Monday, February 13, 2012

"How Afghan Peace Talks Are Splintering the Taliban"

Even if I didn't question the reporters' assertion that Taliban were a unified force before the groups operating under the umbrella name learned of the peace talks, even if "peace talks" with Taliban in no way address the most deadly groups operating in Pakistan (Haqqani Network, al Qaeda, LeT), there is another major issue the reporters don't address: word of the "secret" negotiations is splintering the Afghan Army and spreading renewed fear among Afghan civilians that NATO is selling out their country to Pakistan and a Taliban reign of terror. But for what it's worth, here is the report:

How Afghan Peace Talks Are Splintering the TalibanThe Daily Beast
By Sami Yousafzai and Ron Moreau [Newsweek]
February 13, 2012

Will the Taliban survive talking with the Americans? Many fighters say no.

Ever since he was 20, Ahmad Jamal has been a loyal follower of Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar. He became a supporter back in 1996, the year Omar’s mujahedin marched to power in Kabul, and until late last year he was an active combatant in the war against U.S. and Afghan National Army forces. Even so, something changed when he heard about the secret peace talks between the Americans and the Taliban in the Gulf state of Qatar. Although at first he dismissed the tales as enemy propaganda, the more he heard, the more his worries grew. “Those rumors raised questions in my mind for days and nights,” Jamal says. And eventually he had to admit to himself that the news was true. “When I realized the Taliban was really talking face to face with the Americans—the worst enemies of Islam!—my dream of the holy jihad was washed away,” he says.

That’s when he decided to do something he had never dreamed of: abandon the fight. You don’t tell the Taliban you’re quitting—not if you want to keep living. Still, he had to say goodbye to his 25-year-old kid brother, Ahmad Bilal; the two had been fighting side by side for four years. “I’m not going to risk making my four children orphans and my wife a widow so some Taliban leaders can share power with the American puppet [President Hamid] Karzai in the Presidential Palace,” Jamal says he told Bilal late one night. Then he got rid of his weapon and headed off to rejoin his family in Pakistan, their home since the days of the Soviet occupation. On the way, he passed through Kabul, where he spoke with a Newsweek reporter. “I fought to kick out the infidels from my country and to restore our Islamic regime, not to give up our ideals,” Jamal said as they sat together at a kebab shop. “I cannot trust my leaders anymore.”

Disclosure of the leadership’s secret talks in Qatar—confirmed and driven home by the group’s opening of a liaison office in the emirate’s capital, Doha—has devastated the insurgency’s ranks. The previously unified movement is splitting, if not shattering, as doubts grow among its members about the logic of their once-unshakable commitment to jihad. Many formerly loyal fighters like Jamal have become confused and demoralized. Although there have been no reports so far of any large-scale desertions, some ranking Taliban admit they’re worried about the possibility. “I fear there is a serious risk of defections,” says a Taliban logistics officer. Intentionally or not, Washington’s decision to put out serious peace feelers to the group has sowed dissension among the insurgents, even before the talks have made any real progress.

Veteran commanders are at a loss to explain to their troops exactly what’s happening in Qatar, let alone what the senior leadership is thinking. According to Taliban sources, at least one senior member of the group’s main military council could only throw up his hands in response to his subordinates’ questions, saying, “I don’t know more than I’ve heard on the radio.” That kind of talk is anything but reassuring to the group’s fighters and subcommanders. In the past two years the Taliban’s former strongholds have been hit hard by the Americans’ troop surge and by the Special Operations Forces’ night raids. Now many Taliban worry that after so much hardship and sacrifice, their leaders may be in the process of selling them out. “Mullah Omar has always said fight, fight, fight until the Americans withdraw their troops,” says Rahmatullah, a former insurgent (like many other Afghans he uses a single name). “Suddenly he’s talking to the Americans. How can Mullah Omar cross out 18 years of resistance? It’s impossible for Taliban to understand.”

In the frozen mountains of Maidan-Wardak province, just west of Kabul, Jamal’s younger brother is fighting on—and yet he too harbors doubts about the insurgency’s future. “We were shocked and stunned by the news,” says Bilal, referring to the secret discussions. “I’m afraid these peace talks are a conspiracy to destroy the Taliban, to silence the barrels of our guns,” he says. “Our guns are our beauty and strength,” he continues. “Without them we would be lost forever.” He believes there’s no choice but to keep fighting. “We have to restore our Islamic regime with our weapons, not talk about peace with the infidels,” he says. He keeps telling himself that Omar will never compromise the movement. “I can’t believe that Mullah Omar would sell the blood of our martyrs,” he says. “The Taliban will not stop the jihad until we get a clear message from him.”

