannot say what was discussed," an Afghan government official told CNN last month.
In the statement Thursday, the Taliban insisted that "the enemy has only got propaganda left to show off its power, which in reality has been given to them by someone else and only for a few more days" -- an apparent reference to Karzai's government being bolstered by the United States.
"The Islamic Emirate believes that even if somebody claiming to be from the address of the Islamic Emirate has met with Karzai administration, that person is a fake and, like many times before, once again the Karzai government has been deceived."
In a statement Tuesday, Taliban spokesman Zabiullah Mujahid called Karzai's government "a puppet and unauthorized," and said "meeting with them will not be beneficial in solving the issue."
"The issue is ... who is powerful and has got the power to make a decision, and who hasn't, and everyone around the world knows that the one who has got the authority in opposition to the Mujahideen (the Taliban) is America," he wrote.
Last June, Karzai said the United States was involved in peace talks with the Taliban, and that representatives of the government and insurgents had been in touch, but that no high-level meetings had taken place.
Karzai arrived Thursday in Pakistan for discussions with President Asif Ali Zardari on improving relations between the two countries and peace efforts in Afghanistan.
Monday, February 13, 2012
"How Afghan Peace Talks Are Splintering the Taliban"
Even if I didn't question the reporters' assertion that Taliban were a unified force before the groups operating under the umbrella name learned of the peace talks, even if "peace talks" with Taliban in no way address the most deadly groups operating in Pakistan (Haqqani Network, al Qaeda, LeT), there is another major issue the reporters don't address: word of the "secret" negotiations is splintering the Afghan Army and spreading renewed fear among Afghan civilians that NATO is selling out their country to Pakistan and a Taliban reign of terror. But for what it's worth, here is the report:
How Afghan Peace Talks Are Splintering the TalibanThe Daily Beast
By Sami Yousafzai and Ron Moreau [Newsweek]
February 13, 2012
Will the Taliban survive talking with the Americans? Many fighters say no.
Ever since he was 20, Ahmad Jamal has been a loyal follower of Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar. He became a supporter back in 1996, the year Omar’s mujahedin marched to power in Kabul, and until late last year he was an active combatant in the war against U.S. and Afghan National Army forces. Even so, something changed when he heard about the secret peace talks between the Americans and the Taliban in the Gulf state of Qatar. Although at first he dismissed the tales as enemy propaganda, the more he heard, the more his worries grew. “Those rumors raised questions in my mind for days and nights,” Jamal says. And eventually he had to admit to himself that the news was true. “When I realized the Taliban was really talking face to face with the Americans—the worst enemies of Islam!—my dream of the holy jihad was washed away,” he says.
That’s when he decided to do something he had never dreamed of: abandon the fight. You don’t tell the Taliban you’re quitting—not if you want to keep living. Still, he had to say goodbye to his 25-year-old kid brother, Ahmad Bilal; the two had been fighting side by side for four years. “I’m not going to risk making my four children orphans and my wife a widow so some Taliban leaders can share power with the American puppet [President Hamid] Karzai in the Presidential Palace,” Jamal says he told Bilal late one night. Then he got rid of his weapon and headed off to rejoin his family in Pakistan, their home since the days of the Soviet occupation. On the way, he passed through Kabul, where he spoke with a Newsweek reporter. “I fought to kick out the infidels from my country and to restore our Islamic regime, not to give up our ideals,” Jamal said as they sat together at a kebab shop. “I cannot trust my leaders anymore.”
Disclosure of the leadership’s secret talks in Qatar—confirmed and driven home by the group’s opening of a liaison office in the emirate’s capital, Doha—has devastated the insurgency’s ranks. The previously unified movement is splitting, if not shattering, as doubts grow among its members about the logic of their once-unshakable commitment to jihad. Many formerly loyal fighters like Jamal have become confused and demoralized. Although there have been no reports so far of any large-scale desertions, some ranking Taliban admit they’re worried about the possibility. “I fear there is a serious risk of defections,” says a Taliban logistics officer. Intentionally or not, Washington’s decision to put out serious peace feelers to the group has sowed dissension among the insurgents, even before the talks have made any real progress.
