Military comeback a distant dream for Afghan Taliban
By Rob Taylor
February 6, 2012
Reuters
KABUL - A secret NATO report ["The State of the Taliban" -- leaked to the BBC and Times on February 1, 2012] showing the strength of confidence among the Afghan Taliban is raising concerns from Kabul to Washington that the militant group might overrun the country again when foreign combat forces finally leave.
But analysts doubt the militants, who rose from the ashes of Afghanistan's civil war, will be able to again race into the capital in pick-up trucks, hang their opponents in public and once more impose their austere brand of Islam on the country.
Although still much feared, experts say they don't have the military capability to seize control of the whole country when NATO combat troops withdraw in 2014.
Despite the bold predictions of Taliban detainees whose opinions formed the basis of the NATO report, which was leaked last week, circumstances have changed substantially. A partial comeback appears to be the best the Taliban can hope for.
"When they ruled before, many people had fled Afghanistan. There was no young generation. Without much fighting, they captured 90 percent of Afghanistan. But now the situation has completely changed," said Waheed Mujhda, Kabul-based expert on the Taliban.
"They accept that the time has changed. They accept that it's impossible for one party to capture all Afghanistan and rule all over Afghanistan."
The Taliban, ousted after a U.S. invasion in 2001, was able to sweep to power in 1995 partly because it was able to exploit the chaos gripping Afghanistan in the years following the end of the failed Soviet occupation.
DIFFICULT TO TOPPLE GOVERNMENT
The Afghan army and security forces may still be deeply flawed, but their mere size would make it difficult for the Taliban to simply topple the government when NATO troops go.
With an estimated 25,000 fighters at the most, the Taliban is hugely outnumbered by NATO and Afghan forces.
Its budget too is miniscule, put at just $150 million a year. By contrast, the United States has spent some $500 billion on its 10-year war there.
"The government is very fragile but we have to keep in mind it is supported by a 250,000 strong security apparatus ... which is also supported by the international community and these two big elements were missing when the Taliban seized the country in the mid-90s," said Pakistani security analyst Imtiaz Gul.
Without tanks and fighter planes, the Taliban could find itself battling government forces -- and remaining Western special forces - for years.
And a survey by The Asia Foundation showed that the proportion of respondents who say they had some level of sympathy with the motives of armed opposition groups reached its lowest level last year.
Also standing in the way would be the threat of a renewed civil war from the Taliban's old ethnic foes, a small army of Western advisors likely to remain after 2014, and the opposition of many ordinary Afghans.
A surge in U.S. and NATO troop numbers that began in 2010 has suppressed the Taliban on the open battlefield, forcing the insurgency last year to turn to assassinations and high-profile attacks in Kabul to regain a psychological advantage.
Taliban commanders still speak of waging jihad until Islamic rule is restored. But some militants are starting to long for a peaceful end to Afghanistan's years of conflict.
"There are fighters who had suffered losses, lost their family members in fighting and became homeless who want a peaceful solution to the long war," said a Taliban commander who identified himself by his codename Qari Baryal.
In a surprise announcement last month, the Afghan Taliban announced it would open a political office in Qatar, suggesting the group may be willing to negotiate -- for government positions or official control over much of its historical southern heartland.
That also suggests it thinks the odds of a complete takeover are slim and is instead looking for major gains in the political arena.
Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid said it was too soon to say how political maneuvers towards peace negotiations could unfold, although the Taliban was open to conciliation.
But there are questions over how cohesive the Taliban can remain.
Ghulam Jelani Zwak, director of Afghan Analytical and Advisory Centre, said he believes peace talks and the NATO withdrawal will lead to the break up of the Taliban between more extreme insurgents and those willing to accept a peace deal.
"But there is no open sign of disaffection in the Taliban, and so we can only guess at that," he said.
MEDIEVAL JUSTICE
The Taliban's medieval justice and punishment system -- including hangings, oppression of women and amputating the limbs of thieves -- was initially accepted by Afghans because it brought security and an end to a period of chaotic warlord rule.
Today, many Afghans have grown accustomed to improved access for women to education and work, and an economy in which growth has averaged 9.1 percent. Foreign investment has climbed sharply from zero in Taliban days to a peak of $300 million in 2008.
Social networks like Facebook and Twitter are catching on among young Afghans, providing a forum for users to criticize the government and the Taliban.
Kamran Bokhari, a South Asia expert at global intelligence firm STRATFOR, said the Taliban had become interested in a political solution over fighting because it needed both a withdrawal of foreign troops and international acceptance of a more moderate face to take part in eventual power sharing.
For those still fighting against Taliban militants, they remain a formidable foe. They have proven resilient in the face of American-led NATO firepower during the war, outsmarting the best U.S. military minds through the use of homemade bombs, sophisticated high-profile attacks and political savvy.
At remote Afghan army posts, soldiers like Nassem Gul doubt their own ability to repel the Taliban that has kept NATO at bay for over a decade.
"When the Taliban try to overrun our post, we think first to call NATO air support. If there is no air support it is very difficult to fight and even hold this post," said Gul, complaining he needs heavier weapons than his AK-47 rifle.
(Additional reporting by Serena Chaudhry in ISLAMABAD and Hamid Shalizi in KABUL, Editing by Michael Georgy and Jonathan Thatcher)
Wednesday, February 8, 2012
Tuesday, February 7, 2012
US Marines' battlefield experiences with ANA
Behind the Cover Story: Luke Mogelson on the U.S. Endgame in Afghanistan
By Rachel Nolan
February 07, 2012
The New York Times
Nolan interviews reporter who embedded with Marines about their relations with Afghan Army fighters and police units. Overview: he reported the experiences were good or bad, depending on the unit.
By Rachel Nolan
February 07, 2012
The New York Times
Nolan interviews reporter who embedded with Marines about their relations with Afghan Army fighters and police units. Overview: he reported the experiences were good or bad, depending on the unit.
U.S. Lt. Col.: Our military leaders have let us down
See also report from (U.K.)Independent about the colonel's whisteblowing.
"A January 2011 report by the Afghan NGO Security Office noted that public statements made by U.S. and ISAF leaders at the end of 2010 were “sharply divergent from IMF, [international military forces, NGO-speak for ISAF] ‘strategic communication’ messages suggesting improvements. We encourage [nongovernment organization personnel] to recognize that no matter how authoritative the source of any such claim, messages of the nature are solely intended to influence American and European public opinion ahead of the withdrawal, and are not intended to offer an accurate portrayal of the situation for those who live and work here.”
Truth, lies and Afghanistan
By Lt. Col. Daniel L. Davis
February 7, 2012
Armed Forces Journal
How military leaders have let us down
I spent last year in Afghanistan, visiting and talking with U.S. troops and their Afghan partners. My duties with the Army’s Rapid Equipping Force took me into every significant area where our soldiers engage the enemy. Over the course of 12 months, I covered more than 9,000 miles and talked, traveled and patrolled with troops in Kandahar, Kunar, Ghazni, Khost, Paktika, Kunduz, Balkh, Nangarhar and other provinces.
What I saw bore no resemblance to rosy official statements by U.S. military leaders about conditions on the ground.
Entering this deployment, I was sincerely hoping to learn that the claims were true: that conditions in Afghanistan were improving, that the local government and military were progressing toward self-sufficiency. I did not need to witness dramatic improvements to be reassured, but merely hoped to see evidence of positive trends, to see companies or battalions produce even minimal but sustainable progress.
Instead, I witnessed the absence of success on virtually every level.
My arrival in country in late 2010 marked the start of my fourth combat deployment, and my second in Afghanistan. A Regular Army officer in the Armor Branch, I served in Operation Desert Storm, in Afghanistan in 2005-06 and in Iraq in 2008-09. In the middle of my career, I spent eight years in the U.S. Army Reserve and held a number of civilian jobs — among them, legislative correspondent for defense and foreign affairs for Sen. Kay Bailey Hutchison, R-Texas.
As a representative for the Rapid Equipping Force, I set out to talk to our troops about their needs and their circumstances. Along the way, I conducted mounted and dismounted combat patrols, spending time with conventional and Special Forces troops. I interviewed or had conversations with more than 250 soldiers in the field, from the lowest-ranking 19-year-old private to division commanders and staff members at every echelon. I spoke at length with Afghan security officials, Afghan civilians and a few village elders.
I saw the incredible difficulties any military force would have to pacify even a single area of any of those provinces; I heard many stories of how insurgents controlled virtually every piece of land beyond eyeshot of a U.S. or International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) base.
I saw little to no evidence the local governments were able to provide for the basic needs of the people. Some of the Afghan civilians I talked with said the people didn’t want to be connected to a predatory or incapable local government.