Commanders and fighters alike are waiting for some word—any word—from Omar. The reclusive leader hasn’t issued a single verifiable audio or video statement since he was driven from power in late 2001. But considering the disarray in his ranks, he needs to. “Everyone is waiting for a statement from Mullah Omar,” says a Taliban intelligence officer. “They have to hear something from him. And soon.” In fact, there are unconfirmable reports that he did send word orally to several senior commanders via the grapevine late last month. “I will not betray you and compromise the sacrifice of your blood,” the somewhat ambiguous message said, according to one senior Taliban commander who requests anonymity. “My target is to achieve the goal of every Taliban, as we have fought so hard and suffered so much.”

Around the same time, the ruling Quetta Shura’s leadership council sent out a written dispatch—apparently an effort to calm the insurgents’ nerves. A subcommander in Laghman province tells of having attended a meeting where a letter from the council was read aloud. It acknowledged that the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (as the Taliban call their defunct national government) was in the process of opening an office in Qatar. “Apart from continuing the jihad, we want to have a process of negotiations to win the release of prisoners,” the letter said. “We assure you we will not compromise our jihad’s main goal of forcing the U.S. to leave Afghanistan.”

The idea of giving the peace talks a chance may not have much support in the field, but it has traction among rear-echelon Taliban officials and former fighters who continue to believe in the cause. Negotiating with the enemy is not contrary to Islamic teachings, they say. “The Prophet Muhammad talked with and traded with his enemies,” says Rahmatullah, who was arrested in a 2007 night raid and spent two years in U.S. and Afghan detention facilities. “We must talk and reason together.”

Many of these pragmatists want to regain power, but don’t believe it can be done by force of arms. “The talks can help us get politically what we have been trying to win militarily,” says a former senior Taliban minister. They welcome what they see as the American recognition of the insurgency as a viable political force. “It’s good that the U.S. seems ready to end this war and to give the Taliban a role in the future Afghan political system,” says Qazi Habibullah Fauzi, who was the regime’s chargĂ© d’affaires in Saudi Arabia when the Taliban held power. “The question is, after 10 years of fighting has the Taliban gained a political vision that will allow it to take advantage of this opportunity?” says a former senior Taliban diplomat who declined to be quoted by name. “As a former Taliban, my answer is, regrettably, no.”

Everyone, whether for or against negotiations, insists that the insurgents haven’t been brought to the peace table by force. “I’m leaving the jihad not because the Taliban are weak, but because they are dishonoring our ideology,” Jamal says. Rahmatullah agrees. “The Taliban are not weak,” he says. “They can create security problems anywhere, any time. They will slowly come back.” NATO analysts evidently share that view. “Though the Taliban suffered severely in 2011, its strength, motivation, funding, and tactical proficiency remains intact,” says a classified report issued early this year, based on the interrogations of 4,000 Taliban and al Qaeda prisoners. “Many Afghans are already bracing themselves for an eventual return of the Taliban.”

All the same, the insurgency has clearly lost the momentum it had two years ago, before the American surge. Battlefield setbacks in the south, east, and north are believed to be largely responsible for the Taliban’s agreeing to talk. “In the key provinces of Helmand and Kunduz, the Taliban doesn’t exercise one meter of control,” says the Taliban logistics officer, who supports the talks. “We can’t hold ground, and we can’t stop construction and progress, even with IEDs and suicide bombings. It’s time for someone to persuade Mullah Omar to show some flexibility, before we lose everything.”

Nevertheless, there’s no guarantee that even a direct order from Omar himself could get his commanders and fighters to honor a ceasefire. Never mind whether they would go along with the confidence-building measures that are believed to be under discussion. Some Taliban voice doubts that anyone can stop the fighting. “Mullah Omar may not be able to answer his fighters’ questions,” says the Taliban intelligence officer. “Many are addicted to the ideology and the war. It will be difficult, if not impossible, for them to change.”

On the other hand, some former Taliban think the men on the ground could be persuaded to hold their fire—for a while, anyway. When dealing with recalcitrant commanders and fighters, the group’s political operatives are taking the line that the Taliban’s popularity with Afghan villagers would actually be strengthened if the shooting stops and peace comes. “Let’s have and observe a ceasefire and see what happens,” says one Taliban liaison officer. “In the end the Afghan people will support us.” Fauzi agrees. “If the Taliban can show discipline and political maturity during a ceasefire, there’s a strong chance they would gain lots of support in the countryside,” he says.