Veteran commanders are at a loss to explain to their troops exactly what’s happening in Qatar, let alone what the senior leadership is thinking. According to Taliban sources, at least one senior member of the group’s main military council could only throw up his hands in response to his subordinates’ questions, saying, “I don’t know more than I’ve heard on the radio.” That kind of talk is anything but reassuring to the group’s fighters and subcommanders. In the past two years the Taliban’s former strongholds have been hit hard by the Americans’ troop surge and by the Special Operations Forces’ night raids. Now many Taliban worry that after so much hardship and sacrifice, their leaders may be in the process of selling them out. “Mullah Omar has always said fight, fight, fight until the Americans withdraw their troops,” says Rahmatullah, a former insurgent (like many other Afghans he uses a single name). “Suddenly he’s talking to the Americans. How can Mullah Omar cross out 18 years of resistance? It’s impossible for Taliban to understand.”
In the frozen mountains of Maidan-Wardak province, just west of Kabul, Jamal’s younger brother is fighting on—and yet he too harbors doubts about the insurgency’s future. “We were shocked and stunned by the news,” says Bilal, referring to the secret discussions. “I’m afraid these peace talks are a conspiracy to destroy the Taliban, to silence the barrels of our guns,” he says. “Our guns are our beauty and strength,” he continues. “Without them we would be lost forever.” He believes there’s no choice but to keep fighting. “We have to restore our Islamic regime with our weapons, not talk about peace with the infidels,” he says. He keeps telling himself that Omar will never compromise the movement. “I can’t believe that Mullah Omar would sell the blood of our martyrs,” he says. “The Taliban will not stop the jihad until we get a clear message from him.”
Commanders and fighters alike are waiting for some word—any word—from Omar. The reclusive leader hasn’t issued a single verifiable audio or video statement since he was driven from power in late 2001. But considering the disarray in his ranks, he needs to. “Everyone is waiting for a statement from Mullah Omar,” says a Taliban intelligence officer. “They have to hear something from him. And soon.” In fact, there are unconfirmable reports that he did send word orally to several senior commanders via the grapevine late last month. “I will not betray you and compromise the sacrifice of your blood,” the somewhat ambiguous message said, according to one senior Taliban commander who requests anonymity. “My target is to achieve the goal of every Taliban, as we have fought so hard and suffered so much.”
Around the same time, the ruling Quetta Shura’s leadership council sent out a written dispatch—apparently an effort to calm the insurgents’ nerves. A subcommander in Laghman province tells of having attended a meeting where a letter from the council was read aloud. It acknowledged that the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (as the Taliban call their defunct national government) was in the process of opening an office in Qatar. “Apart from continuing the jihad, we want to have a process of negotiations to win the release of prisoners,” the letter said. “We assure you we will not compromise our jihad’s main goal of forcing the U.S. to leave Afghanistan.”
The idea of giving the peace talks a chance may not have much support in the field, but it has traction among rear-echelon Taliban officials and former fighters who continue to believe in the cause. Negotiating with the enemy is not contrary to Islamic teachings, they say. “The Prophet Muhammad talked with and traded with his enemies,” says Rahmatullah, who was arrested in a 2007 night raid and spent two years in U.S. and Afghan detention facilities. “We must talk and reason together.”
Many of these pragmatists want to regain power, but don’t believe it can be done by force of arms. “The talks can help us get politically what we have been trying to win militarily,” says a former senior Taliban minister. They welcome what they see as the American recognition of the insurgency as a viable political force. “It’s good that the U.S. seems ready to end this war and to give the Taliban a role in the future Afghan political system,” says Qazi Habibullah Fauzi, who was the regime’s chargé d’affaires in Saudi Arabia when the Taliban held power. “The question is, after 10 years of fighting has the Taliban gained a political vision that will allow it to take advantage of this opportunity?” says a former senior Taliban diplomat who declined to be quoted by name. “As a former Taliban, my answer is, regrettably, no.”
Everyone, whether for or against negotiations, insists that the insurgents haven’t been brought to the peace table by force. “I’m leaving the jihad not because the Taliban are weak, but because they are dishonoring our ideology,” Jamal says. Rahmatullah agrees. “The Taliban are not weak,” he says. “They can create security problems anywhere, any time. They will slowly come back.” NATO analysts evidently share that view. “Though the Taliban suffered severely in 2011, its strength, motivation, funding, and tactical proficiency remains intact,” says a classified report issued early this year, based on the interrogations of 4,000 Taliban and al Qaeda prisoners. “Many Afghans are already bracing themselves for an eventual return of the Taliban.”