From time to time, I observed Afghan Security forces collude with the insurgency.
From Bad to Abysmal
Much of what I saw during my deployment, let alone read or wrote in official reports, I can’t talk about; the information remains classified. But I can say that such reports — mine and others’ — serve to illuminate the gulf between conditions on the ground and official statements of progress.
And I can relate a few representative experiences, of the kind that I observed all over the country.
In January 2011, I made my first trip into the mountains of Kunar province near the Pakistan border to visit the troops of 1st Squadron, 32nd Cavalry. On a patrol to the northernmost U.S. position in eastern Afghanistan, we arrived at an Afghan National Police (ANP) station that had reported being attacked by the Taliban 2½ hours earlier.
Through the interpreter, I asked the police captain where the attack had originated, and he pointed to the side of a nearby mountain.
“What are your normal procedures in situations like these?” I asked. “Do you form up a squad and go after them? Do you periodically send out harassing patrols? What do you do?”
As the interpreter conveyed my questions, the captain’s head wheeled around, looking first at the interpreter and turning to me with an incredulous expression. Then he laughed.
“No! We don’t go after them,” he said. “That would be dangerous!”
According to the cavalry troopers, the Afghan policemen rarely leave the cover of the checkpoints. In that part of the province, the Taliban literally run free.
In June, I was in the Zharay district of Kandahar province, returning to a base from a dismounted patrol. Gunshots were audible as the Taliban attacked a U.S. checkpoint about one mile away.
As I entered the unit’s command post, the commander and his staff were watching a live video feed of the battle. Two ANP vehicles were blocking the main road leading to the site of the attack. The fire was coming from behind a haystack. We watched as two Afghan men emerged, mounted a motorcycle and began moving toward the Afghan policemen in their vehicles.
The U.S. commander turned around and told the Afghan radio operator to make sure the policemen halted the men. The radio operator shouted into the radio repeatedly, but got no answer.
On the screen, we watched as the two men slowly motored past the ANP vehicles. The policemen neither got out to stop the two men nor answered the radio — until the motorcycle was out of sight.
To a man, the U.S. officers in that unit told me they had nothing but contempt for the Afghan troops in their area — and that was before the above incident occurred.
In August, I went on a dismounted patrol with troops in the Panjwai district of Kandahar province. Several troops from the unit had recently been killed in action, one of whom was a very popular and experienced soldier. One of the unit’s senior officers rhetorically asked me, “How do I look these men in the eye and ask them to go out day after day on these missions? What’s harder: How do I look [my soldier’s] wife in the eye when I get back and tell her that her husband died for something meaningful? How do I do that?”
One of the senior enlisted leaders added, “Guys are saying, ‘I hope I live so I can at least get home to R&R leave before I get it,’ or ‘I hope I only lose a foot.’ Sometimes they even say which limb it might be: ‘Maybe it’ll only be my left foot.’ They don’t have a lot of confidence that the leadership two levels up really understands what they’re living here, what the situation really is.”
On Sept. 11, the 10th anniversary of the infamous attack on the U.S., I visited another unit in Kunar province, this one near the town of Asmar. I talked with the local official who served as the cultural adviser to the U.S. commander. Here’s how the conversation went:
Davis: “Here you have many units of the Afghan National Security Forces [ANSF]. Will they be able to hold out against the Taliban when U.S. troops leave this area?”
Adviser: “No. They are definitely not capable. Already all across this region [many elements of] the security forces have made deals with the Taliban. [The ANSF] won’t shoot at the Taliban, and the Taliban won’t shoot them.
“Also, when a Taliban member is arrested, he is soon released with no action taken against him. So when the Taliban returns [when the Americans leave after 2014], so too go the jobs, especially for everyone like me who has worked with the coalition.
“Recently, I got a cellphone call from a Talib who had captured a friend of mine. While I could hear, he began to beat him, telling me I’d better quit working for the Americans. I could hear my friend crying out in pain. [The Talib] said the next time they would kidnap my sons and do the same to them. Because of the direct threats, I’ve had to take my children out of school just to keep them safe.
“And last night, right on that mountain there [he pointed to a ridge overlooking the U.S. base, about 700 meters distant], a member of the ANP was murdered. The Taliban came and called him out, kidnapped him in front of his parents, and took him away and murdered him. He was a member of the ANP from another province and had come back to visit his parents. He was only 27 years old. The people are not safe anywhere.”
That murder took place within view of the U.S. base, a post nominally responsible for the security of an area of hundreds of square kilometers. Imagine how insecure the population is beyond visual range. And yet that conversation was representative of what I saw in many regions of Afghanistan.
In all of the places I visited, the tactical situation was bad to abysmal. If the events I have described — and many, many more I could mention — had been in the first year of war, or even the third or fourth, one might be willing to believe that Afghanistan was just a hard fight, and we should stick it out. Yet these incidents all happened in the 10th year of war.
As the numbers depicting casualties and enemy violence indicate the absence of progress, so too did my observations of the tactical situation all over Afghanistan.
Credibility Gap
I’m hardly the only one who has noted the discrepancy between official statements and the truth on the ground.
A January 2011 report by the Afghan NGO Security Office noted that public statements made by U.S. and ISAF leaders at the end of 2010 were “sharply divergent from IMF, [international military forces, NGO-speak for ISAF] ‘strategic communication’ messages suggesting improvements. We encourage [nongovernment organization personnel] to recognize that no matter how authoritative the source of any such claim, messages of the nature are solely intended to influence American and European public opinion ahead of the withdrawal, and are not intended to offer an accurate portrayal of the situation for those who live and work here.”
The following month, Anthony Cordesman, on behalf of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, wrote that ISAF and the U.S. leadership failed to report accurately on the reality of the situation in Afghanistan.
“Since June 2010, the unclassified reporting the U.S. does provide has steadily shrunk in content, effectively ‘spinning’ the road to victory by eliminating content that illustrates the full scale of the challenges ahead,” Cordesman wrote. “They also, however, were driven by political decisions to ignore or understate Taliban and insurgent gains from 2002 to 2009, to ignore the problems caused by weak and corrupt Afghan governance, to understate the risks posed by sanctuaries in Pakistan, and to ‘spin’ the value of tactical ISAF victories while ignoring the steady growth of Taliban influence and control.”
How many more men must die in support of a mission that is not succeeding and behind an array of more than seven years of optimistic statements by U.S. senior leaders in Afghanistan? No one expects our leaders to always have a successful plan. But we do expect — and the men who do the living, fighting and dying deserve — to have our leaders tell us the truth about what’s going on.
I first encountered senior-level equivocation during a 1997 division-level “experiment” that turned out to be far more setpiece than experiment. Over dinner at Fort Hood, Texas, Training and Doctrine Command leaders told me that the Advanced Warfighter Experiment (AWE) had shown that a “digital division” with fewer troops and more gear could be far more effective than current divisions. The next day, our congressional staff delegation observed the demonstration firsthand, and it didn’t take long to realize there was little substance to the claims. Virtually no legitimate experimentation was actually conducted. All parameters were carefully scripted. All events had a preordained sequence and outcome. The AWE was simply an expensive show, couched in the language of scientific experimentation and presented in glowing press releases and public statements, intended to persuade Congress to fund the Army’s preference. Citing the AWE’s “results,” Army leaders proceeded to eliminate one maneuver company per combat battalion. But the loss of fighting systems was never offset by a commensurate rise in killing capability.
A decade later, in the summer of 2007, I was assigned to the Future Combat Systems (FCS) organization at Fort Bliss, Texas. It didn’t take long to discover that the same thing the Army had done with a single division at Fort Hood in 1997 was now being done on a significantly larger scale with FCS. Year after year, the congressionally mandated reports from the Government Accountability Office revealed significant problems and warned that the system was in danger of failing. Each year, the Army’s senior leaders told members of Congress at hearings that GAO didn’t really understand the full picture and that to the contrary, the program was on schedule, on budget, and headed for success. Ultimately, of course, the program was canceled, with little but spinoffs to show for $18 billion spent.
If Americans were able to compare the public statements many of our leaders have made with classified data, this credibility gulf would be immediately observable. Naturally, I am not authorized to divulge classified material to the public. But I am legally able to share it with members of Congress. I have accordingly provided a much fuller accounting in a classified report to several members of Congress, both Democrats and Republicans, senators and House members.
A nonclassified version is available at www.afghanreport.com. [Editor’s note: At press time, Army public affairs had not yet ruled on whether Davis could post this longer version.]