To do that, the insurgents would have to accept that Afghanistan is not the same as it was 10 years ago. “The Taliban should change and compromise,” says Rahmatullah. “Because the people have changed. Afghans have seen development, technology, and the benefit of knowledge over these past 10 years.” He believes that most Afghans—in the villages, at least—are still undecided about which side to back, and that a cessation of hostilities would favor the insurgents. “The majority of people are not talking but are watching and waiting.”

Breakthroughs at the talks seem vanishingly unlikely in the near term. Any talk of prisoner releases and ceasefires is premature at best; even Taliban who support the negotiations understand that much. “It has taken us months to decide to open an office in Qatar,” says the former Taliban cabinet minister, who is still close to the insurgency. “It’s just the beginning, and we have a very long and difficult way ahead.” The important thing is that some Taliban are finally setting out on that journey.

Sami Yousafzai is Newsweek's correspondent in Pakistan and Afghanistan, where he has covered militancy, al Qaeda, and the Taliban for the magazine since 9/11. He was born in Afghanistan but moved to Pakistan with his family after the Russian invasion in 1979. He began his career as a sports journalist but switched to war reporting in 1997.
Ron Moreau is Newsweek’s Afghanistan and Pakistan correspondent and has been covering the region for the magazine the past 10 years. Since he first joined Newsweek during the Vietnam War, he has reported extensively from Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America.

"Killing is the art of the Taliban"

"Recently Afghan government expressed it's agreement to transfer of Taliban prisoners to Qatar to join their families. It came as Pakistani media reported that the talks between the US and the Taliban have ended without result."

Taliban are Terrorists and the Murderers of Afghan People: Spanta
Tolo TV
February 13, 2012

National Security Advisor to President Karzai, in an Exclusive Interview with TOLOnews, said that Taliban are the murderers of Afghan people and are servants of foreigners.

Mr Spanta said one should not expect humane behaviour from the Taliban.

He said if government tries to bring Taliban to power, he will feel ashamed to being part of it.

Killing is the art of the Taliban and if anyone calls Taliban leaders as "heroes", will be a traitor and enemy of Afghanistan, Mr Spanta continued.

Taliban's aim is to impose medieval culture on contemporary era.

"If government tries to bring Taliban into power and ignore our achievements, I want to say from now that I am feel ashamed before history," Mr Spanta said.

He emphasised that Afghan government should not lose the war it's winning, with Taliban's propaganda.

Mr Spanta believes that the Taliban can be considered the main problem for Afghanistan in the last 10 years.

He called Hezbe Islami an easy party to talk to, but said that government should talk with main players of the Afghan crisis.

He called Taliban's Qatar office only an address to the militant group, and not a political office.

"This office is only an address for talking to the Taliban, and it can in no way be seen as recognition of the Taliban," he added.

He called corruption a major challenge ahead of the Afghan government. Existence of corruption has paved the way for the enemies of Afghanistan to misuse it.

He once again emphasised on Afghan-owned Peace process and said Afghanistan will not sacrifice the past achievements.

The statements come as Afghan government recently agreed to establishment of Taliban's Qatar office.

The Taliban group has also shown its readiness for talks with the US government and it's Western allies.

Release of Taliban leaders from Guantanamo Bay prison has been Taliban main pre-condition for talks.

Recently Afghan government expressed it's agreement to transfer of Taliban prisoners to Qatar to join their families.

It came as Pakistani media reported that the talks between the US and the Taliban have ended without result.

Yet another Western development fad inflicted on Afghanistan

The NSP structure was intended to embody the notion of "participatory development," which has become something of a slogan within the development community.

Leaving Afghan Development in the Wrong Hands
By Matiullah Amin
February 13, 2012
Foreign Affairs

Why Relying on Locals Isn't the Answer

As the date for the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan approaches, neither Washington nor Kabul is paying enough attention to long-term development. The lack of a strategy for the day after troops depart will leave Afghanistan unable to sustain itself -- a scenario that is not good for the Afghan people or for the donor population.

The international community, to the extent that it has considered the development question, has hung virtually all its hopes on the Afghan government's National Solidarity Program, which relies on rural citizens to carry out development projects. According to many think tanks, the NSP offers the best way forward, because, in the words of the Center for a New American Security, it "generates institutions at the local level that are crucial to any vision of a self-sustaining Afghan state."

But some major and unavoidable contradictions are built into the NSP framework, keeping the program from realizing its potential. Namely, by relying on unskilled local populations, the program dooms itself to inefficiency. Meanwhile, the NSP's too-short project timelines mean that there is hardly time to transfer any skills to locals, so gains are fleeting, if ever achieved at all. Unless its weaknesses are addressed, the NSP will prove unsustainable and could end up further undermining the Afghan people's confidence in their government -- the exact opposite of what the program was once hoped to deliver.