All the same, the insurgency has clearly lost the momentum it had two years ago, before the American surge. Battlefield setbacks in the south, east, and north are believed to be largely responsible for the Taliban’s agreeing to talk. “In the key provinces of Helmand and Kunduz, the Taliban doesn’t exercise one meter of control,” says the Taliban logistics officer, who supports the talks. “We can’t hold ground, and we can’t stop construction and progress, even with IEDs and suicide bombings. It’s time for someone to persuade Mullah Omar to show some flexibility, before we lose everything.”
Nevertheless, there’s no guarantee that even a direct order from Omar himself could get his commanders and fighters to honor a ceasefire. Never mind whether they would go along with the confidence-building measures that are believed to be under discussion. Some Taliban voice doubts that anyone can stop the fighting. “Mullah Omar may not be able to answer his fighters’ questions,” says the Taliban intelligence officer. “Many are addicted to the ideology and the war. It will be difficult, if not impossible, for them to change.”
On the other hand, some former Taliban think the men on the ground could be persuaded to hold their fire—for a while, anyway. When dealing with recalcitrant commanders and fighters, the group’s political operatives are taking the line that the Taliban’s popularity with Afghan villagers would actually be strengthened if the shooting stops and peace comes. “Let’s have and observe a ceasefire and see what happens,” says one Taliban liaison officer. “In the end the Afghan people will support us.” Fauzi agrees. “If the Taliban can show discipline and political maturity during a ceasefire, there’s a strong chance they would gain lots of support in the countryside,” he says.
To do that, the insurgents would have to accept that Afghanistan is not the same as it was 10 years ago. “The Taliban should change and compromise,” says Rahmatullah. “Because the people have changed. Afghans have seen development, technology, and the benefit of knowledge over these past 10 years.” He believes that most Afghans—in the villages, at least—are still undecided about which side to back, and that a cessation of hostilities would favor the insurgents. “The majority of people are not talking but are watching and waiting.”
Breakthroughs at the talks seem vanishingly unlikely in the near term. Any talk of prisoner releases and ceasefires is premature at best; even Taliban who support the negotiations understand that much. “It has taken us months to decide to open an office in Qatar,” says the former Taliban cabinet minister, who is still close to the insurgency. “It’s just the beginning, and we have a very long and difficult way ahead.” The important thing is that some Taliban are finally setting out on that journey.
Sami Yousafzai is Newsweek's correspondent in Pakistan and Afghanistan, where he has covered militancy, al Qaeda, and the Taliban for the magazine since 9/11. He was born in Afghanistan but moved to Pakistan with his family after the Russian invasion in 1979. He began his career as a sports journalist but switched to war reporting in 1997.
Ron Moreau is Newsweek’s Afghanistan and Pakistan correspondent and has been covering the region for the magazine the past 10 years. Since he first joined Newsweek during the Vietnam War, he has reported extensively from Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America.
How Afghan Peace Talks Are Splintering the TalibanThe Daily Beast
By Sami Yousafzai and Ron Moreau [Newsweek]
February 13, 2012
Will the Taliban survive talking with the Americans? Many fighters say no.
Ever since he was 20, Ahmad Jamal has been a loyal follower of Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar. He became a supporter back in 1996, the year Omar’s mujahedin marched to power in Kabul, and until late last year he was an active combatant in the war against U.S. and Afghan National Army forces. Even so, something changed when he heard about the secret peace talks between the Americans and the Taliban in the Gulf state of Qatar. Although at first he dismissed the tales as enemy propaganda, the more he heard, the more his worries grew. “Those rumors raised questions in my mind for days and nights,” Jamal says. And eventually he had to admit to himself that the news was true. “When I realized the Taliban was really talking face to face with the Americans—the worst enemies of Islam!—my dream of the holy jihad was washed away,” he says.