Tell The Truth
When it comes to deciding what matters are worth plunging our nation into war and which are not, our senior leaders owe it to the nation and to the uniformed members to be candid — graphically, if necessary — in telling them what’s at stake and how expensive potential success is likely to be. U.S. citizens and their elected representatives can decide if the risk to blood and treasure is worth it.
Likewise when having to decide whether to continue a war, alter its aims or to close off a campaign that cannot be won at an acceptable price, our senior leaders have an obligation to tell Congress and American people the unvarnished truth and let the people decide what course of action to choose. That is the very essence of civilian control of the military. The American people deserve better than what they’ve gotten from their senior uniformed leaders over the last number of years. Simply telling the truth would be a good start. AFJ
"A January 2011 report by the Afghan NGO Security Office noted that public statements made by U.S. and ISAF leaders at the end of 2010 were “sharply divergent from IMF, [international military forces, NGO-speak for ISAF] ‘strategic communication’ messages suggesting improvements. We encourage [nongovernment organization personnel] to recognize that no matter how authoritative the source of any such claim, messages of the nature are solely intended to influence American and European public opinion ahead of the withdrawal, and are not intended to offer an accurate portrayal of the situation for those who live and work here.”
Truth, lies and Afghanistan
By Lt. Col. Daniel L. Davis
February 7, 2012
Armed Forces Journal
How military leaders have let us down
I spent last year in Afghanistan, visiting and talking with U.S. troops and their Afghan partners. My duties with the Army’s Rapid Equipping Force took me into every significant area where our soldiers engage the enemy. Over the course of 12 months, I covered more than 9,000 miles and talked, traveled and patrolled with troops in Kandahar, Kunar, Ghazni, Khost, Paktika, Kunduz, Balkh, Nangarhar and other provinces.
What I saw bore no resemblance to rosy official statements by U.S. military leaders about conditions on the ground.
Entering this deployment, I was sincerely hoping to learn that the claims were true: that conditions in Afghanistan were improving, that the local government and military were progressing toward self-sufficiency. I did not need to witness dramatic improvements to be reassured, but merely hoped to see evidence of positive trends, to see companies or battalions produce even minimal but sustainable progress.
Instead, I witnessed the absence of success on virtually every level.
My arrival in country in late 2010 marked the start of my fourth combat deployment, and my second in Afghanistan. A Regular Army officer in the Armor Branch, I served in Operation Desert Storm, in Afghanistan in 2005-06 and in Iraq in 2008-09. In the middle of my career, I spent eight years in the U.S. Army Reserve and held a number of civilian jobs — among them, legislative correspondent for defense and foreign affairs for Sen. Kay Bailey Hutchison, R-Texas.
As a representative for the Rapid Equipping Force, I set out to talk to our troops about their needs and their circumstances. Along the way, I conducted mounted and dismounted combat patrols, spending time with conventional and Special Forces troops. I interviewed or had conversations with more than 250 soldiers in the field, from the lowest-ranking 19-year-old private to division commanders and staff members at every echelon. I spoke at length with Afghan security officials, Afghan civilians and a few village elders.
I saw the incredible difficulties any military force would have to pacify even a single area of any of those provinces; I heard many stories of how insurgents controlled virtually every piece of land beyond eyeshot of a U.S. or International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) base.
I saw little to no evidence the local governments were able to provide for the basic needs of the people. Some of the Afghan civilians I talked with said the people didn’t want to be connected to a predatory or incapable local government.
From time to time, I observed Afghan Security forces collude with the insurgency.
From Bad to Abysmal
Much of what I saw during my deployment, let alone read or wrote in official reports, I can’t talk about; the information remains classified. But I can say that such reports — mine and others’ — serve to illuminate the gulf between conditions on the ground and official statements of progress.
And I can relate a few representative experiences, of the kind that I observed all over the country.
In January 2011, I made my first trip into the mountains of Kunar province near the Pakistan border to visit the troops of 1st Squadron, 32nd Cavalry. On a patrol to the northernmost U.S. position in eastern Afghanistan, we arrived at an Afghan National Police (ANP) station that had reported being attacked by the Taliban 2½ hours earlier.
Through the interpreter, I asked the police captain where the attack had originated, and he pointed to the side of a nearby mountain.
“What are your normal procedures in situations like these?” I asked. “Do you form up a squad and go after them? Do you periodically send out harassing patrols? What do you do?”
As the interpreter conveyed my questions, the captain’s head wheeled around, looking first at the interpreter and turning to me with an incredulous expression. Then he laughed.
“No! We don’t go after them,” he said. “That would be dangerous!”
According to the cavalry troopers, the Afghan policemen rarely leave the cover of the checkpoints. In that part of the province, the Taliban literally run free.
In June, I was in the Zharay district of Kandahar province, returning to a base from a dismounted patrol. Gunshots were audible as the Taliban attacked a U.S. checkpoint about one mile away.
As I entered the unit’s command post, the commander and his staff were watching a live video feed of the battle. Two ANP vehicles were blocking the main road leading to the site of the attack. The fire was coming from behind a haystack. We watched as two Afghan men emerged, mounted a motorcycle and began moving toward the Afghan policemen in their vehicles.
The U.S. commander turned around and told the Afghan radio operator to make sure the policemen halted the men. The radio operator shouted into the radio repeatedly, but got no answer.
On the screen, we watched as the two men slowly motored past the ANP vehicles. The policemen neither got out to stop the two men nor answered the radio — until the motorcycle was out of sight.
To a man, the U.S. officers in that unit told me they had nothing but contempt for the Afghan troops in their area — and that was before the above incident occurred.
In August, I went on a dismounted patrol with troops in the Panjwai district of Kandahar province. Several troops from the unit had recently been killed in action, one of whom was a very popular and experienced soldier. One of the unit’s senior officers rhetorically asked me, “How do I look these men in the eye and ask them to go out day after day on these missions? What’s harder: How do I look [my soldier’s] wife in the eye when I get back and tell her that her husband died for something meaningful? How do I do that?”
One of the senior enlisted leaders added, “Guys are saying, ‘I hope I live so I can at least get home to R&R leave before I get it,’ or ‘I hope I only lose a foot.’ Sometimes they even say which limb it might be: ‘Maybe it’ll only be my left foot.’ They don’t have a lot of confidence that the leadership two levels up really understands what they’re living here, what the situation really is.”
On Sept. 11, the 10th anniversary of the infamous attack on the U.S., I visited another unit in Kunar province, this one near the town of Asmar. I talked with the local official who served as the cultural adviser to the U.S. commander. Here’s how the conversation went:
Davis: “Here you have many units of the Afghan National Security Forces [ANSF]. Will they be able to hold out against the Taliban when U.S. troops leave this area?”
Adviser: “No. They are definitely not capable. Already all across this region [many elements of] the security forces have made deals with the Taliban. [The ANSF] won’t shoot at the Taliban, and the Taliban won’t shoot them.
“Also, when a Taliban member is arrested, he is soon released with no action taken against him. So when the Taliban returns [when the Americans leave after 2014], so too go the jobs, especially for everyone like me who has worked with the coalition.
“Recently, I got a cellphone call from a Talib who had captured a friend of mine. While I could hear, he began to beat him, telling me I’d better quit working for the Americans. I could hear my friend crying out in pain. [The Talib] said the next time they would kidnap my sons and do the same to them. Because of the direct threats, I’ve had to take my children out of school just to keep them safe.
“And last night, right on that mountain there [he pointed to a ridge overlooking the U.S. base, about 700 meters distant], a member of the ANP was murdered. The Taliban came and called him out, kidnapped him in front of his parents, and took him away and murdered him. He was a member of the ANP from another province and had come back to visit his parents. He was only 27 years old. The people are not safe anywhere.”
That murder took place within view of the U.S. base, a post nominally responsible for the security of an area of hundreds of square kilometers. Imagine how insecure the population is beyond visual range. And yet that conversation was representative of what I saw in many regions of Afghanistan.
In all of the places I visited, the tactical situation was bad to abysmal. If the events I have described — and many, many more I could mention — had been in the first year of war, or even the third or fourth, one might be willing to believe that Afghanistan was just a hard fight, and we should stick it out. Yet these incidents all happened in the 10th year of war.
As the numbers depicting casualties and enemy violence indicate the absence of progress, so too did my observations of the tactical situation all over Afghanistan.
Credibility Gap
I’m hardly the only one who has noted the discrepancy between official statements and the truth on the ground.