The NSP was created in 2003 by the Afghan Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development after Ashraf Ghani, the country's finance minister at the time, advocated for a community-led development program. He had closely followed the work of Scott Guggenheim, his friend from graduate school, who had successfully used the community-driven approach in Indonesia in the late 1990s. The NSP today consists of 28,884 Community Development Councils, which are elected to consult with locals to establish a list of development priorities. The projects they select together are meant to benefit a broad public, not just specific groups. While executing projects, the NSP emphasizes partnership between the government and local populations by integrating local preferences and ideas.

The NSP structure was intended to embody the notion of "participatory development," which has become something of a slogan within the development community. Today, the program is almost a poster child for the concept. Senator Carl Levin (D-Mich.), for example, touts it as giving communities the opportunity to create a new civic infrastructure -- an essential component of any successful counterinsurgency campaign. Some also believe that it strengthens the sense of local ownership in projects and ensures that the gains are sustained over the long term. After a visit to an NSP-built primary school near Bagram, for example, Levin noted that villagers were "prepared to defend [the school] with their lives against the Taliban."

Despite its good intentions, the NSP has fallen well short of expectations. Put simply, it is not very efficient: its wholehearted focus on giving communities everything they want diminishes its ability to deliver what they need. The NSP glorifies the processes at the expense of providing substantive outcomes.

To begin with, rural Afghans have low tolerance for social risk. Local consensus generally favors non-controversial programs, which, in turn, leads to a complete denial of important projects. One striking example is girls' education: a mere 4.34 percent of the total budget disbursed through the NSP since 2003 was directed toward education, and those funds are usually spent on the construction and refurbishment of schools. Only 30 percent of the schools built by the NSP are for girls.

Meanwhile, the NSP is plagued by a lack of expertise among its local staff. The Afghan civil war of the 1990s, and the years of Taliban rule that followed, brought the level of infrastructure and human capital in the country to near zero. Afghan villagers simply lack the skills needed to efficiently implement projects. For example, in 2010, villagers in Tatar Khil spent approximately $55,000 on a school that the NSP later declared "failed" due to inadequate quality. Yet another example is a school that the NSP built in Kapisa province that did not meet the quality standards set by the provincial Department of Education. In Baghlan province, locals received funds from the NSP to build hydroelectric power plants, water supply and irrigation networks, and sanitation facilities. But the necessary skills and equipment to complete such ambitious projects were in short supply and many of them were halted before they were finished -- or didn't work once they were.

Beyond NSP's regular two- to three-year commitment, some communities become eligible for what is called the Cycle III phase, formerly known as Cycle II+, which provides an additional 12 months of need-based support. The extra funds are meant to help communities successfully finish projects that they have already started. But not every villiage and town is assured of this extra help. Without it, the NSP's projects are simply too quick and too short-lived. What Afghanistan needs most is a population with technical skills. Those take longer to develop than two or three years.

Finally, since participatory development projects are planned and carried out at the local level, they are vulnerable to local "elite capture," or embezzlement by program officials. That is especially true for the NSP, given Afghanistan's tribal dynamics and the prominence local commanders gained during the anti-Soviet jihad. In Parwan province, one NSP council member, who was not elected but imposed on the program because of his powerful father was accused of siphoning off program money. He was never held responsible because he claimed to be protected by the police and a member of parliament. Donor representatives believe that local council members regularly hire relatives or friends from other villages for infrastructure projects; this raises their suspicions that they are not reliable partners and hold programs back from being efficient (on the other hand, some members might just trust family members to be more reliable).

The NSP will not put Afghanistan on the path to prosperity. What the country needs is a new program -- one that would overcome the current one's problems. For starters, such a program should reduce the maximum allotment of aid from $60,000 per community in phase one to $30,000. This would minimize the incentive for elites to steal and would allow rural communities to test out specific projects with smaller sums. A new NSP would also arrange for councils to work with communities for five to ten years, in order to transfer professional skills and give social norms a chance to change. (The two modifications would offset each other: increased commitment time would be made possible by a fifty percent cut in the first round of funding. The NSP currently promises $60,000 over two to three years; the new program would total that over five to ten.) A new and improved NSP would also require more community financial contribution to each project. The program would start off asking for a 10 percent payment, as the NSP currently does, but it would increase that ask by 10 to 15 percent every year to reduce dependency. By the time a project was completed, ownership and management would have completely transferred to locals.