That’s when he decided to do something he had never dreamed of: abandon the fight. You don’t tell the Taliban you’re quitting—not if you want to keep living. Still, he had to say goodbye to his 25-year-old kid brother, Ahmad Bilal; the two had been fighting side by side for four years. “I’m not going to risk making my four children orphans and my wife a widow so some Taliban leaders can share power with the American puppet [President Hamid] Karzai in the Presidential Palace,” Jamal says he told Bilal late one night. Then he got rid of his weapon and headed off to rejoin his family in Pakistan, their home since the days of the Soviet occupation. On the way, he passed through Kabul, where he spoke with a Newsweek reporter. “I fought to kick out the infidels from my country and to restore our Islamic regime, not to give up our ideals,” Jamal said as they sat together at a kebab shop. “I cannot trust my leaders anymore.”
Disclosure of the leadership’s secret talks in Qatar—confirmed and driven home by the group’s opening of a liaison office in the emirate’s capital, Doha—has devastated the insurgency’s ranks. The previously unified movement is splitting, if not shattering, as doubts grow among its members about the logic of their once-unshakable commitment to jihad. Many formerly loyal fighters like Jamal have become confused and demoralized. Although there have been no reports so far of any large-scale desertions, some ranking Taliban admit they’re worried about the possibility. “I fear there is a serious risk of defections,” says a Taliban logistics officer. Intentionally or not, Washington’s decision to put out serious peace feelers to the group has sowed dissension among the insurgents, even before the talks have made any real progress.
Veteran commanders are at a loss to explain to their troops exactly what’s happening in Qatar, let alone what the senior leadership is thinking. According to Taliban sources, at least one senior member of the group’s main military council could only throw up his hands in response to his subordinates’ questions, saying, “I don’t know more than I’ve heard on the radio.” That kind of talk is anything but reassuring to the group’s fighters and subcommanders. In the past two years the Taliban’s former strongholds have been hit hard by the Americans’ troop surge and by the Special Operations Forces’ night raids. Now many Taliban worry that after so much hardship and sacrifice, their leaders may be in the process of selling them out. “Mullah Omar has always said fight, fight, fight until the Americans withdraw their troops,” says Rahmatullah, a former insurgent (like many other Afghans he uses a single name). “Suddenly he’s talking to the Americans. How can Mullah Omar cross out 18 years of resistance? It’s impossible for Taliban to understand.”
In the frozen mountains of Maidan-Wardak province, just west of Kabul, Jamal’s younger brother is fighting on—and yet he too harbors doubts about the insurgency’s future. “We were shocked and stunned by the news,” says Bilal, referring to the secret discussions. “I’m afraid these peace talks are a conspiracy to destroy the Taliban, to silence the barrels of our guns,” he says. “Our guns are our beauty and strength,” he continues. “Without them we would be lost forever.” He believes there’s no choice but to keep fighting. “We have to restore our Islamic regime with our weapons, not talk about peace with the infidels,” he says. He keeps telling himself that Omar will never compromise the movement. “I can’t believe that Mullah Omar would sell the blood of our martyrs,” he says. “The Taliban will not stop the jihad until we get a clear message from him.”
Commanders and fighters alike are waiting for some word—any word—from Omar. The reclusive leader hasn’t issued a single verifiable audio or video statement since he was driven from power in late 2001. But considering the disarray in his ranks, he needs to. “Everyone is waiting for a statement from Mullah Omar,” says a Taliban intelligence officer. “They have to hear something from him. And soon.” In fact, there are unconfirmable reports that he did send word orally to several senior commanders via the grapevine late last month. “I will not betray you and compromise the sacrifice of your blood,” the somewhat ambiguous message said, according to one senior Taliban commander who requests anonymity. “My target is to achieve the goal of every Taliban, as we have fought so hard and suffered so much.”
Around the same time, the ruling Quetta Shura’s leadership council sent out a written dispatch—apparently an effort to calm the insurgents’ nerves. A subcommander in Laghman province tells of having attended a meeting where a letter from the council was read aloud. It acknowledged that the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (as the Taliban call their defunct national government) was in the process of opening an office in Qatar. “Apart from continuing the jihad, we want to have a process of negotiations to win the release of prisoners,” the letter said. “We assure you we will not compromise our jihad’s main goal of forcing the U.S. to leave Afghanistan.”