A January 2011 report by the Afghan NGO Security Office noted that public statements made by U.S. and ISAF leaders at the end of 2010 were “sharply divergent from IMF, [international military forces, NGO-speak for ISAF] ‘strategic communication’ messages suggesting improvements. We encourage [nongovernment organization personnel] to recognize that no matter how authoritative the source of any such claim, messages of the nature are solely intended to influence American and European public opinion ahead of the withdrawal, and are not intended to offer an accurate portrayal of the situation for those who live and work here.”
The following month, Anthony Cordesman, on behalf of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, wrote that ISAF and the U.S. leadership failed to report accurately on the reality of the situation in Afghanistan.
“Since June 2010, the unclassified reporting the U.S. does provide has steadily shrunk in content, effectively ‘spinning’ the road to victory by eliminating content that illustrates the full scale of the challenges ahead,” Cordesman wrote. “They also, however, were driven by political decisions to ignore or understate Taliban and insurgent gains from 2002 to 2009, to ignore the problems caused by weak and corrupt Afghan governance, to understate the risks posed by sanctuaries in Pakistan, and to ‘spin’ the value of tactical ISAF victories while ignoring the steady growth of Taliban influence and control.”
How many more men must die in support of a mission that is not succeeding and behind an array of more than seven years of optimistic statements by U.S. senior leaders in Afghanistan? No one expects our leaders to always have a successful plan. But we do expect — and the men who do the living, fighting and dying deserve — to have our leaders tell us the truth about what’s going on.
I first encountered senior-level equivocation during a 1997 division-level “experiment” that turned out to be far more setpiece than experiment. Over dinner at Fort Hood, Texas, Training and Doctrine Command leaders told me that the Advanced Warfighter Experiment (AWE) had shown that a “digital division” with fewer troops and more gear could be far more effective than current divisions. The next day, our congressional staff delegation observed the demonstration firsthand, and it didn’t take long to realize there was little substance to the claims. Virtually no legitimate experimentation was actually conducted. All parameters were carefully scripted. All events had a preordained sequence and outcome. The AWE was simply an expensive show, couched in the language of scientific experimentation and presented in glowing press releases and public statements, intended to persuade Congress to fund the Army’s preference. Citing the AWE’s “results,” Army leaders proceeded to eliminate one maneuver company per combat battalion. But the loss of fighting systems was never offset by a commensurate rise in killing capability.
A decade later, in the summer of 2007, I was assigned to the Future Combat Systems (FCS) organization at Fort Bliss, Texas. It didn’t take long to discover that the same thing the Army had done with a single division at Fort Hood in 1997 was now being done on a significantly larger scale with FCS. Year after year, the congressionally mandated reports from the Government Accountability Office revealed significant problems and warned that the system was in danger of failing. Each year, the Army’s senior leaders told members of Congress at hearings that GAO didn’t really understand the full picture and that to the contrary, the program was on schedule, on budget, and headed for success. Ultimately, of course, the program was canceled, with little but spinoffs to show for $18 billion spent.
If Americans were able to compare the public statements many of our leaders have made with classified data, this credibility gulf would be immediately observable. Naturally, I am not authorized to divulge classified material to the public. But I am legally able to share it with members of Congress. I have accordingly provided a much fuller accounting in a classified report to several members of Congress, both Democrats and Republicans, senators and House members.
A nonclassified version is available at www.afghanreport.com. [Editor’s note: At press time, Army public affairs had not yet ruled on whether Davis could post this longer version.]
Tell The Truth
When it comes to deciding what matters are worth plunging our nation into war and which are not, our senior leaders owe it to the nation and to the uniformed members to be candid — graphically, if necessary — in telling them what’s at stake and how expensive potential success is likely to be. U.S. citizens and their elected representatives can decide if the risk to blood and treasure is worth it.
Likewise when having to decide whether to continue a war, alter its aims or to close off a campaign that cannot be won at an acceptable price, our senior leaders have an obligation to tell Congress and American people the unvarnished truth and let the people decide what course of action to choose. That is the very essence of civilian control of the military. The American people deserve better than what they’ve gotten from their senior uniformed leaders over the last number of years. Simply telling the truth would be a good start. AFJ
Monday, February 6, 2012
Would you buy a used car from Mullah Omar?
"This week, the Afghan government said it wanted to pursue its own talks with the Taliban in Saudi Arabia — a reflection, some officials said, of Mr. Karzai’s frustration that he had been left out of the American effort to help open the office in Qatar. Adding to the complexity is the role of the Pakistanis, who have their own interests."
I'm saving this report because I want to read it six months now in case I should be a good mood then.
Obama Got Message Supporting Talks With Taliban, but Maybe Not From Its Leader
by Mark Landler
February 5, 2012
WASHINGTON - President Obama received a message last year, purporting to be from the elusive Taliban leader Mullah Muhammad Omar, in which he expressed an interest in opening talks that could end the war in Afghanistan, according to several current and former administration officials.
The message, which was received last summer, also pressed Mr. Obama on the issue of releasing Taliban prisoners held in American custody, these officials said. The communication, however, was not signed by Mullah Omar, and its authenticity could not be verified by American officials, some of whom have doubts about whether it came from him or from other Taliban leaders.
Still, as one senior official put it, “it tracks with what we’ve heard from other Taliban intermediaries.” And a former senior official said the White House took the message seriously, whatever its source.
The disclosure of the message comes at a delicate moment, after the Taliban announced that they would open a political office in Qatar and the administration sent a senior diplomat to the Middle East to prepare the ground with allies for resuming preliminary negotiations with a representative of the group.
It also comes as lawmakers on Capitol Hill, and some inside the administration, have expressed opposition to releasing any Taliban prisoners. And it is surfacing as a campaign issue, with the Republican front-runner, Mitt Romney, saying that the nation should not be talking to its enemies.
The White House would not comment on the letter, which was first disclosed Friday by The Associated Press.
Among the hurdles in interpreting the message, officials said, are the mysteries around Mullah Omar, a shadowy figure who served as de facto leader of Afghanistan but who went into hiding after the September 2001 terrorist attacks and whose exact whereabouts and role in the Taliban leadership are not clear.
“The question has always been, ‘Is Mullah Omar in the loop and in favor?’ ” said Bruce O. Riedel, a former intelligence analyst who led the White House’s policy review on Afghanistan in 2009. “A message from him, or purportedly from him, would help answer that $64 million question.”
American intelligence officials believe that Mullah Omar is in hiding in Pakistan, perhaps in Karachi. Some administration officials remain convinced that he plays a central role in directing the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan, and that he would have to be involved in any credible reconciliation process.
If authentic, the message would not be the first time that Mullah Omar has reached out to American officials. In 1998, two days after an American cruise missile strike on an training camp for Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, he unexpectedly telephoned a State Department official, Michael E. Malinowski, who took the call on his porch at 2:30 a.m. According to declassified records, Mullah Omar demanded proof that Osama bin Laden, the intended target of the strike, was involved in terrorism.
The message to Mr. Obama, a former official said, indicated that Mullah Omar was serious about talks. But it also reveals his frustration that the administration seems resistant to releasing Taliban prisoners, the former official said. Under a plan being discussed, at least five senior Taliban prisoners held in the military jail in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, would be transferred to house arrest in Qatar.
Among other hurdles is the role of Afghanistan’s president, Hamid Karzai, whose views on the process have been unpredictable. This week, the Afghan government said it wanted to pursue its own talks with the Taliban in Saudi Arabia — a reflection, some officials said, of Mr. Karzai’s frustration that he had been left out of the American effort to help open the office in Qatar. Adding to the complexity is the role of the Pakistanis, who have their own interests.
The negotiations could also be affected by Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta’s disclosure on Wednesday that American troops planned to end their combat role in Afghanistan in mid-2013, 18 months early — a signal, some analysts said, that the United States was rushing for the exit.
The Obama administration has defended the effort to explore talks with the Taliban, even as it concedes the risks.
“The reality is, we never have the luxury of negotiating for peace with our friends,” said Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton about the initiative earlier this month. “If you’re sitting across the table discussing a peaceful resolution to a conflict, you’re sitting across from people who you by definition don’t agree with and who you may previously have been across a battlefield from.”
Steven Lee Myers contributed reporting.
I'm saving this report because I want to read it six months now in case I should be a good mood then.
Obama Got Message Supporting Talks With Taliban, but Maybe Not From Its Leader
by Mark Landler
February 5, 2012
WASHINGTON - President Obama received a message last year, purporting to be from the elusive Taliban leader Mullah Muhammad Omar, in which he expressed an interest in opening talks that could end the war in Afghanistan, according to several current and former administration officials.
The message, which was received last summer, also pressed Mr. Obama on the issue of releasing Taliban prisoners held in American custody, these officials said. The communication, however, was not signed by Mullah Omar, and its authenticity could not be verified by American officials, some of whom have doubts about whether it came from him or from other Taliban leaders.