The executive director of NSP, Mohammad Ismati, has set the goal of the organization "attaining the landmark of full national coverage" in the next four years. Instead, Afghans must strive for substantive outcomes in each and every community. Quality matters. If designed and implemented correctly, a smarter development strategy could provide for a sustainable transition beyond 2014; otherwise, Afghanistan is doomed to depending on others. And that would lead to a vicious cycle of instability and reduced donor commitment; Afghans, and the rest of the world, would have to start again from scratch.

Sunday, February 12, 2012

Afghanistan labor, education stats

Afghanistan's Future Is Freezing, Tired and in Need of Help
By Katherine Brown
February 12, 2012
Bloomberg

Afghans under the age of five are literally freezing to death from an especially harsh winter, the coldest in two decades. In camps set up in Kabul for Afghans fleeing the volatile south, at least 22 children have died. The families would rather stay in the camps with no heat or electricity than return to the warmer yet dangerous territory they left behind.

Then there is the harsh economy. On Tuesday, the International Labor Organization reported that children as young as 5 years old contribute to an enormous underage labor market in eastern Afghanistan. They are essentially doing the dirty work of brick-making to pay off their families' debts. It may be better than being an "opium bride," described by journalist Fariba Nawa in her new book, "Opium Nation." Farmers wanting a cut of Afghanistan's $1.4 billion opium business borrow money for supplies from drug traffickers, and some end up paying back the traffickers with their daughters instead of cash.

It's not all bad news. There are 8 million children enrolled in school, 2.4 million of whom are girls -- a stark improvement since 2001. Ninety percent of children have been inoculated against polio and child mortality rates have dropped. Western non-governmental organizations and groups like the U.S. Agency for International Development have scores of programs to provide training, health care and other services to young Afghans.

The coming troop withdrawal in 2014 has attracted most of the headlines. But even after the troops leave, bilateral aid programs and a network of NGOs will remain in Afghanistan to try to build on this progress.

The West has invested a decade into the country -- and during that time, millions of Afghans have been born and come of age: More than two-thirds of Afghanistan's population of 34 million is under the age of 30. As the U.S. prepares to leave Afghanistan, we should also remember those who will lead Afghanistan next.

(Katherine Brown is a member of the Bloomberg View editorial staff.)

Friday, February 10, 2012

USAID Afghanistan road construction boondoggle: "No clear strategic thinking on development assistance."

"You can find programs and projects that have been successful, but for me it is quite obvious that huge amounts of money have been misspent," says Kai Eide, the Norwegian diplomat who headed United Nations operations in Afghanistan in 2008-2010. "There has been no clear strategic thinking on development assistance."

I would like to see a list of the USAID projects that have been successful in Afghanistan. Dion Nissenbaum's well-written and researched report is unfortunately one in a long line of reports over the years about poorly conceived aid/development projects for Afghans.

Roads to Nowhere: Program to Win Over Afghans Fail
By Dion Nissenbaum
February 10, 2012
The Wall Street Journal

KABUL - U.S. taxpayers paid Afghan entrepreneur Ajmal Hasas millions of dollars as part of a plan to win over villages in the country's insurgent heartlands.

Instead, Mr. Hasas' seven-mile road construction project went so awry that his security guards opened fire on some of the very villagers he was trying to woo on behalf of his American funders.

Mr. Hasas was a point man in a $400 million U.S. Agency for International Development campaign to build as much as 1,200 miles of roads in some of the Afghanistan's most remote and turbulent places.

Three years and nearly $270 million later, less than 100 miles of gravel road have been completed, according to American officials. More than 125 people were killed and 250 others were wounded in insurgent attacks aimed at derailing the project, USAID said. The agency shut down the road-building effort in December.

As the American involvement in Afghanistan is winding down ahead of the pullout of most forces in 2014, the USAID roads saga stands as a reminder of the limited progress the U.S. and its allies have achieved here over the past decade—and at how high a cost.

"You can find programs and projects that have been successful, but for me it is quite obvious that huge amounts of money have been misspent," says Kai Eide, the Norwegian diplomat who headed United Nations operations in Afghanistan in 2008-2010. "There has been no clear strategic thinking on development assistance."

With USAID's road project cut short, special internal auditors from the agency have been trying to figure out what went wrong. Afghan construction companies are still seeking millions of dollars for unpaid bills from the American nonprofit, International Relief and Development, or IRD, that ran the program. And remote Afghan villages that were supposed to benefit from the U.S. initiative have been left with unfinished roads and unfulfilled promises. USAID officials say the program fell short of its goals, which is why they canceled it.

The road-building efforts began a decade ago, as Washington began transforming USAID into a tool in its military counterinsurgency campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, shifting the agency's focus from promoting long-term development to shorter-term initiatives meant to attract community support in insurgent-saturated areas.