The idea of giving the peace talks a chance may not have much support in the field, but it has traction among rear-echelon Taliban officials and former fighters who continue to believe in the cause. Negotiating with the enemy is not contrary to Islamic teachings, they say. “The Prophet Muhammad talked with and traded with his enemies,” says Rahmatullah, who was arrested in a 2007 night raid and spent two years in U.S. and Afghan detention facilities. “We must talk and reason together.”
Many of these pragmatists want to regain power, but don’t believe it can be done by force of arms. “The talks can help us get politically what we have been trying to win militarily,” says a former senior Taliban minister. They welcome what they see as the American recognition of the insurgency as a viable political force. “It’s good that the U.S. seems ready to end this war and to give the Taliban a role in the future Afghan political system,” says Qazi Habibullah Fauzi, who was the regime’s chargé d’affaires in Saudi Arabia when the Taliban held power. “The question is, after 10 years of fighting has the Taliban gained a political vision that will allow it to take advantage of this opportunity?” says a former senior Taliban diplomat who declined to be quoted by name. “As a former Taliban, my answer is, regrettably, no.”
Everyone, whether for or against negotiations, insists that the insurgents haven’t been brought to the peace table by force. “I’m leaving the jihad not because the Taliban are weak, but because they are dishonoring our ideology,” Jamal says. Rahmatullah agrees. “The Taliban are not weak,” he says. “They can create security problems anywhere, any time. They will slowly come back.” NATO analysts evidently share that view. “Though the Taliban suffered severely in 2011, its strength, motivation, funding, and tactical proficiency remains intact,” says a classified report issued early this year, based on the interrogations of 4,000 Taliban and al Qaeda prisoners. “Many Afghans are already bracing themselves for an eventual return of the Taliban.”
All the same, the insurgency has clearly lost the momentum it had two years ago, before the American surge. Battlefield setbacks in the south, east, and north are believed to be largely responsible for the Taliban’s agreeing to talk. “In the key provinces of Helmand and Kunduz, the Taliban doesn’t exercise one meter of control,” says the Taliban logistics officer, who supports the talks. “We can’t hold ground, and we can’t stop construction and progress, even with IEDs and suicide bombings. It’s time for someone to persuade Mullah Omar to show some flexibility, before we lose everything.”
Nevertheless, there’s no guarantee that even a direct order from Omar himself could get his commanders and fighters to honor a ceasefire. Never mind whether they would go along with the confidence-building measures that are believed to be under discussion. Some Taliban voice doubts that anyone can stop the fighting. “Mullah Omar may not be able to answer his fighters’ questions,” says the Taliban intelligence officer. “Many are addicted to the ideology and the war. It will be difficult, if not impossible, for them to change.”
On the other hand, some former Taliban think the men on the ground could be persuaded to hold their fire—for a while, anyway. When dealing with recalcitrant commanders and fighters, the group’s political operatives are taking the line that the Taliban’s popularity with Afghan villagers would actually be strengthened if the shooting stops and peace comes. “Let’s have and observe a ceasefire and see what happens,” says one Taliban liaison officer. “In the end the Afghan people will support us.” Fauzi agrees. “If the Taliban can show discipline and political maturity during a ceasefire, there’s a strong chance they would gain lots of support in the countryside,” he says.
To do that, the insurgents would have to accept that Afghanistan is not the same as it was 10 years ago. “The Taliban should change and compromise,” says Rahmatullah. “Because the people have changed. Afghans have seen development, technology, and the benefit of knowledge over these past 10 years.” He believes that most Afghans—in the villages, at least—are still undecided about which side to back, and that a cessation of hostilities would favor the insurgents. “The majority of people are not talking but are watching and waiting.”
Breakthroughs at the talks seem vanishingly unlikely in the near term. Any talk of prisoner releases and ceasefires is premature at best; even Taliban who support the negotiations understand that much. “It has taken us months to decide to open an office in Qatar,” says the former Taliban cabinet minister, who is still close to the insurgency. “It’s just the beginning, and we have a very long and difficult way ahead.” The important thing is that some Taliban are finally setting out on that journey.