Still, as one senior official put it, “it tracks with what we’ve heard from other Taliban intermediaries.” And a former senior official said the White House took the message seriously, whatever its source.
The disclosure of the message comes at a delicate moment, after the Taliban announced that they would open a political office in Qatar and the administration sent a senior diplomat to the Middle East to prepare the ground with allies for resuming preliminary negotiations with a representative of the group.
It also comes as lawmakers on Capitol Hill, and some inside the administration, have expressed opposition to releasing any Taliban prisoners. And it is surfacing as a campaign issue, with the Republican front-runner, Mitt Romney, saying that the nation should not be talking to its enemies.
The White House would not comment on the letter, which was first disclosed Friday by The Associated Press.
Among the hurdles in interpreting the message, officials said, are the mysteries around Mullah Omar, a shadowy figure who served as de facto leader of Afghanistan but who went into hiding after the September 2001 terrorist attacks and whose exact whereabouts and role in the Taliban leadership are not clear.
“The question has always been, ‘Is Mullah Omar in the loop and in favor?’ ” said Bruce O. Riedel, a former intelligence analyst who led the White House’s policy review on Afghanistan in 2009. “A message from him, or purportedly from him, would help answer that $64 million question.”
American intelligence officials believe that Mullah Omar is in hiding in Pakistan, perhaps in Karachi. Some administration officials remain convinced that he plays a central role in directing the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan, and that he would have to be involved in any credible reconciliation process.
If authentic, the message would not be the first time that Mullah Omar has reached out to American officials. In 1998, two days after an American cruise missile strike on an training camp for Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, he unexpectedly telephoned a State Department official, Michael E. Malinowski, who took the call on his porch at 2:30 a.m. According to declassified records, Mullah Omar demanded proof that Osama bin Laden, the intended target of the strike, was involved in terrorism.
The message to Mr. Obama, a former official said, indicated that Mullah Omar was serious about talks. But it also reveals his frustration that the administration seems resistant to releasing Taliban prisoners, the former official said. Under a plan being discussed, at least five senior Taliban prisoners held in the military jail in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, would be transferred to house arrest in Qatar.
Among other hurdles is the role of Afghanistan’s president, Hamid Karzai, whose views on the process have been unpredictable. This week, the Afghan government said it wanted to pursue its own talks with the Taliban in Saudi Arabia — a reflection, some officials said, of Mr. Karzai’s frustration that he had been left out of the American effort to help open the office in Qatar. Adding to the complexity is the role of the Pakistanis, who have their own interests.
The negotiations could also be affected by Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta’s disclosure on Wednesday that American troops planned to end their combat role in Afghanistan in mid-2013, 18 months early — a signal, some analysts said, that the United States was rushing for the exit.
The Obama administration has defended the effort to explore talks with the Taliban, even as it concedes the risks.
“The reality is, we never have the luxury of negotiating for peace with our friends,” said Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton about the initiative earlier this month. “If you’re sitting across the table discussing a peaceful resolution to a conflict, you’re sitting across from people who you by definition don’t agree with and who you may previously have been across a battlefield from.”
Steven Lee Myers contributed reporting.
Sunday, February 5, 2012
Economist editorial: Price of NATO's failure in Afghanistan
The spectre of comparisons
The Economist
February 5, 2012
RELISHING their country’s reputation as the graveyard of empires, Afghans are proud of having vanquished all the foreign armies that have ventured onto their soil. Yet the Soviet army, the most recent, was not exactly defeated: it withdrew in 1989 because it had wearied of an unpopular war that it struggled to justify to the people at home. Nearly 25 years later, America and its allies risk a similar failure of nerve and will.
This week Leon Panetta, America’s defence secretary, has aired hopes that NATO soldiers in Afghanistan can finish their combat mission as much as 18 months early—by the second half of next year, rather than the end of 2014 (see article). He has also raised doubts that the outside world can afford to stick to its plans to pay for a permanent 350,000-strong Afghan security force. Such a shift has obvious attractions. Operations in Afghanistan cost a fortune and take precious lives. It does not help that some of the killers are NATO’s supposed partners: rogue Afghan soldiers murdered four unarmed French trainers last month and an American marine just this week.
It is estimated to cost $1m to keep an American soldier in Afghanistan for a year—and some 90,000 are there, along with a further 40,000 from nearly 50 other countries. At a time when money is short, this is a huge sum. Moreover, the Obama administration has other strategic priorities. It wants to “pivot” eastward, to soothe maritime nerves jangled by China’s rise (see Banyan). And then there are elections, in France, America and elsewhere. Incumbents want to campaign as the men who are bringing the boys home.
For three reasons, however, succumbing to such electoral temptations, by even voicing the possibility of an early drawdown, is a mistake. First, limiting NATO’s combat role and the strength of Afghan forces threatens the “transition” to a counter-insurgency war almost entirely waged by locals. This has been bearing fruit: violence is down in Helmand and Kandahar provinces; better-trained Afghan troops are proving their mettle against the Taliban; surveys of Afghan opinion suggest that the Taliban’s popularity has fallen dramatically. Even so, the deadline of 2014 was always going to be difficult to meet. Nothing suggests that it can safely be brought forward, or that Afghanistan can get by with fewer troops.
Second, 2014 is a crucial year in Afghan politics. Foreign forces will be needed to secure the vote for a successor to the president, Hamid Karzai. Their absence might even tempt him to renege on his promise not to seek an (unconstitutional) third term. And third, just as progress has been made in bringing the Taliban into peace talks, whispers of an early withdrawal will only encourage their intransigence. They have always said that the foreigners have the watches, but they have the time. Pakistan, whose continued clandestine support for the Taliban was catalogued in a leaked NATO report this week, will have little incentive to turn against its old partners-in-jihad.
The price of failure
An early transition may mean that the West will leave Afghanistan without completing its first, limited goal—to stop the country providing a base for al-Qaeda and its fellow jihadis. Moreover, Afghanistan is at greater risk of becoming a swamp that festers regional rivalries—especially that between India and Pakistan. These would soon become America’s business. Lastly, the whole sorry story will send a chilling message everywhere about the worth of Western commitments.
The Economist
February 5, 2012
RELISHING their country’s reputation as the graveyard of empires, Afghans are proud of having vanquished all the foreign armies that have ventured onto their soil. Yet the Soviet army, the most recent, was not exactly defeated: it withdrew in 1989 because it had wearied of an unpopular war that it struggled to justify to the people at home. Nearly 25 years later, America and its allies risk a similar failure of nerve and will.
This week Leon Panetta, America’s defence secretary, has aired hopes that NATO soldiers in Afghanistan can finish their combat mission as much as 18 months early—by the second half of next year, rather than the end of 2014 (see article). He has also raised doubts that the outside world can afford to stick to its plans to pay for a permanent 350,000-strong Afghan security force. Such a shift has obvious attractions. Operations in Afghanistan cost a fortune and take precious lives. It does not help that some of the killers are NATO’s supposed partners: rogue Afghan soldiers murdered four unarmed French trainers last month and an American marine just this week.
It is estimated to cost $1m to keep an American soldier in Afghanistan for a year—and some 90,000 are there, along with a further 40,000 from nearly 50 other countries. At a time when money is short, this is a huge sum. Moreover, the Obama administration has other strategic priorities. It wants to “pivot” eastward, to soothe maritime nerves jangled by China’s rise (see Banyan). And then there are elections, in France, America and elsewhere. Incumbents want to campaign as the men who are bringing the boys home.
For three reasons, however, succumbing to such electoral temptations, by even voicing the possibility of an early drawdown, is a mistake. First, limiting NATO’s combat role and the strength of Afghan forces threatens the “transition” to a counter-insurgency war almost entirely waged by locals. This has been bearing fruit: violence is down in Helmand and Kandahar provinces; better-trained Afghan troops are proving their mettle against the Taliban; surveys of Afghan opinion suggest that the Taliban’s popularity has fallen dramatically. Even so, the deadline of 2014 was always going to be difficult to meet. Nothing suggests that it can safely be brought forward, or that Afghanistan can get by with fewer troops.
Second, 2014 is a crucial year in Afghan politics. Foreign forces will be needed to secure the vote for a successor to the president, Hamid Karzai. Their absence might even tempt him to renege on his promise not to seek an (unconstitutional) third term. And third, just as progress has been made in bringing the Taliban into peace talks, whispers of an early withdrawal will only encourage their intransigence. They have always said that the foreigners have the watches, but they have the time. Pakistan, whose continued clandestine support for the Taliban was catalogued in a leaked NATO report this week, will have little incentive to turn against its old partners-in-jihad.