"I call it hijacking," said one USAID official formerly stationed in Afghanistan. "Aid as a weapons system has never been tested—and they are putting it into the field with no evidence that it works."

J. Alex Thier, Washington-based director of USAID's Afghanistan and Pakistan program, disagrees. He said the strategy can help stabilize regions of the country—if used when security is improving and local leaders are cooperating.

"What USAID does in these districts can at best have an impact if the other things are also pulling in the right direction," he said.

USAID was established 50 years ago by President John F. Kennedy. It became America's key economic tool to help developing nations.

The Bush administration overhauled the agency's mission after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, aligning USAID more closely with military objectives as America invaded Afghanistan and Iraq.

In Iraq, U.S. officials embarked on the largest rebuilding project since the Marshall Plan that helped rebuild Europe after World War II. But the $53 billion initiative was hobbled by the spreading insurgency, massive security costs that sometimes ate up more than half of contract costs, uncooperative government leaders and constantly shifting priorities, according to Stuart Bowen, America's special inspector general for reconstruction in Iraq.

After concluding that at least $4 billion in U.S. aid had been squandered in Iraq, Mr. Bowen warned American officials in 2009 that they were making the same mistakes in Afghanistan. State Department officials said at the time that they had learned lessons from Iraq and were working to better coordinate military and civilian efforts in Afghanistan.

As part of America's $85 billion reconstruction program in Afghanistan, USAID has spent more than $15 billion since 2002, more than in any other country. As in Iraq, the program in Afghanistan has been repeatedly disrupted by the spread of the insurgency across the country, poor oversight, an overreliance on outside contractors, cost overruns and corruption, according to U.S. officials and government investigative reports.

A $260 million effort to upgrade southern Afghanistan's Kajaki hydroelectric dam has repeatedly faltered and remains incomplete. Meanwhile, a $300 million contract to build a major power plant outside Kabul cost more than twice the original estimate and remains largely idle as Afghanistan relies on cheaper power from its neighbors.

But road projects have received the single largest slice of USAID money—more than $2 billion. One of the biggest beneficiaries has been IRD, founded in 1998 by Arthur Keys.

From the start, President Barack Obama's administration saw road construction as key for winning support from Afghans by making it easier to travel, by opening up new trade routes—and by connecting remote villages to Afghan government institutions and services.

Officials at USAID and IRD say that the Afghanistan Strategic Roads Project wasn't a roads program in the usual sense. They said building roads was, in many ways, a secondary goal; the main objective was spreading jobs and money to win over rural communities that harbor insurgents.

"As a grant, this was never intended to be a major road construction project," says Jeff Grieco, a former USAID official who now serves as communications director at IRD. "It was intended to be a capacity building program. We have dramatically improved Afghan capacity to build roads and to do community development work."

It certainly wasn't the cheapest way to get roads built. A typical gravel road in Afghanistan is supposed to cost about $290,000 per mile, according to USAID. It cost American taxpayers about $2.8 million for each mile of gravel road completed by IRD, making them the most expensive miles of road ever built by the U.S. government in Afghanistan.

Less than half the $269 million spent on the project went to actual road construction, IRD officials say. A quarter of the funds were paid to IRD administration and staff. About 15% was spent on security, and 8% was allocated to the community-development projects IRD said were central to the success of the project.

As part of the Strategic Roads Project, USAID set aside millions of dollars in the contract to set up small soap factories, run reading programs for illiterate villagers, dig wells and teach sewing to Afghan women—all with the expectation that it would win American troops good will.

But the community program was hobbled when IRD put a halt to awarding grants in southeastern Afghanistan for eight months after discovering that IRD staff were falsifying reports and exaggerating the impact of the development projects, according to former IRD workers. After revamping the staff and project, IRD resumed handing out grants for things like "flower literacy" programs that taught Afghan women how to make flower arrangements.

Then, after conferring with USAID, IRD tried to press ahead with construction without setting up new community projects, said U.S. officials.

"You had these villages with no community ownership or buy in and they just made the situation worse," said one USAID official. "That's when things really started going sour."

In Khost, the volatile eastern province along the Pakistani border where Mr. Hasas was paid $3 million to build seven miles of gravel road, tensions flared soon after he began work in 2008.

Ajab Noor Mangal, a local construction-company owner hired to work on the project, said Mr. Hasas alienated the community by only hiring workers from two of the five local clans.

Afghans excluded from the project looted Mr. Hasas's construction sites and stripped them bare. At one point, Mr. Hasas said, four men affiliated with the project were kidnapped, killed and dumped in public with a warning note signed by insurgents. The deaths brought construction to a halt.