Sami Yousafzai is Newsweek's correspondent in Pakistan and Afghanistan, where he has covered militancy, al Qaeda, and the Taliban for the magazine since 9/11. He was born in Afghanistan but moved to Pakistan with his family after the Russian invasion in 1979. He began his career as a sports journalist but switched to war reporting in 1997.
Ron Moreau is Newsweek’s Afghanistan and Pakistan correspondent and has been covering the region for the magazine the past 10 years. Since he first joined Newsweek during the Vietnam War, he has reported extensively from Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America.
Monday, February 6, 2012
Would you buy a used car from Mullah Omar?
"This week, the Afghan government said it wanted to pursue its own talks with the Taliban in Saudi Arabia — a reflection, some officials said, of Mr. Karzai’s frustration that he had been left out of the American effort to help open the office in Qatar. Adding to the complexity is the role of the Pakistanis, who have their own interests."
I'm saving this report because I want to read it six months now in case I should be a good mood then.
Obama Got Message Supporting Talks With Taliban, but Maybe Not From Its Leader
by Mark Landler
February 5, 2012
WASHINGTON - President Obama received a message last year, purporting to be from the elusive Taliban leader Mullah Muhammad Omar, in which he expressed an interest in opening talks that could end the war in Afghanistan, according to several current and former administration officials.
The message, which was received last summer, also pressed Mr. Obama on the issue of releasing Taliban prisoners held in American custody, these officials said. The communication, however, was not signed by Mullah Omar, and its authenticity could not be verified by American officials, some of whom have doubts about whether it came from him or from other Taliban leaders.
Still, as one senior official put it, “it tracks with what we’ve heard from other Taliban intermediaries.” And a former senior official said the White House took the message seriously, whatever its source.
The disclosure of the message comes at a delicate moment, after the Taliban announced that they would open a political office in Qatar and the administration sent a senior diplomat to the Middle East to prepare the ground with allies for resuming preliminary negotiations with a representative of the group.
It also comes as lawmakers on Capitol Hill, and some inside the administration, have expressed opposition to releasing any Taliban prisoners. And it is surfacing as a campaign issue, with the Republican front-runner, Mitt Romney, saying that the nation should not be talking to its enemies.
The White House would not comment on the letter, which was first disclosed Friday by The Associated Press.
Among the hurdles in interpreting the message, officials said, are the mysteries around Mullah Omar, a shadowy figure who served as de facto leader of Afghanistan but who went into hiding after the September 2001 terrorist attacks and whose exact whereabouts and role in the Taliban leadership are not clear.
“The question has always been, ‘Is Mullah Omar in the loop and in favor?’ ” said Bruce O. Riedel, a former intelligence analyst who led the White House’s policy review on Afghanistan in 2009. “A message from him, or purportedly from him, would help answer that $64 million question.”
American intelligence officials believe that Mullah Omar is in hiding in Pakistan, perhaps in Karachi. Some administration officials remain convinced that he plays a central role in directing the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan, and that he would have to be involved in any credible reconciliation process.
If authentic, the message would not be the first time that Mullah Omar has reached out to American officials. In 1998, two days after an American cruise missile strike on an training camp for Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, he unexpectedly telephoned a State Department official, Michael E. Malinowski, who took the call on his porch at 2:30 a.m. According to declassified records, Mullah Omar demanded proof that Osama bin Laden, the intended target of the strike, was involved in terrorism.
The message to Mr. Obama, a former official said, indicated that Mullah Omar was serious about talks. But it also reveals his frustration that the administration seems resistant to releasing Taliban prisoners, the former official said. Under a plan being discussed, at least five senior Taliban prisoners held in the military jail in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, would be transferred to house arrest in Qatar.
Among other hurdles is the role of Afghanistan’s president, Hamid Karzai, whose views on the process have been unpredictable. This week, the Afghan government said it wanted to pursue its own talks with the Taliban in Saudi Arabia — a reflection, some officials said, of Mr. Karzai’s frustration that he had been left out of the American effort to help open the office in Qatar. Adding to the complexity is the role of the Pakistanis, who have their own interests.
The negotiations could also be affected by Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta’s disclosure on Wednesday that American troops planned to end their combat role in Afghanistan in mid-2013, 18 months early — a signal, some analysts said, that the United States was rushing for the exit.