The price of failure
An early transition may mean that the West will leave Afghanistan without completing its first, limited goal—to stop the country providing a base for al-Qaeda and its fellow jihadis. Moreover, Afghanistan is at greater risk of becoming a swamp that festers regional rivalries—especially that between India and Pakistan. These would soon become America’s business. Lastly, the whole sorry story will send a chilling message everywhere about the worth of Western commitments.
Thursday, February 2, 2012
Impact of U.S. announcement of 2013 combat troop drawdown
Early End to U.S. Combat Role in Afghanistan Draws Cheers, Jeers, Confusion
by Jim Lobe
February 2, 2012
IPS News
WASHINGTON, Feb 2, 2012 (IPS) - U.S. Defence Secretary Leon Panetta's surprise announcement Wednesday that U.S. troops will phase out their combat role in Afghanistan by mid-2013 is drawing mixed reactions, as well as a fair bit of confusion, from both critics and supporters of the 11-year-old war here.
The frontrunner for the Republican presidential nomination, Mitt Romney, called the decision "misguided" and "naïve". Neo- conservatives and other hawks charged that it was politically motivated and would result in the return of the Taliban to Kabul little more than a decade after a U.S-coordinated military campaign chased their leadership into Pakistan.
"Only in some alternative universe is this a winning strategy," complained Max Boot, a neo-conservative military analyst at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). "In the world we actually inhabit it is a recipe for a slow-motion – or maybe not so slow – catastrophe."
But the war's critics, many of whom were deeply disappointed by President Barack Obama's decision shortly after taking office in 2009 to send substantially more troops to Afghanistan, cheered Panetta's announcement.
"This is good news," said Matthew Hoh, a former Marine officer and State Department adviser in Afghanistan who until recently directed the Afghanistan Study Group here. "What we've needed to do for some time is to transition from a belligerent in the conflict to a mediator focused on facilitating an inclusive political settlement. This appears intended to do that."
Whether that was indeed the intention remained unclear Thursday, however, as the senior officials here insisted that Panetta's announcement did not signal a major shift in U.S. or NATO strategy which had set the deadline for all security tasks to be transferred to Afghan forces by the end of 2014.
"This was an assessment of what could happen within the context of the stated policy of NATO, which is to transfer the security lead to the Afghan security forces by 2014, and, within that …timeline, the transition will take place," White House spokesman Jay Carney told reporters.
Similarly, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) director, Gen. (ret.) David Petraeus, the architect of the U.S. counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan, insisted that Panetta's remarks were consistent with previous planning.
"This is exactly in line with the policy that we started back in the summer of 2011, transitioning leadership of combat operations from ISAF (the International Security Assistance Force) to Afghan forces and then progressively complete it by the end of 2014," he told congressmen on Capitol Hill.
Panetta's remarks, which clearly also took the government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai and U.S. allies by surprise, were made to reporters while he was en route to a NATO conference in Brussels.
Not only did he say that Washington hoped to end the U.S. combat role by mid-2013 – 18 months before the end-of-2014 deadline – but he also indicated that NATO will likely cancel plans to expand the size of Afghanistan's security forces from the current 310,000 to 350,000 soldiers and police.
His remarks came at a critical moment on a number of fronts.
With Washington's and Pakistan's apparent backing, the Taliban has established an office in Qatar where they have been engaged in talks with U.S. officials over confidence-building measures, such as the return of Taliban detainees imprisoned in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, that could lead to broader peace talks.
At the same time, Karzai, who only reluctantly endorsed the Doha talks, has reportedly been pushing to open a separate negotiating channel to begin negotiations under the auspices of Saudi Arabia.
While cooperating with U.S. efforts to engage the Taliban, Islamabad has continued to reject U.S. appeals to reopen NATO supply routes through Pakistani territory that were closed in late November to protest the accidental killing by U.S. warplanes of 24 Pakistani troops at a border post.
As a result, Washington has been made to rely almost exclusively on the Northern Supply Network through Central Asia, making logistical support for the troops far more expensive. The U.S. has already budgeted more than 90 billion dollars for the war this year.
In the wake of the killing of four French Legionnaires by an Afghan soldier - the latest in a lengthy series of such incidents against NATO troops - French President Nicolas Sarkozy last week announced that he will withdraw all 3,600 French combat troops by the end 2013, a year earlier than previously scheduled.
Amidst all these developments, the leak this week of a sensitive NATO report based on the interrogation of some 4,000 Taliban detainees in Afghanistan shed new and very discouraging light on both the degree to which Pakistan's military intelligence agency (ISI) has backed - even controlled - the Taliban and the confidence of Taliban militants themselves that they are winning the war.
The report also noted that the Taliban was receiving support from Afghan government officials, including Army units in areas from which NATO forces had withdrawn. The government "continues to declare its willingness to fight, yet many of its personnel have secretly reached out to insurgents, seeking long-term options in the event of a possible Taliban victory," according to the report.
The thrust of the report - that NATO forces have failed to stop, let alone reverse, the Taliban's momentum - strongly contradicted the more-optimistic assessments by U.S. and NATO field commanders and is certain to fuel growing public sentiment in the West, including the U.S., that the war has not been worth the expense in blood and treasure.
In the last major nationwide poll conducted on Afghanistan in mid- January, 56 percent of respondents said U.S. troops should be withdrawn "as soon as possible".
Washington currently has some 90,000 troops in Afghanistan, down from a high of just over 100,000 last summer. It plans to withdraw another 22,000 by the end of this summer. In his remarks Wednesday, Panetta stressed that no decision had been made regarding the pace of the withdrawal of the remaining 68,000 troops.
According to Leslie Gelb, president emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations, however, Panetta's remarks suggest that the administration has adopted a strategy to end "America's major military footprint in Afghanistan well before the previous December 2014 deadline," but that won't be clear until after the presidential elections here in November.
Writing for the Daily Beast website, Gelb claimed that Panetta, Vice President Joe Biden, and National Security Adviser Tom Donilon had become convinced late last year that, with the death last May of Osama bin Laden and the successful disruption of his Al-Qaeda, U.S. interests in Afghanistan "were no longer vital, and that more American deaths and billions (of dollars) in costs were no longer worthwhile."
As a result, even while continuing efforts to target senior and mid- ranking Taliban commanders, Washington is now focusing its efforts on a negotiated settlement.
But whether that will be possible, particularly given the apparent confidence of the Taliban, remains very much in doubt.
"The Taliban are a much larger organisation than they were a couple of years ago, and we've ruined our relationship with Pakistan," according to Hoh, who blames Petraeus' aggressive "surge" strategy for these setbacks.
"The policy has clearly failed, and now we're to put some kind of settlement together before we leave, and there's a real possibility that will fail."
*Jim Lobe's blog on U.S. foreign policy can be read at:
http://www.lobelog.com.
by Jim Lobe
February 2, 2012
IPS News
WASHINGTON, Feb 2, 2012 (IPS) - U.S. Defence Secretary Leon Panetta's surprise announcement Wednesday that U.S. troops will phase out their combat role in Afghanistan by mid-2013 is drawing mixed reactions, as well as a fair bit of confusion, from both critics and supporters of the 11-year-old war here.
The frontrunner for the Republican presidential nomination, Mitt Romney, called the decision "misguided" and "naïve". Neo- conservatives and other hawks charged that it was politically motivated and would result in the return of the Taliban to Kabul little more than a decade after a U.S-coordinated military campaign chased their leadership into Pakistan.
"Only in some alternative universe is this a winning strategy," complained Max Boot, a neo-conservative military analyst at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). "In the world we actually inhabit it is a recipe for a slow-motion – or maybe not so slow – catastrophe."
But the war's critics, many of whom were deeply disappointed by President Barack Obama's decision shortly after taking office in 2009 to send substantially more troops to Afghanistan, cheered Panetta's announcement.
"This is good news," said Matthew Hoh, a former Marine officer and State Department adviser in Afghanistan who until recently directed the Afghanistan Study Group here. "What we've needed to do for some time is to transition from a belligerent in the conflict to a mediator focused on facilitating an inclusive political settlement. This appears intended to do that."
Whether that was indeed the intention remained unclear Thursday, however, as the senior officials here insisted that Panetta's announcement did not signal a major shift in U.S. or NATO strategy which had set the deadline for all security tasks to be transferred to Afghan forces by the end of 2014.
"This was an assessment of what could happen within the context of the stated policy of NATO, which is to transfer the security lead to the Afghan security forces by 2014, and, within that …timeline, the transition will take place," White House spokesman Jay Carney told reporters.