"We couldn't find a single person to work on the road," Mr. Hasas recalls.

Under the IRD contract, Mr. Hasas and the other Afghan firms working on their roads were responsible for providing their own security. So Mr. Hasas said he cobbled together nearly 100 gunmen and armed them with rented rocket-propelled grenades and heavy machine guns.

Things reached a nadir in the fall of 2010, when around 100 angry Afghans, including a small number of suspected insurgents, tried to storm the construction site, according to Messrs. Hasas and Mangal.

Mr. Mangal, who was in Kabul at the time, says he ordered the contractor's gunmen to open fire on the demonstrators, including some armed protesters who he said shot at the security team. Mr. Mangal says he is still paying for the wounded villagers' medical treatment.

Villagers who took part in the demonstration told a different story. Two men involved in the protest said IRD security sparked a larger confrontation after opening fire on a dozen unarmed men protesting IRD's refusal to move staff from an office overlooking homes where outsiders could see into private family compounds—a major slight in the conservative culture.

"All the villagers criticize the construction company because they were just here to earn money and they did not care about the quality of the road," said Najib, a local resident who worked on the road project and had two relatives injured during the protest.

IRD officials say they never heard about the conflict between the contractor and the villagers.

The project was part of the ongoing "Afghan First" initiative meant to support Afghan companies instead of the international firms that have received the lion's share of the billions in aid that have flooded Afghanistan.

But IRD is still embroiled in payment disputes with Afghan subcontractors who say that the company has failed to pay its bills. Now that the project is shut down, IRD said it has told contractors final payment decisions rest with USAID. USAID said it couldn't comment on the question of payments.

The animosity escalated in 2010 when embittered Afghan subcontractors secured arrest warrants for two IRD officials. Afghan police briefly detained one of the Westerners in Kabul who oversaw the project, according to officials familiar with the incident.

Faced with more arrest threats during the spring, IRD hid another top manager in the back of an SUV, flew her to Kandahar and quietly spirited her out of the country before she, too, could be detained, according to former IRD employees familiar with the controversy. IRD declined to comment on the incident.

USAID officials say the agency moved swiftly to scale back and shut down the IRD roads project as it became clear in 2010 that it was foundering. "How quickly can you stop a dump truck?" said one USAID official. "You get the momentum going and one thing we committed to doing isn't stopping it and creating a wreck."

Mr. Thier said his agency has learned important lessons from the problems in the IRD project and has changed the way it operates. USAID tripled its Afghanistan-based staff, beefed up its screening of Afghan partners, established new independent monitoring procedures and added more people to directly oversee such programs, he said.

The steep drop-off in U.S. reconstruction funds for Afghanistan has also prompted USAID to shift its focus from big ticket stabilization projects to more modest proposals, including agricultural development programs, that can be successfully taken over by Afghan officials.

In November, as part of a wider shift at the State Department, USAID established a new Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations that is meant to address some of the long-standing coordination and strategic problems with America's reconstruction missions abroad.

Still, the project's failures appeared to have no impact on USAID's confidence in IRD. Last year, as construction delays mounted and American officials moved to shut the program down, USAID awarded IRD nearly $140 million to launch three new projects in Afghanistan, though none involved roads. USAID officials said they still had confidence in IRD's ability to carry out big projects in Afghanistan.

Afghan entrepreneur Delawar Faizan, meanwhile, says that IRD still owes him nearly $4 million for his work in constructing roads in eastern Afghanistan's Nangarhar Province. He said that IRD gave him a check last fall to settle some of his claims, but it bounced because the company's bank account was frozen. Now, he said, IRD has told him he has to wait for approval from USAID to get paid.

"Where has the money gone?" he asked.

Ziaulhaq Sultani, Habib Khan Totakhil and Mali Khan Yaqubi contributed to this article.

Thursday, February 9, 2012

"Almost all rogue [ANA] soldiers and Taliban infiltrators who carried attacks against Nato forces had fake files"

Afghanistan's army recruitment messBBC
February 9, 2012

When Afghan soldier Abdul Saboor killed four French colleagues last month, he ended up hastening -- by a year -- France's exit from the war-torn nation. The BBC's Bilal Sarwary went to Saboor's village and uncovered a tale of deceit, raising questions about how Afghan soldiers are recruited.

When Abdul Saboor picked up his gun on 20 January, it was not to defend his country, family or honour.

He opened fire on French forces while on a joint operation hunting down a top Taliban commander in a remote part of Kapisa province last month.

"The mood was upbeat. We were just a whiff away from a big catch," one intelligence agent said.