The Obama administration has defended the effort to explore talks with the Taliban, even as it concedes the risks.
“The reality is, we never have the luxury of negotiating for peace with our friends,” said Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton about the initiative earlier this month. “If you’re sitting across the table discussing a peaceful resolution to a conflict, you’re sitting across from people who you by definition don’t agree with and who you may previously have been across a battlefield from.”
Steven Lee Myers contributed reporting.
I'm saving this report because I want to read it six months now in case I should be a good mood then.
Obama Got Message Supporting Talks With Taliban, but Maybe Not From Its Leader
by Mark Landler
February 5, 2012
WASHINGTON - President Obama received a message last year, purporting to be from the elusive Taliban leader Mullah Muhammad Omar, in which he expressed an interest in opening talks that could end the war in Afghanistan, according to several current and former administration officials.
The message, which was received last summer, also pressed Mr. Obama on the issue of releasing Taliban prisoners held in American custody, these officials said. The communication, however, was not signed by Mullah Omar, and its authenticity could not be verified by American officials, some of whom have doubts about whether it came from him or from other Taliban leaders.
Still, as one senior official put it, “it tracks with what we’ve heard from other Taliban intermediaries.” And a former senior official said the White House took the message seriously, whatever its source.
The disclosure of the message comes at a delicate moment, after the Taliban announced that they would open a political office in Qatar and the administration sent a senior diplomat to the Middle East to prepare the ground with allies for resuming preliminary negotiations with a representative of the group.
It also comes as lawmakers on Capitol Hill, and some inside the administration, have expressed opposition to releasing any Taliban prisoners. And it is surfacing as a campaign issue, with the Republican front-runner, Mitt Romney, saying that the nation should not be talking to its enemies.
The White House would not comment on the letter, which was first disclosed Friday by The Associated Press.
Among the hurdles in interpreting the message, officials said, are the mysteries around Mullah Omar, a shadowy figure who served as de facto leader of Afghanistan but who went into hiding after the September 2001 terrorist attacks and whose exact whereabouts and role in the Taliban leadership are not clear.
“The question has always been, ‘Is Mullah Omar in the loop and in favor?’ ” said Bruce O. Riedel, a former intelligence analyst who led the White House’s policy review on Afghanistan in 2009. “A message from him, or purportedly from him, would help answer that $64 million question.”
American intelligence officials believe that Mullah Omar is in hiding in Pakistan, perhaps in Karachi. Some administration officials remain convinced that he plays a central role in directing the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan, and that he would have to be involved in any credible reconciliation process.
If authentic, the message would not be the first time that Mullah Omar has reached out to American officials. In 1998, two days after an American cruise missile strike on an training camp for Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, he unexpectedly telephoned a State Department official, Michael E. Malinowski, who took the call on his porch at 2:30 a.m. According to declassified records, Mullah Omar demanded proof that Osama bin Laden, the intended target of the strike, was involved in terrorism.
The message to Mr. Obama, a former official said, indicated that Mullah Omar was serious about talks. But it also reveals his frustration that the administration seems resistant to releasing Taliban prisoners, the former official said. Under a plan being discussed, at least five senior Taliban prisoners held in the military jail in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, would be transferred to house arrest in Qatar.
Among other hurdles is the role of Afghanistan’s president, Hamid Karzai, whose views on the process have been unpredictable. This week, the Afghan government said it wanted to pursue its own talks with the Taliban in Saudi Arabia — a reflection, some officials said, of Mr. Karzai’s frustration that he had been left out of the American effort to help open the office in Qatar. Adding to the complexity is the role of the Pakistanis, who have their own interests.
The negotiations could also be affected by Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta’s disclosure on Wednesday that American troops planned to end their combat role in Afghanistan in mid-2013, 18 months early — a signal, some analysts said, that the United States was rushing for the exit.
The Obama administration has defended the effort to explore talks with the Taliban, even as it concedes the risks.
“The reality is, we never have the luxury of negotiating for peace with our friends,” said Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton about the initiative earlier this month. “If you’re sitting across the table discussing a peaceful resolution to a conflict, you’re sitting across from people who you by definition don’t agree with and who you may previously have been across a battlefield from.”
Steven Lee Myers contributed reporting.
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