Similarly, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) director, Gen. (ret.) David Petraeus, the architect of the U.S. counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan, insisted that Panetta's remarks were consistent with previous planning.
"This is exactly in line with the policy that we started back in the summer of 2011, transitioning leadership of combat operations from ISAF (the International Security Assistance Force) to Afghan forces and then progressively complete it by the end of 2014," he told congressmen on Capitol Hill.
Panetta's remarks, which clearly also took the government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai and U.S. allies by surprise, were made to reporters while he was en route to a NATO conference in Brussels.
Not only did he say that Washington hoped to end the U.S. combat role by mid-2013 – 18 months before the end-of-2014 deadline – but he also indicated that NATO will likely cancel plans to expand the size of Afghanistan's security forces from the current 310,000 to 350,000 soldiers and police.
His remarks came at a critical moment on a number of fronts.
With Washington's and Pakistan's apparent backing, the Taliban has established an office in Qatar where they have been engaged in talks with U.S. officials over confidence-building measures, such as the return of Taliban detainees imprisoned in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, that could lead to broader peace talks.
At the same time, Karzai, who only reluctantly endorsed the Doha talks, has reportedly been pushing to open a separate negotiating channel to begin negotiations under the auspices of Saudi Arabia.
While cooperating with U.S. efforts to engage the Taliban, Islamabad has continued to reject U.S. appeals to reopen NATO supply routes through Pakistani territory that were closed in late November to protest the accidental killing by U.S. warplanes of 24 Pakistani troops at a border post.
As a result, Washington has been made to rely almost exclusively on the Northern Supply Network through Central Asia, making logistical support for the troops far more expensive. The U.S. has already budgeted more than 90 billion dollars for the war this year.
In the wake of the killing of four French Legionnaires by an Afghan soldier - the latest in a lengthy series of such incidents against NATO troops - French President Nicolas Sarkozy last week announced that he will withdraw all 3,600 French combat troops by the end 2013, a year earlier than previously scheduled.
Amidst all these developments, the leak this week of a sensitive NATO report based on the interrogation of some 4,000 Taliban detainees in Afghanistan shed new and very discouraging light on both the degree to which Pakistan's military intelligence agency (ISI) has backed - even controlled - the Taliban and the confidence of Taliban militants themselves that they are winning the war.
The report also noted that the Taliban was receiving support from Afghan government officials, including Army units in areas from which NATO forces had withdrawn. The government "continues to declare its willingness to fight, yet many of its personnel have secretly reached out to insurgents, seeking long-term options in the event of a possible Taliban victory," according to the report.
The thrust of the report - that NATO forces have failed to stop, let alone reverse, the Taliban's momentum - strongly contradicted the more-optimistic assessments by U.S. and NATO field commanders and is certain to fuel growing public sentiment in the West, including the U.S., that the war has not been worth the expense in blood and treasure.
In the last major nationwide poll conducted on Afghanistan in mid- January, 56 percent of respondents said U.S. troops should be withdrawn "as soon as possible".
Washington currently has some 90,000 troops in Afghanistan, down from a high of just over 100,000 last summer. It plans to withdraw another 22,000 by the end of this summer. In his remarks Wednesday, Panetta stressed that no decision had been made regarding the pace of the withdrawal of the remaining 68,000 troops.
According to Leslie Gelb, president emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations, however, Panetta's remarks suggest that the administration has adopted a strategy to end "America's major military footprint in Afghanistan well before the previous December 2014 deadline," but that won't be clear until after the presidential elections here in November.
Writing for the Daily Beast website, Gelb claimed that Panetta, Vice President Joe Biden, and National Security Adviser Tom Donilon had become convinced late last year that, with the death last May of Osama bin Laden and the successful disruption of his Al-Qaeda, U.S. interests in Afghanistan "were no longer vital, and that more American deaths and billions (of dollars) in costs were no longer worthwhile."
As a result, even while continuing efforts to target senior and mid- ranking Taliban commanders, Washington is now focusing its efforts on a negotiated settlement.
But whether that will be possible, particularly given the apparent confidence of the Taliban, remains very much in doubt.
"The Taliban are a much larger organisation than they were a couple of years ago, and we've ruined our relationship with Pakistan," according to Hoh, who blames Petraeus' aggressive "surge" strategy for these setbacks.
"The policy has clearly failed, and now we're to put some kind of settlement together before we leave, and there's a real possibility that will fail."
*Jim Lobe's blog on U.S. foreign policy can be read at:
http://www.lobelog.com.
State of the war analysis; reaction to announcement of 2013 combat troop drawdown
Includes mention of leaked NATO report, "The State of the Taliban"
Early End to U.S. Combat Role in Afghanistan Draws Cheers, Jeers, Confusion
by Jim Lobe
February 2, 2012
IPS News
WASHINGTON, Feb 2, 2012 (IPS) - U.S. Defence Secretary Leon Panetta's surprise announcement Wednesday that U.S. troops will phase out their combat role in Afghanistan by mid-2013 is drawing mixed reactions, as well as a fair bit of confusion, from both critics and supporters of the 11-year-old war here.
The frontrunner for the Republican presidential nomination, Mitt Romney, called the decision "misguided" and "naïve". Neoconservatives and other hawks charged that it was politically motivated and would result in the return of the Taliban to Kabul little more than a decade after a U.S-coordinated military campaign chased their leadership into Pakistan.
"Only in some alternative universe is this a winning strategy," complained Max Boot, a neoconservative military analyst at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). "In the world we actually inhabit it is a recipe for a slow-motion –- or maybe not so slow –- catastrophe."
But the war's critics, many of whom were deeply disappointed by President Barack Obama's decision shortly after taking office in 2009 to send substantially more troops to Afghanistan, cheered Panetta's announcement.
"This is good news," said Matthew Hoh, a former Marine officer and State Department adviser in Afghanistan who until recently directed the Afghanistan Study Group here. "What we've needed to do for some time is to transition from a belligerent in the conflict to a mediator focused on facilitating an inclusive political settlement. This appears intended to do that."
Whether that was indeed the intention remained unclear Thursday, however, as the senior officials here insisted that Panetta's announcement did not signal a major shift in U.S. or NATO strategy which had set the deadline for all security tasks to be transferred to Afghan forces by the end of 2014.
"This was an assessment of what could happen within the context of the stated policy of NATO, which is to transfer the security lead to the Afghan security forces by 2014, and, within that …timeline, the transition will take place," White House spokesman Jay Carney told reporters.
Similarly, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) director, Gen. (ret.) David Petraeus, the architect of the U.S. counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan, insisted that Panetta's remarks were consistent with previous planning.
"This is exactly in line with the policy that we started back in the summer of 2011, transitioning leadership of combat operations from ISAF (the International Security Assistance Force) to Afghan forces and then progressively complete it by the end of 2014," he told congressmen on Capitol Hill.
Panetta's remarks, which clearly also took the government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai and U.S. allies by surprise, were made to reporters while he was en route to a NATO conference in Brussels.
Not only did he say that Washington hoped to end the U.S. combat role by mid-2013 – 18 months before the end-of-2014 deadline – but he also indicated that NATO will likely cancel plans to expand the size of Afghanistan's security forces from the current 310,000 to 350,000 soldiers and police.
His remarks came at a critical moment on a number of fronts.
With Washington's and Pakistan's apparent backing, the Taliban has established an office in Qatar where they have been engaged in talks with U.S. officials over confidence-building measures, such as the return of Taliban detainees imprisoned in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, that could lead to broader peace talks.
At the same time, Karzai, who only reluctantly endorsed the Doha talks, has reportedly been pushing to open a separate negotiating channel to begin negotiations under the auspices of Saudi Arabia.
While cooperating with U.S. efforts to engage the Taliban, Islamabad has continued to reject U.S. appeals to reopen NATO supply routes through Pakistani territory that were closed in late November to protest the accidental killing by U.S. warplanes of 24 Pakistani troops at a border post.
As a result, Washington has been made to rely almost exclusively on the Northern Supply Network through Central Asia, making logistical support for the troops far more expensive. The U.S. has already budgeted more than 90 billion dollars for the war this year.
In the wake of the killing of four French Legionnaires by an Afghan soldier - the latest in a lengthy series of such incidents against NATO troops - French President Nicolas Sarkozy last week announced that he will withdraw all 3,600 French combat troops by the end 2013, a year earlier than previously scheduled.
Amidst all these developments, the leak this week of a sensitive NATO report based on the interrogation of some 4,000 Taliban detainees in Afghanistan shed new and very discouraging light on both the degree to which Pakistan's military intelligence agency (ISI) has backed - even controlled - the Taliban and the confidence of Taliban militants themselves that they are winning the war.