"Suddenly, someone opened fire. I thought that the action had begun. But there was Saboor standing with smoke billowing from machine gun surrounded by bodies of French soldiers." He had fired 120 bullets and was overpowered before he could flee.

Attacks where Afghan soldiers turn their weapons on their colleagues or coalition troops are becoming more common. In most cases, the attacker is driven by anger or hatred.

One officer said that Saboor had been upset when he was told of pictures circulating on the internet, which showed American soldiers urinating on the bodies of Taliban fighters.

But should Saboor have been in the army in the first place? Hospital to army

His mother died when he was 10 years old and and Saboor ran away from home after his father remarried. His father became concerned about his son's mental health.

"He didn't spend even five days with me in the past 10 years," Saboor's father said. "He would roam aimlessly through the day, eat and sleep on the streets."

Saboor became very sick and his father said doctors recommended he be hospitalised for months. So he was admitted to a psychiatric hospital in Kabul. When his father returned for him, doctors said he had run away. As it turned out, he had joined the army.

It is unclear how he managed to fool the army health commission, a panel of senior doctors and psychiatrists, whose task is to assess the physical fitness and mental balance of a prospective recruit.

And his suspected mental illness was apparently not noticed by fellow trainees and instructors at Kabul's Military Training Centre in the eight weeks he spent there, investigators say. He was deployed to Kapisa shortly afterwards.

But Saboor had joined and deserted the army once before too. Nine months into service the first time round, Saboor deserted the army and ran away to Peshawar in Pakistan.

People in his village told me that Saboor turned up one day after deserting. "He looked tired and sick," one villager said. "One of his uncles then took him away to Peshawar for treatment."

So how did he end up in the army again? Faked files

The BBC has seen documents that shows Saboor's recruitment file for the ANA when he joined the second time round was faked. The BBC has also seen hundreds of fake documents belonging to other recruits. This is clearly a broader problem.

The defence ministry in Afghanistan has been preparing a biometric database of all its soldiers for the last 10 months.

Since the arrival of biometrics 10 months ago at Kabul's Military Training Centre, investigators have identified more than 2,300 recruits who either deserted the army previously, were in the police force or had criminal problems.

In the last few months, more than 500 recruits have been turned down because they are considered untrustworthy or suspected of being Taliban infiltrators.

Recruitment officials say they are asked to provide 8,000 soldiers a month. So far they have given the ANA 300,000 from across the country.

"Almost all rogue soldiers and Taliban infiltrators who carried attacks against Nato forces had fake files," defence officials said.

Officials say they cannot go into every district and village to check background and gather intelligence.

According to Saboor's file, he approached an army recruiter and offered to pay for fake enlistment documents. The recruiter arranged a national ID, a sworn statement from two people vouching for Saboor's integrity and other papers. These paved the way for Saboor's second stint with the ANA.

There is no mention of Saboor's mental illness or his previous record in the army - an important requirement in the recruitment process.

"It is possible that Saboor slipped through the cracks in the system," a defence ministry official said adding that all those who arranged his fake papers have been arrested.

Another defence official, who also wished to remain unnamed, said that the army has 185,000 soldiers but spoke of the constant pressure to meet the target of 195,000. He says that time constraints means that they haven't had time to perform biometrics or background checks." Denial

Most Afghan and Nato officials the BBC spoke to about the Kapisa incident refused to comment. But the spokesman for the armed forces in Paris, Col Thierry Burkhard, was more forthcoming.

The colonel said the preliminary report received by the French government from Kabul makes no mention of Saboor's psychological problems. He said that during interrogation in the presence of French investigators, Saboor appeared calm and answered questions in a determined fashion.

"Apart from the fact that Saboor's behaviour in itself could raise questions about his sanity, any allegations that he is insane are not necessarily true," Col Burkhard said.

The colonel said the French authorities are aware that Saboor was recruited twice, at least once on a forged set of documents, but he said it is something the Afghan authorities have to deal with.

The consequences of Saboor's attack have been dramatic. French troops will now withdraw a year early and France's President Nicolas Sarkozy said France cannot accept that a single soldier dies at the hands of an ally.

But it has laid bare the vulnerability at the heart of the Afghan army, in its very recruitment process.

Wednesday, February 8, 2012

Newest improved US aid strategy in Pakistan: Same as the old bad strategyo

This September 19, 2011 gem from the Washington Post, US wants more of its aid to help civilians rather than the military, ambassador says is one those reports that drives me to the sherry bottle. All foreign aid has to go through Pakistan's government, and that's another way saying it helps fund Pakistan's military. State knows this. Congress knows this. The White House knows this. Everyone in Washington knows. So why even bother with a fancier fig leaf?