The report also noted that the Taliban was receiving support from Afghan government officials, including Army units in areas from which NATO forces had withdrawn. The government "continues to declare its willingness to fight, yet many of its personnel have secretly reached out to insurgents, seeking long-term options in the event of a possible Taliban victory," according to the report.
The thrust of the report - that NATO forces have failed to stop, let alone reverse, the Taliban's momentum - strongly contradicted the more-optimistic assessments by U.S. and NATO field commanders and is certain to fuel growing public sentiment in the West, including the U.S., that the war has not been worth the expense in blood and treasure.
In the last major nationwide poll conducted on Afghanistan in mid- January, 56 percent of respondents said U.S. troops should be withdrawn "as soon as possible".
Washington currently has some 90,000 troops in Afghanistan, down from a high of just over 100,000 last summer. It plans to withdraw another 22,000 by the end of this summer. In his remarks Wednesday, Panetta stressed that no decision had been made regarding the pace of the withdrawal of the remaining 68,000 troops.
According to Leslie Gelb, president emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations, however, Panetta's remarks suggest that the administration has adopted a strategy to end "America's major military footprint in Afghanistan well before the previous December 2014 deadline," but that won't be clear until after the presidential elections here in November.
Writing for the Daily Beast website, Gelb claimed that Panetta, Vice President Joe Biden, and National Security Adviser Tom Donilon had become convinced late last year that, with the death last May of Osama bin Laden and the successful disruption of his Al-Qaeda, U.S. interests in Afghanistan "were no longer vital, and that more American deaths and billions (of dollars) in costs were no longer worthwhile."
As a result, even while continuing efforts to target senior and mid- ranking Taliban commanders, Washington is now focusing its efforts on a negotiated settlement.
But whether that will be possible, particularly given the apparent confidence of the Taliban, remains very much in doubt.
"The Taliban are a much larger organisation than they were a couple of years ago, and we've ruined our relationship with Pakistan," according to Hoh, who blames Petraeus' aggressive "surge" strategy for these setbacks.
"The policy has clearly failed, and now we're to put some kind of settlement together before we leave, and there's a real possibility that will fail."
*Jim Lobe's blog on U.S. foreign policy can be read at:
http://www.lobelog.com.
Early End to U.S. Combat Role in Afghanistan Draws Cheers, Jeers, Confusion
by Jim Lobe
February 2, 2012
IPS News
WASHINGTON, Feb 2, 2012 (IPS) - U.S. Defence Secretary Leon Panetta's surprise announcement Wednesday that U.S. troops will phase out their combat role in Afghanistan by mid-2013 is drawing mixed reactions, as well as a fair bit of confusion, from both critics and supporters of the 11-year-old war here.
The frontrunner for the Republican presidential nomination, Mitt Romney, called the decision "misguided" and "naïve". Neoconservatives and other hawks charged that it was politically motivated and would result in the return of the Taliban to Kabul little more than a decade after a U.S-coordinated military campaign chased their leadership into Pakistan.
"Only in some alternative universe is this a winning strategy," complained Max Boot, a neoconservative military analyst at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). "In the world we actually inhabit it is a recipe for a slow-motion –- or maybe not so slow –- catastrophe."
But the war's critics, many of whom were deeply disappointed by President Barack Obama's decision shortly after taking office in 2009 to send substantially more troops to Afghanistan, cheered Panetta's announcement.
"This is good news," said Matthew Hoh, a former Marine officer and State Department adviser in Afghanistan who until recently directed the Afghanistan Study Group here. "What we've needed to do for some time is to transition from a belligerent in the conflict to a mediator focused on facilitating an inclusive political settlement. This appears intended to do that."
Whether that was indeed the intention remained unclear Thursday, however, as the senior officials here insisted that Panetta's announcement did not signal a major shift in U.S. or NATO strategy which had set the deadline for all security tasks to be transferred to Afghan forces by the end of 2014.
"This was an assessment of what could happen within the context of the stated policy of NATO, which is to transfer the security lead to the Afghan security forces by 2014, and, within that …timeline, the transition will take place," White House spokesman Jay Carney told reporters.
Similarly, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) director, Gen. (ret.) David Petraeus, the architect of the U.S. counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan, insisted that Panetta's remarks were consistent with previous planning.
"This is exactly in line with the policy that we started back in the summer of 2011, transitioning leadership of combat operations from ISAF (the International Security Assistance Force) to Afghan forces and then progressively complete it by the end of 2014," he told congressmen on Capitol Hill.
Panetta's remarks, which clearly also took the government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai and U.S. allies by surprise, were made to reporters while he was en route to a NATO conference in Brussels.
Not only did he say that Washington hoped to end the U.S. combat role by mid-2013 – 18 months before the end-of-2014 deadline – but he also indicated that NATO will likely cancel plans to expand the size of Afghanistan's security forces from the current 310,000 to 350,000 soldiers and police.
His remarks came at a critical moment on a number of fronts.
With Washington's and Pakistan's apparent backing, the Taliban has established an office in Qatar where they have been engaged in talks with U.S. officials over confidence-building measures, such as the return of Taliban detainees imprisoned in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, that could lead to broader peace talks.
At the same time, Karzai, who only reluctantly endorsed the Doha talks, has reportedly been pushing to open a separate negotiating channel to begin negotiations under the auspices of Saudi Arabia.
While cooperating with U.S. efforts to engage the Taliban, Islamabad has continued to reject U.S. appeals to reopen NATO supply routes through Pakistani territory that were closed in late November to protest the accidental killing by U.S. warplanes of 24 Pakistani troops at a border post.
As a result, Washington has been made to rely almost exclusively on the Northern Supply Network through Central Asia, making logistical support for the troops far more expensive. The U.S. has already budgeted more than 90 billion dollars for the war this year.
In the wake of the killing of four French Legionnaires by an Afghan soldier - the latest in a lengthy series of such incidents against NATO troops - French President Nicolas Sarkozy last week announced that he will withdraw all 3,600 French combat troops by the end 2013, a year earlier than previously scheduled.
Amidst all these developments, the leak this week of a sensitive NATO report based on the interrogation of some 4,000 Taliban detainees in Afghanistan shed new and very discouraging light on both the degree to which Pakistan's military intelligence agency (ISI) has backed - even controlled - the Taliban and the confidence of Taliban militants themselves that they are winning the war.
The report also noted that the Taliban was receiving support from Afghan government officials, including Army units in areas from which NATO forces had withdrawn. The government "continues to declare its willingness to fight, yet many of its personnel have secretly reached out to insurgents, seeking long-term options in the event of a possible Taliban victory," according to the report.
The thrust of the report - that NATO forces have failed to stop, let alone reverse, the Taliban's momentum - strongly contradicted the more-optimistic assessments by U.S. and NATO field commanders and is certain to fuel growing public sentiment in the West, including the U.S., that the war has not been worth the expense in blood and treasure.
In the last major nationwide poll conducted on Afghanistan in mid- January, 56 percent of respondents said U.S. troops should be withdrawn "as soon as possible".
Washington currently has some 90,000 troops in Afghanistan, down from a high of just over 100,000 last summer. It plans to withdraw another 22,000 by the end of this summer. In his remarks Wednesday, Panetta stressed that no decision had been made regarding the pace of the withdrawal of the remaining 68,000 troops.
According to Leslie Gelb, president emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations, however, Panetta's remarks suggest that the administration has adopted a strategy to end "America's major military footprint in Afghanistan well before the previous December 2014 deadline," but that won't be clear until after the presidential elections here in November.
Writing for the Daily Beast website, Gelb claimed that Panetta, Vice President Joe Biden, and National Security Adviser Tom Donilon had become convinced late last year that, with the death last May of Osama bin Laden and the successful disruption of his Al-Qaeda, U.S. interests in Afghanistan "were no longer vital, and that more American deaths and billions (of dollars) in costs were no longer worthwhile."
As a result, even while continuing efforts to target senior and mid- ranking Taliban commanders, Washington is now focusing its efforts on a negotiated settlement.
But whether that will be possible, particularly given the apparent confidence of the Taliban, remains very much in doubt.
"The Taliban are a much larger organisation than they were a couple of years ago, and we've ruined our relationship with Pakistan," according to Hoh, who blames Petraeus' aggressive "surge" strategy for these setbacks.
"The policy has clearly failed, and now we're to put some kind of settlement together before we leave, and there's a real possibility that will fail."
*Jim Lobe's blog on U.S. foreign policy can be read at:
http://www.lobelog.com.
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